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When the national economy performs poorly but recovery is a challenging task 
due to monetary austerity in an integrated Europe, there is an emerging pressure for tight 
cost control. This economic pressure has led to diverse outcomes in the industrial 
relations of developed European countries. In some countries the wage-setting process 
has been more coordinated, whereas it has not changed much in others. Among those 
countries with increasing coordination, there also have been various paths to the change, 
which have ranged from government unilateralism to voluntary pact building. In this 
study I explain these diverse dynamics of the European industrial relations by focusing on 
the interactions between the economic pressure and other non-economic causes, which 
are drawn from the national political party system and the social organizations of unions 
and employers. I test my claims mainly in a comparative historical analysis of eleven 
developed European countries, covering the period from the 1970s to the 2000s. Overall, 
my study suggests that both economic and non-economic causes are important in the 
adjustment processes of economic institutions, thus complementing an influential 
approach to the study of European political economy, which emphasizes the economic 
side of the causal mechanism. 
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The wage-setting systems in developed European countries, which were mostly 
characterized by a relatively high level of coordination among unions, employers, or the 
government, have been under challenge in recent decades. European financial integration 
has been among the widely-cited causes for this challenge. Influential studies (Kurzer 
1993; Scharpf 1991) argued that the integration process provides employers with greater 
mobility by allowing them to (re)locate their assets across the national borders. This 
freedom gives employers strong power resources vis-à-vis unions. If the employers have 
suffered from a poorly performing economy due to the failure of wage cost control, they 
would use this power to change the current wage-setting system to produce better control 
of wage costs. 
The employers’ choice, according to the previous studies, will be to de-coordinate 
the wage-setting process. In other words, they will weaken (or close) the bargaining units 
at more aggregate levels in order to give more freedom to the units at more individual 
level. For instance, if wages have been set under the guideline of nation-wide wage 
settlements, now wages are set only for certain specific industries or companies without 
any implications beyond their specific domains. The rationale behind is that employers 
make the wage-setting process more fragmented and then increase the market discipline 
against their unions to save more of wage costs (Crouch 1995; Soskice 1990). 
A series of dramatic events in the European industrial relations, which were 
concentrated on the early 1980s, seemed to confirm the validity of this argument. In the 
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UK, the government-backed experiments with tripartite wage coordination, which had 
started in the second half of the 1960s, collapsed in 1980 and was replaced by a system of 
pure company-level wage negotiations. Similar changes took place in other countries. In 
1981, the Irish wage-setting system, which had been centralized nationwide throughout 
the 1970s, collapsed to another system of company-level bargaining. In the same year the 
centralized government arbitration in Denmark also gave into the pressure for industry-
level bargaining. Finally in 1984, the Italian wage-setting system --- which had been 
characterized by a company-level bargaining system coupled with tight 
legal/administrative regulations --- changed to a new system in which the company-level 
tier assumed a more prominent role in the wage-setting process. In all of these events, 
employers played a crucial role by taking a direct initiative to the change or by providing 
strong support for the government’s attempt at the change (Due et al. 1995; Ferrera and 
Gualmini 2000; Hall 1986, pp.100-36; Hardiman 1988, pp. 80-120, 217-39). 
Initially, these experiences seemed to have a European-wide implication. Leading 
scholars began expressing their concern that the coordinated wage-setting system in 
Europe would not survive the challenge of European economic integration (Streeck 1998). 
However, this prediction was contradicted by the empirical developments in many of 
European countries in recent decades. While the search for the flexibility became a 
universal phenomenon, permitting substantial wage differentials within and across 
companies and industries, there were no more cases of de-coordination, in which 
employers aimed at weakening or closing the bargaining units at more aggregate levels on 
behalf of those at lower levels. This was true even for the countries in which employers 
suffered seriously from the same poor economic conditions as those in the previous cases 
of breakdown. Belgium (since the 1980s), Finland (the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s), 
France (the mid-1980s to the 1990s), Ireland (the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s), Italy (the 
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1990s), and the Netherlands (the 1970s to the early 1980s) are among the best examples 
of this. Unlike the previous breakdown cases, the wage-setting systems in these countries 
either stayed with the status quo or became more coordinated. 
Researchers in the European political economy have tried to explain how this 
unexpected development could happen. Some of them took a functionalist approach, 
emphasizing the economic necessity arising from monetary integration, the final stage of 
European financial integration. They noted that monetary integration puts macroeconomic 
policies of the member countries in tight constraints, which effectively exclude the option 
of flexible accommodation and stimulation. These constraints then facilitate unions and 
employers to build a consensus that wage costs must be tightly controlled to keep the 
national economy in good shape (Huber and Stephens 2005; Crouch 2000). This pressure 
will grow even greater if wage costs have been already out of control and thus the 
national economy has been under stress for a substantial period of time. In this situation, 
there will emerge a broad feeling of system crisis and vulnerability among all unions and 
employers. It will then dictate the industrial actors to search for an immediate solution for 
the wage problem (Pochet and Fajertag 2000; Visser and Hemerijck 1997). 
The solution, according to the studies, will be to make the wage-setting process 
more coordinated. By letting the bargaining units at more aggregate levels --- in which 
wage negotiators may have a better idea on the macroeconomic consequence of the 
failure of tight wage moderation --- play a more prominent role in the wage-setting 
process, unions and employers will be better able to produce peaceful cost control in a 
more predictable way. Of course, this argument is counter-intuitive if seen from the 
viewpoint of the previous studies, which would predict that powerful employers will 
choose de-coordination to address the wage problem. But the rationale here is that the 
preference of employers change as the economic integration deepens. With a new stage of 
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integration, characterized by the Europe-wide fixed exchange rate regime, employers find 
that their government can no longer provide macroeconomic accommodation and 
stimulation for them. This means that they are put in a very vulnerable economic situation. 
Now even a short-term failure of wage cost control is likely to result in instantaneous 
profit squeezes. Thus, employers become more cooperative with unions to seek a more 
stable and predictable solution to their wage problems (Visser and Hemerijck 1997; 
Rhodes 2001). 
While partly building on these recent studies, another group of researchers 
criticized the studies as being too much functionalistic. To be sure, the structural pressure 
--- created by the combination of monetary integration and poor economic performance --
- would promote a certain direction of adjustment in the wage-setting process. However, 
this pressure alone may not be enough to determine the final outcome of the adjustment 
process. Instead, we should also look at other mediating factors, mainly non-economic, 
which will come into play between the economic pressure and the final institutional 
outcome. 
For instance, unions and employers will need to have certain organizational 
capability of collective action to make the project of increasing coordination a real 
possibility (Baccaro 2003; Baccaro and Lim 2007; Hassel 2003; Regini and Regalia 
1997). This is because such a change depends on how successfully the participating actors 
will be able to overcome their temptation for myopic self-interests on behalf of their long-
term shared interests. Unless they are at least moderately organized, there will be no 
effective means which they can use to self-enforce the cooperative strategy. 
My study builds on these recent innovations in the study of European industrial 
relations. More specifically, I join in the efforts to explore how non-economic domestic 
variables mediate the effect of the economic pressure on the wage-setting process. I focus 
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on the experiences of several European countries in which economic actors have suffered 
from the double constraints of monetary integration and poorly-performing economy. I 
then raise the following three questions to which existing studies have not paid close 
attention. In answering these questions, I will highlight how various non-economic 
variables, which are drawn from the national political party system and the social 
organizations of unions and employers, have played important roles in the adjustment 
process of industrial relations. 
First, I ask why employers in this urgent economic situation have not chosen de-
coordination as a means to take a tight control of their wage costs. Although the previous 
prediction for de-coordination has been contradicted by the experiences of many 
European countries, recent studies have not yet provided a clear answer for exactly why 
employers decided not to exercise their power to strengthen the market discipline. I 
provide an answer by focusing on the short-term costs of the institutional change. While 
the market discipline is likely to curb wage costs in the long run, its short-term effect is 
far from being satisfactory. This is because, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2, 
unions become increasingly militant during the period of the institutional transition. 
Furthermore, given that the process of monetary integration eliminates a possibility for 
the government to implement flexible macroeconomic policies to compensate for the 
rising wage militancy, employers find the strategy of de-coordination is too much costly 
for them. They thus decide to abandon this strategy, regardless of its potential long-term 
benefits. I test this hypothesis with a Boolean comparative analysis of eleven developed 
European countries, which covers mainly the period from the 1970s to the 1990s, along 
with some brief historical comparative accounts of the countries. 
Once the path to de-coordination is made difficult to pursue, recent studies 
suggested that both employers and unions are likely to be interested in the option of 
 6 
increasing coordination. By making the wage-setting process more coordinated, the 
economic actors expect that they will be able to produce peaceful cost control in a more 
predictable way. If provided with a proven or potential capability for collective action, the 
actors will find the cooperative project to be a real plausible solution for the national 
economic problems. My study does not deny the relevance of this explanation, but still 
argues that the organizational capability is not yet sufficient to produce the expected 
outcome in the wage-setting process. Rather, I introduce another mediating condition, 
which is the government’s commitment to the cooperative solution, and emphasize that 
the organized industrial actors will be seriously interested in the solution only if their 
government also feels in the same way. 
I argue that this government commitment is strongly influenced by certain 
characteristics of the national political party system. If political parties compete by 
making general programmatic appeals to voters, the government will be seriously 
committed to the coordinative solution. But if the parties compete via non-programmatic 
appeals such as clientelistic votes-buying or charismatic mobilization, the government 
will not be so much interested in the solution. These different preferences are because of 
different electoral concerns by the governing parties. If parties enjoy substantial mass 
supports from clientelistic or charisma-influenced followers, they may consider that the 
prospect of their reelection is not bad at least in the short run. They thus will not be 
seriously committed to dealing with the national economic problem, which is not only a 
demanding task but also will likely alienate their core voters for various reasons. If the 
parties rely on general programmatic appeals, however, the situation changes. Now they 
must tackle the problem because reelection will be very difficult without a successful 
performance in macroeconomic management. In Chapter 3, I provide more detailed 
arguments and empirical support for this hypothesis by looking at the Italian experience 
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in the 1990s. I also take a comparative look at the South Korean case in the late 1990s, in 
which a similar tripartite cooperation was experimented with under a similar economic 
difficulty. 
In Chapter 4, I narrow my focus down to the countries in which the wage-setting 
process has been more coordinated. Here I am interested in the diversity in the paths to 
increasing coordination. In some countries the change took place via social pacts, 
voluntary or government-pushed, in which the government, unions, and employers 
reached tripartite agreements regarding wage moderation, job creation, and moderate 
reforms of welfare and the labor market. In other countries, the government imposed 
obligatory wage guidelines in a unilateral way, although the government still was careful 
to incorporate the unions’ concerns for jobs and social protection in its final plan. Existing 
studies have been mostly silent on this issue, although some studies have begun to 
provide an explanation by looking at electoral politics. I provide an alternative 
explanation by focusing on the rivalry within the labor movement. I argue that the 
government chooses a negotiated solution only if the labor movement is relatively free of 
internal division and rivalry and, thus, is capable of producing a broad inter-union 
consensus for wage moderation. If this is not the case, however, the government has no 
other choice but to take a unilateral initiative to impose tight control of wage costs. 
My dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapters 2 to 4, I provide and test my 
answers for those three questions in separate article formats. In Chapter 5, I summarize 
the findings of my study and discuss their broad implications for the literature of 
European political economy, especially in the context of the recent theoretical 
controversies regarding the so-called “varieties of capitalism” approach. 
  
CHAPTER 2 
CAPITAL OPENNESS, MONETARY INTEGRATION, AND WAGE-SETTING 
COORDINATION IN DEVELOPED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
How capital openness influences the wage-setting process is a topic that has been 
dealt with extensively in the political economy literature of developed Europe. One well-
known hypothesis suggests that high capital openness induces employers to de-coordinate 
the wage-setting process, if wage costs have been under poor control. Good examples 
include Denmark, Ireland, Italy, and the UK in the early 1980s, in which wage bargaining 
became more fragmented and individualized after a period of unsuccessful wage 
coordination (Due et al. 1995; Ferrera and Gualmini 2000; Hall 1986, pp.100-36; 
Hardiman 1988, pp. 80-120, 217-39). However, this hypothesis has been challenged by 
another development in the region. Poor performance in no other countries in Europe led 
to de-coordination in the wage-setting process. Even the countries with a previous 
experience with de-coordination did not repeat the same choice when they encountered 
the same economic problem in more recent years. 
How could we reconcile these opposing experiences? First, we could abandon the 
hypothesis of capital openness, and ask what other causes could have led to the events of 
breakdown in the early 1980s. Alternatively, we could contextualize the hypothesis, and 
explore under what circumstance the effect of capital openness holds and under what 
circumstance it does not. This study takes the second approach. Focusing on the 
mediating role of European monetary integration, I argue that the hypothesis holds only if 
a country is not committed to the integration process. 
The rationale for this argument is as follows. Employers adopt the strategy of de-
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coordination to address a problem of excessive wage costs. By making wage bargaining 
more fragmented and individualized, employers expect that they will be better able to 
increase the market discipline in the wage-setting process and then save more of their 
wage costs (Crouch 1995; Soskice 1990). One problem, however, is that this disciplinary 
effect is realized only in the long run, while wage costs may even increase during the 
transition period. This is because de-coordination initially invites myopic militant 
responses from the major union actors. For instance, high-level union organizations, who 
have engaged in wage negotiations with broad coverage, may find that they are losing 
power in the wake of de-coordination. They thus may adopt a strategy of wage militancy 
as a quick recipe to prolong their influence on the national wage-setting process. Lower-
level unions also become freer of the guidance of the upper-level negotiations. Especially 
for those with strong organizational power, this provides a golden opportunity for 
maximizing their short-term wage gains, without being constrained by the concern about 
the macroeconomic consequence of their wage-push. 
Given this unsatisfactory performance along the path to de-coordination, I argue, 
employers' preference for the institutional change is strongly affected by the feasibility of 
government macroeconomic accommodation. When such an option is available, 
employers can adhere to their initial plan without encountering serious financial 
difficulties. This is because their government can provide flexible policy benefits, 
whenever necessary, to compensate for the rising wage costs during the transition period. 
The situation changes, however, when this option is not available due to the government's 
commitment to European monetary integration. Employers then become more sensitive to 
the short-term performance following the change, and ultimately abandon their attempt 
regardless of their expectation of the potential disciplinary benefits of the change. 
Once the path to de-coordination is made difficult, employers will then have to 
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make a choice between the following two options: returning to the status quo ante or 
further increasing the level of coordination. Here, the natural questions to be asked 
include: which of the two options would they like and, if they choose to increase 
coordination, how would they make the change happen? While all certainly interesting 
questions, it is beyond the scope of this study to deal with them. Rather, interested readers 
should consult the flourishing literature on European social pacts to find various answers 
and debates (Baccaro 2003; Baccaro and Lim 2007; Fajertag and Pochet eds. 2000; 
Hamann and Kelly 2007; Hassel 2003). 
In the next section, I provide a close definition of the dependent variable of this 
study. I then review the previous studies of capital openness, summarizing them in a 
conditional hypothesis. Next, I provide a theoretical discussion on why this hypothesis 
does not hold when a country is committed to monetary integration. My claim is tested in 
a Boolean historical analysis of eleven EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK), 
primarily covering the period from the 1970s to the early 2000s. 
 
2.1. Definition Of The Subject 
In the industrial relations literature, there are two competing approaches to 
capturing the defining characteristics of industrial relations. Both pay attention to how 
wages are set, but from different angles. One looks at the level of centralization, focusing 
on the extent to which industrial actors or the government can produce certain 
hierarchically-binding, solidaristic wage settlements (Iversen 1998, pp.47-57; Goden, 
Lange, and Wallerstein 2006; Traxler, Blaschke, and Kittel 2002, pp.113-9). The other 
approach pays attention to the level of coordination. Here, centralization is still 
considered important, but only as one of various ways in which wages are determined 
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collectively. Also, unions and employers who are involved in high-level coordination 
(that is, wage coordination with more encompassing coverage and influence) do not 
necessarily need to have the same degree of organizational development. Depending on 
the feasibility of pattern-setting, certain actors can assume a broader role beyond their 
direct organizational domain (Kenworthy 2001; Soskice 1990; Traxler Blaschke, and 
Kittel 2001, pp.149-61). 
Which of these provides a better basis for research may not be answered 
unequivocally. Rather, the choice should be made depending on the purpose of any given 
study. In this study I adopt the coordination-based approach. This is because I am 
interested in the degree to which wages are negotiated beyond the boundaries of certain 
companies or sectors, which may not necessarily be predetermined by the level of 
centralization per se. However, the centralization-based approach is still a good choice if 
a researcher is interested in, for example, the egalitarian aspects of the wage-setting 
process (such as wage dispersion). 
Traditionally, a high level of coordination meant an inflexible wage structure, in 
which wages were set relatively homogeneously across companies and sectors. However, 
this is no longer true today because the agreements reached at the aggregate levels, while 
focusing on the issue of overall wage increases, have left more room for flexibility for 
lower-level wage negotiators with regard to wage differentials, occasional opt-outs, etc 
(Rhodes 2001; Teulings and Hartog 1998, pp.25-54). Readers thus should not consider 
that this study suggests any implication for the flexibility side of wage-setting. The search 
for flexibility has been a universal trend across all European countries, whereas the level 




2.2. The Hypothesis Of Capital Openness 
Many influential studies which explored the effect of capital openness on the 
wage-setting process were carried out in the 1990s. The term capital openness was 
broadly defined as the extent to which capital owners can (re)locate their assets freely 
across national borders, as exemplified by the liberalization of cross-border financial 
transactions (Quinn 1997). Among the questions that those studies asked was whether or 
not the traditional form of European wage-setting --- which had been characterized by a 
relatively high level of intra- and inter-industry coordination --- could survive the era of 
high capital openness. The increasing mobility on the side of employers provided them 
with great power resource vis-à-vis unions. They could use this power to de-coordinate 
the wage-setting process, anticipating that it would increase the market discipline on their 
unions and thus bring higher and speedier returns for their investments. After a period of 
heated debates (Garrett 1998; Kurzer 1993; Scharpf 1991), however, a consensus 
emerged among researchers that the final effect of capital openness would vary depending 
on specific domestic conditions (Soskice 1999; Traxler 1995). Several causal accounts 
were provided for these differential effects, which can be summarized in the following 
approaches. 
In a performance-driven approach, the current performance on wage cost control 
was an important factor in mediating the effect of capital openness. Good performance 
would encourage employers to stay with the status quo of their wage-setting system, 
whereas poor performance would motivate them to use their power to abandon it. For 
instance, expert studies of Denmark (Due et al. 1995; Iversen and Thygensen 1998), 
Ireland (Hardiman 1988), Italy (Ferrera and Gualmini 2000), and the UK (Hall 1986, 
pp.100-36; Scharpf 1991) showed that the events of de-coordination in the early 1980s 
were mainly due to the poor performance on wage cost control throughout the 1970s and 
 13 
early 1980s. 
Why then did the employers choose de-coordination to deal with their wage 
problems? The answer begins with Soskice’s seminal study (Soskice 1990). Building on a 
previous study by Calmfors and Driffill (1988), he presented a theory of an inverted U-
shaped relationship between the degree of successful wage coordination and the level of 
aggregate wage costs. He argued that the costs will be the highest when wages are set in 
the zone of medium or mediocre coordination, whereas the costs will fall as the 
negotiations take place with no coordination or with very high coordination. This 
hypothetically suggests that employers who suffer in the zone of poor coordination are 
given two theoretically possible solutions; they can either decrease or increase the level of 
their engagement in wage coordination. 
Crouch built on this formulation, and explained the employers’ final choice by 
further looking at a specific context in which the employers were situated (Crouch 1995). 
I noted that the employers had taken a coordinative approach to the wage-setting process 
(although their commitment had never been strong). But this collective approach turned 
out to be a failure. The employers thus became less interested in continuing or even 
strengthening their failed approach. Instead, they were more attracted to an alternative 
approach in which they could tackle the wage problem in a more market-oriented way. By 
making wage negotiations more fragmented and individualized, they would be better able 
to increase the market discipline on their unions and thus save more of wage costs. Their 
enhanced power position over unions added more confidence to this solution because they 
could make the change happen even if unions would resist. 
Focusing on the Nordic experiences and especially the Swedish breakdown as an 
ideal typical case, other studies provided different perspectives on the effect of capital 
openness. In one group of these studies, economic performance was still important but 
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from a different angle. Rather than focusing on the performance of aggregate cost control, 
they paid more attention to the issue of the functional fit between the wage-setting system 
and the production regime. From this perspective, Swedish employers favored the change 
from the solidaristic to industry-level bargaining because the new system would facilitate 
wage differentials across the industrial sectors with different productivities. This 
flexibility, they thought, would be very important for the success of a newly emerging 
technological paradigm, ‘diversified quality production,’ which was replacing the 
previous Fordist paradigm of standardized mass production (Pontusson and 
Swenson1996). Meanwhile, other studies took a more political approach to the Swedish 
breakdown. They highlighted the role of the power struggle between employers and 
unions, especially the ideological conflicts between the LO (the unions’ national 
organization) and the SAF (the employers’ national organization). In the 1970s, the LO 
initiated its challenge against the employers' prerogatives on the capitalist ownership and 
management. In the 1980s, the SAF --- whose power increased in the wake of 
internationalization --- responded with a series of counter offensives, which led to the 
decentralization of the solidaristic wage-setting system (Huber and Stephens 1998; 
Pestoff 1995; Wallerstein and Golden 2000). 
Given the interest of this study to search for a more generalizable hypothesis on 
the effect of capital openness, I find that the explanation based on the performance of 
aggregate cost control has greater appeal. Its empirical references are drawn from various 
places in developed Europe, including Denmark, Ireland, Italy and the UK, as briefly 
alluded to above. But the alternative hypotheses, which are centered on the power 
struggle and the production regime, do not have such a merit. Their applicability is 
virtually limited to the Swedish experience up until the early 1980s. Looking at Ferner 
and Hyman's edited volumes on the European industrial relations (Ferner and Hyman eds. 
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1992; Ferner and Hyman eds. 1998), unions in no other countries have launched such 
frontal attacks against the fundamental interests of capitalist employers. In addition, high-
level wage settlements in other European countries, even including Sweden after the early 
1980s, also have been cautious to leave substantial room for lower-level flexibility when 
finalizing wage settlements (Rhodes 2001; Teulings and Hartog 1998, pp.25-54). All 
these considerations suggest that the Sweden-specific factors would not play an important 
role in the wage-setting process, if examined in a broad European context. 
In light of the discussion so far, I now propose a general hypothesis of capital 
openness, that high capital openness motivates employers to de-coordinate the wage-
setting process if ages have been set under poor control. In this study, however, I argue 
that this hypothesis is still insufficiently specified. We should consider another mediating 
variable for full specification. More specifically, I pay close attention to the role of 
European monetary integration. I then claim that the hypothesis will hold only if the 
government is not committed to the integration process. If committed, the hypothesis will 
not hold. The next section provides a theoretical explanation of why this would be so. 
 
2.3. Capital Openness With Monetary Commitment 
One notable feature of monetary integration is that it produces a strong pressure 
for tight cost control (Crouch 2000; Huber and Stephens 2005). With the commitment to a 
formally or virtually fixed exchange rate, the government places itself in a situation in 
which it does not engage in any active macroeconomic accommodation even in the short 
term. Arbitrary currency devaluation is automatically eliminated from the list of feasible 
policy options. Fiscal and monetary stimulation also is not considered, because these 
policies will make domestic inflation higher than in other countries, which first triggers 
the outflow of financial assets and then increases the pressure for currency devaluation. 
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What this all means for the wage-setting process is that shocks in wage costs can no 
longer be filtered via the government’s flexible compensation. In the tradable sectors, this 
constraint means instantaneous loss of their price competitiveness (Martin 1999). Even in 
the sheltered service sectors, the situation is not much better. The low productivity 
inherent in these sectors will make it difficult for employers to deal with the cost-
pushfulness without accommodating government policies (Iversen and Wren 1998). 
In a country where wages have already been poorly controlled, the pressure for 
cost control will be even greater. There, any continued trend of high wage costs will 
further deteriorate the already fragile profit base for employers, which will also worsen 
the already insecure job situation of workers. Accordingly, as previous studies argued, 
there will be a broad consensus among economic actors that their economy is in a deep 
crisis and wage costs must be controlled tightly to get out of the crisis (Crouch 2000; 
Baccaro 2003). 
2.3.1. The mediating effect of monetary commitment 
How will employers respond to this urgent call for cost control? Here the 
hypothesis of capital openness will suggest that, if those employers are already mobile, 
then they will use their power to de-coordinate the wage-setting process to save wage 
costs. One problem with this, however, is that the hypothesis focuses only on the long-
term potential benefits of the market-oriented reform (Calmfors and Driffill 1988; Crouch 
1995; Soskice 1990). Depending on what happens during the period of transition, 
however, it is always possible that employers may have to re-consider their initial 
decision. 
Of crucial importance are how long it will take before the expected disciplinary 
effect is realized and how costly the transition will be. If wage costs fall immediately or, 
even if not, employers can complete the transition without further increase in their wage 
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costs, they will find no problem with adhering to their initial choice. If the transition takes 
time and wage costs also increase during the period, however, employers will have to 
have second thoughts. This sensitivity to the short-term performance is because of their 
urgent economic situation. They have already suffered from the chronic problem of high 
wage costs. Now wage costs increase even further following the institutional change. 
Even worse, they have to bear all these costs by themselves because their government 
cannot provide any compensatory measures for them. Under this circumstance, employers 
will find they are in a really serious financial stress. They will thus be pressed to search 
for a quick solution to reduce their burden. One easy way to do this is simply to withdraw 
from their initial attempt and save the transition costs. They will then be able to search for 
a new solution to the chronic wage problem.  
In the meantime, we have a quite different situation if the government can still 
provide flexible policies, such as currency devaluation and monetary/fiscal stimulation. 
True, the government’s support can hardly be fully compensatory (Cukierman 1992). This 
is because any artificial policies aiming at macroeconomic accommodation will also 
facilitate inflation expectation among the public, which will weaken the effectiveness of 
those policies in the long run. Accordingly, even the employers with generous policy 
benefits will not be able to avoid a difficulty in dealing with their chronic problem of high 
wage costs. Government intervention, however, can make notable difference in the short-
term management of economic turbulence, in which the government does have clear 
informational superiority over the public. In this study, I argue this effective intervention 
helps employers adhere to their initial decision for de-coordination. 
Let’s suppose that wage costs happen to fall, or at least do not increase during the 
transition. Then the employers’ financial position will improve immediately or, even if 
not, will not worsen. No additional government accommodation will be even necessary in 
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this situation. But what if wage costs increase during the transition? Will the employers 
suffer from these additional costs? The answer is no. This is because their government 
can provide various compensatory measures to help them deal with the costs. These 
policy benefits will also be generous, regardless of government partisanship, given that 
any government is well aware that shrinking business activity will dampen its electoral 
prospect by worsening the national economy (Garrett 1998, pp.28-31). Under this 
circumstance, employers will find no compelling reason to reconsider their initial 
decision for de-coordination. They will maintain their stance as long as they believe in the 
long-term benefit of the market-oriented reform. 
2.3.2. Sources for the unsatisfactory performance in the transition periods 
Are there any reasonable grounds for the concern for the poor short-term 
performance on the path to de-coordination? Here, previous studies do not help much 
because they are primarily interested in the long-term equilibrium performances of wage-
setting institutions (See Iversen (1998, pp.17-38) and Traxler and Kittel (2000) for good 
summary). Because the short-term performance cannot be analyzed in the same way as 
the long-term performance is, we need a discussion that is dedicated to the specific issues 
that arise during the time of institutional fluidity. 
Here I suggest that we should look at the reactions from the major union actors. 
First, there are high-level union organizations --- usually the peak union confederations, 
industry unions, or their cartels --- who have engaged in wage negotiations with broad 
coverage. Obviously, they lose power in the wake of de-coordination because the change 
reduces the room for their engagement in the national wage-setting process. Not only do 
their voices not draw as much attention from employers as before, but they also lose 
much of their previous control over lower-level unions. This, however, does not mean that 
they will soon disappear from the scene of industrial relations (Traxler 1995). Rather, they 
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will still function, desperately trying to resist the institutional change and also re-tighten 
their control over lower-level unions. To promote this goal, they will find the strategy of 
wage militancy to be attractive. If successful, they will be able to punish employers by 
increasing the financial burden for the transition. Lower-level unions will also be satisfied, 
finding that their wages can still be kept safe from the market discipline even after the 
change to de-coordination. 
Next, for lower-level unions, the institutional change means more freedom from 
the upper-level guidance. Especially for large-sized unions with strong organizational 
power, de-coordination provides a golden opportunity to maximize their short-term wage 
gains. Previously, their potential for wage push was somehow underexploited because the 
upper-level negotiators --- regardless of how effective they were --- were concerned that 
the egoistic behaviours of these unions would easily trigger nation-wide wage inflation. 
In the new system, however, these unions are less constrained by this public-minded 
concern. They are just in a better position to focus on their short-term gains. 
It is not difficult to understand that the interactions between those short-sighted 
union actors will result in a delay in peaceful wage moderation. The upper-level unions 
and/or other strong lower-level unions will take the initiative for tough wage bargaining. 
This militancy will then spread to other unions as a guideline for the given bargaining 
round. The situation will even worsen if the productive capacities are distributed 
unequally across the companies and sectors (Traxler and Kittel 2000), if the workers in 
certain companies or sectors possess scare specialized skills (Walsh 1993), or if there are 
sizable public sectors which are not exposed to the market competition (Garrett and Way 
2000). Not only can unions in more productive, skill-scarce, or protected sectors or 
companies claim higher wages easily, but other unions are also pressed to keep up with 
the rising wage standard. Unless all these problems are resolved simultaneously, which 
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may be difficult in a short time, the wage-setting process will be put under serious stress. 
 
2.4. Boolean Dichotomous Analysis 
To test the claim developed so far, I adopt a Boolean comparative analysis 
technique. This choice is justifiable because the method allows us to deal with the 
necessary/sufficient types f causality in a larger than small-N setting. Designed for 
probabilistic causality, statistical analysis is generally not suited for testing these types of 
causality. Small-N analysis may do better, but one problem here is that it has strong 
restriction on the sample size. That said, there are a few more specific issues which 
support the use of the Boolean analysis. First, as discussed in detail in the measurement 
section, all variables are specified dichotomous in this study. Capital openness is high or 
not. Wage costs are controlled poorly or not. Monetary commitment is present or not. And 
the wage-setting process is de-coordinated or not. Also, the nature of the causality driven 
by those independent variables is conjunctural, in the sense that the variables produce an 
expected outcome only in a certain combination. Although the statistical analysis can deal 
with these challenges by dichotomizing the variables and introducing their various 
interaction terms in the estimation equation, a Boolean analysis can address these issues 
in a way that fits better with the nature of necessary/sufficient causality (Hicks, Misra, 
and Ng 1995; Mahoney 2007; Ragin 1987). 
Usually a Boolean analysis begins with dichotomous measurements of the 
independent and dependent variables, which often cover more than several cases 
depending on data availability. It then presents a so-called truth table in which the 
presence or absence of the expected outcome is linked to various combinations of the 
independent variables. Checking that all these combinations are theoretically exhaustive 
and also do not produce contradictory outcomes (in other words, each combination must 
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produce only one of the dichotomous outcomes, not both), the analysis then moves to the 
next stage, where the empirical associations are summarized into certain 
necessary/sufficient types of logical relations. First, any redundant independent variables 
or their combinations --- whose presence or absence does not make difference in the 
logical relations with the dependent variable --- are eliminated. This will make the logical 
expression more parsimonious. Then, the final logical relations are derived by using the 
logical “and (×)” or “or (+)” terms. For instance, anytime we find a sufficient condition, 
we express it by identifying a single variable (if the outcome is caused solely by this 
variable) or a list of variables which are linked together with the logical “and (×)” terms 
(if the outcome is caused jointly by these variables). Should we find more than one 
sufficient condition, then we link them together with the logical “or (+)” term to reach a 
final expression of the necessary and sufficient relationship. 
Note that in this study I do not search for multiple sufficient routes for de-
coordination. Rather, I am interested in full specification of one sufficient route, without 
claiming that it is the only possible route to de-coordination. More specifically, I build on 
the previous hypothesis on the combined effect of capital openness and poor wage-
coordination. I then show that this combination does not yet provide a fully sufficient 
route for de-coordination, unless further joined by the variable of European monetary 
commitment. To test this, I present all theoretically possible combinations of the three 
variables; produce a truth table in which these combinations are linked to the dependent 
variable in various ways; and derive a final logical expression which summarizes these 
associations. To compensate for this rather narrow use of the Boolean method, as well as 
to confirm the robustness of the empirical finding, I provide another Boolean analysis by 
utilizing several alternative variables whose effects are specified independently of those 
which were used in the original analysis. I show that none of these alternative variables, 
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individually or in combinations, produces the outcome reached by the original analysis.  
The Boolean approach, however, is not without potential problems. First, the 
dichotomous measurement is not free of arbitrariness in determining specific cut-offs. 
Second, the truth table and its logical induction are still 'associational' in their nature, 
meaning that they do not fully reveal the real causal relationships among the variables 
involved (Rueschemeyer and Stephens 1997). To address these problems, I will 
complement the Boolean analysis with brief historical comparative accounts for the 
sample European countries. In doing so, I will show that the dichotomous measurements 
were not arbitrary and the relations among the variables also had real historical grounds. 
2.4.1. Sample and coverage 
To obtain a sample of developed European countries, two screening criteria are 
adopted here. First, they should have the EU membership in the 1990s. This reflects the 
fact that European integration up until those years was mainly an agenda within the 
developed Western Europe. Second, the countries also should be covered by the publicly 
available pooled time-series data which provide comparable measures for the dependent 
variable. Applying these criteria leads to the selection of eleven European countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the UK.  
The analysis then covers these countries mainly from the 1970s to the 1990s, 
when the level of capital openness was high or began to be high in most of the countries 
(Eichengreen 2008). The pre-1970 and post-2000 periods are also examined, but only 
briefly due to the limited data coverage for some key variables. The earlier period is 
examined as a part of the main analysis, because it diversifies the sample by adding a few 
more cases of low capital openness. The recent period, however, does not bring such 
benefit because the previous periods provide enough examples for all the theoretically 
 23 
possible combinations of the independent variables. Accordingly, this period is examined 
in a separate section after the main analysis is completed. There, I present various 
configurations of the independent and dependent variables in the early 2000s, using the 
same or other alternative sources of the data. I then show that my claim is supported even 
in this extended period. 
Finally, it should be noted that the analysis covers the Swedish case only from the 
second half of the 1980s. This is because the Swedish breakdown in the early 1980s is not 
relevant for the hypothesis testing. This study is interested in the combined effect of high 
capital openness, poor wage coordination, and European monetary commitment. Yet, the 
Swedish breakdown is known to have been driven by different combinations of causes, as 
discussed previously. 
2.4.2. Measurements 
The dependent variable of the analysis is de-coordination of wage-setting, led by 
employers. This change should be long-lasting without being reversed during a given 
period of analysis. To detect such a change, I select one of the major quantitative 
indicators of wage coordination, and take the following steps for operationalization. First, 
I check if the data series exhibit only one unidirectional change toward de-coordination 
during the period of analysis. If so, I check with previous expert studies to confirm that 
this change was indeed led by employers. Even if there is no clear pattern from the data 
series, I still consider de-coordination to take place if expert studies report any substantial 
change toward the direction, although not captured by the chosen indicator. 
There are two publicly available measures for wage coordination, which were 
developed by Kenworthy (2001) and Nickell, Nuniziata, and Ochel (2005).1 Nickell et al. 
                                                 
1Traxler, Blaschke, and Kittel (2001, pp.149-61) also provide a measure, but this is not 
considered here because the data structure is categorical and thus eliminates the 
possibility of ordered comparison. 
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created their data by focusing on the involved actors’ commitment to collective wage 
coordination, in a continuous scale from 1 to 3. But a problem here is that this measure is 
not free of measurement errors because the data series were created by the authors’ 
subjective judgments (Kenworthy 2001). Kenworthy avoids this problem by focusing on 
certain clearly institutionalized aspects of wage coordination. He pays attention to such 
characteristics as government arbitration, pattern-setting, peace clauses, etc., and 
produces a discrete date series which runs from one (as no coordination) to five (as the 
highest coordination). Appreciating this improved reliability, I adopt his data to measure a 
change to de-coordination. 
Turning next to the independent variables, capital openness is measured by 
Quinn's index for foreign exchange liberalization (Quinn 1997). His measure runs from 0 
to 4, reflecting the severity of taxation and legal/administrative regulations on foreign 
currency exchanges. More specifically, the score of 0 represents complete control of the 
exchanges, in which transactions are rarely approved and, even if so, all received foreign 
currencies are to be surrendered to the government authority. The score of 1 represents 
quasi-complete control, in which currency exchanges are approved occasionally but on 
the condition of surrendering all the receipts to the authority or paying heavy taxes. With 
a score of 2, the situation improves because exchanges are now frequently approved or 
free of regulation. But actual transactions are still under serious restriction due to heavy 
taxation. With the score of 3, the foreign exchange market is significantly liberalized. 
Now, currency exchanges are not subject to any approval as long as they are only 
moderately taxed. With a score of 4, approval is not required and there will be no taxation, 
either.  
In light of this description of the data, I chose the score 3 as the cut-off for high 
capital openness. With only limited or no taxation on foreign currency exchanges, along 
 25 
with no requirement of legal/administrative approval, capital owners will be able to 
(re)locate their assets freely across national borders. As shown in Table 1, a majority of 
the sample countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands) 
have had their scores equal to or higher than the threshold point since the 1960s. Ireland 
(IMF 1976, pp.245-8) and the UK (IMF 1980, pp.420-2) joined them in 1975 and 1979, 
respectively, by further liberalizing outward direct investments; Austria reached the cut-
off in 1977 by further liberalizing inward direct investments (IMF 1977, pp.51-5); and 
Sweden (IMF 1981, pp.393-7) and Finland (IMF 1990, pp.160-3) reached the point in 
1980 and 1989 by liberalizing both their inward and outward direct investments. 
Next, the commitment to European monetary integration is measured by a 
country's participation in an anti-inflationary transnational monetary regime in Europe, in 
which the currency of the county is formally or virtually fixed to a foreign base currency. 
Among the eleven sample countries, Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands began their 
commitment earliest by forming a core monetary group right after the Bretton Woods 
system collapsed in 1973. Belgium was also part of this group, but its commitment was 
steadfast until around 1980 (Hemerijck, Unger, and Visser 2000; Kurzer 1993, pp.159-63, 
217-43).  Note here that in none of these cases the monetary commitment was based on 
formal institutional arrangements. The Snake in the 1970s and the EMS in the 1980s, in 
which other EC countries also participated, were still soft and flexible in their 
coordination mechanism. That is, they allowed the exchange rates of the member 
currencies to change frequently via negotiation and renegotiation of their target rates as 
well as the bands of their permitted fluctuations. Under this circumstance, any successful 
monetary commitment had more to do with domestic policy preference for price stability 
within the participating countries. The unique economic situation shared by these 
countries, that their economies had already been deeply integrated into the German 
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regional economy, made their commitment even more stable (Hemerijck, Unger, and 
Visser 2000). 
Entering the second half of the 1980s, many other European countries began to be 
seriously interested in the idea of anti-inflationary monetary coordination (Eichengreen 
2008). Some countries, such as Denmark, France, and Ireland, did so in their explicit 
aspiration to join in the emerging EMU. Finland, Sweden, and the UK were outside the 
EMS, but still could coordinate their policies successfully with the EMS countries. 
Between 1987 (immediately after the coordinated ERM devaluation in January) and 
1991(preceding the ERM crisis in 1992), there were no attempts at major devaluation by 
any of these countries (except for the Finnish devaluation in November 1991, which was 
precipitated by the exceptional pressures from the Soviet meltdown and the banking 
sector crisis (Kauppinen 2000)). Their currencies also remained stable within a narrow 
band of fluctuation. As attested in World Development Indicators (several years), their 
currencies fluctuated on average within the 3% margin against the German mark, which 
was not so different from the 2.25% margin for the currencies in most EMS countries. 
Lastly, Italy joined in the integration process in January, 1990, by tightening the margin 
for the lira’s fluctuation from the previous 6% to the standard 2.25% (OECD 1991c, 
pp.11-8). 
European monetary coordination continued to be successful in the 1990s, although 
temporarily disturbed by the 1992 ERM crisis. Here again, the formal EMU membership 
did not matter much for actual coordination. According to the OECD Economic Outlook 
(several years), both the insiders and outsiders of the EMU could manage their exchange 
rates tightly against the German mark. For instance, the currencies of eight EMU 
countries in the sample (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, and 
the Netherlands) were depreciated on average only about 0.6% in the second half of the 
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1990s, as compared to the first half. The currencies of the two outsiders, Sweden and the 
UK, were even appreciated 2.2% during the same period. 
Finally, the performance of wage cost control is measured by the real trend in the 
national wage costs. This trend is then evaluated by looking at the overall business 
climate in a given country. Here the rationale goes as follows. Suppose that businesses are 
running well in a country. Then, unions will tend to push for relatively high wages 
without worrying much about their job situations. Employers will also consider this 
militancy as acceptable because their businesses are still thriving. In this situation, we 
may not consider a trend of high wages as an indication of poor cost control. However, 
the situation changes if the business climate turns poor. Employers now are put under 
serious financial stress and can no longer afford high wage costs. In this situation, wages 
really need to be tightly controlled. Any failure in this will clearly indicate that wage costs 
are not in good control. 
Building on this insight, I adopt two indicators for wage costs: the overall wage 
increases in all private sectors net of inflation and productivity, and the work days lost per 
100 workers in a year. The former is drawn from several editions of OECD Economic 
Outlook and the OECD online database (http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Default.aspx). The 
latter is drawn from Huber et al.'s Comparative Welfare States Data Set (Huber et al. 
2004). These indicators are then evaluated in comparison with the real GDP growth 
(evaluated at the German mark) and the unemployment rates, which reflect the overall 
business climate in the national economy (all drawn from Huber et al.’s data). Here the 
point of interest is the movements of the cost indicators at a time when the growth is low 
and unemployment is high. This macroeconomic situation suggests that employers have 
serious problems in investing their resources and hiring workers --- due to whatever 
supply/demand-side issues in their economy. To deal with these difficulties, both the cost 
 28 
indicators have to be controlled very tightly. 
One challenge to this measurement, however, is how to define the threshold point 
for each of those indicators. How low should the economic growth be? How high should 
unemployment be? And, to deal with these economic difficulties, how low should wage 
increases and workday losses be maintained? All these questions must be answered in 
relative terms, and for this purpose I propose the following operational criterion. Wage 
costs should be in poor control if the macroeconomic indicators are worse than the 
European average but the cost indicators are not maintained better than the European 
average. In all other cases, the situation will be different. Those indicators may be in 
mixed shape (some being better and others being worse than the European average), all 
around the average, or all better than the average. In this situation, employers may not be 
strongly motivated for changing their wage-setting process. They will just consider that 
their wage costs are only under mild stress or even in good control, or somewhere in the 
middle. 
2.4.3. The result of the Boolean analysis 
Table 2 summarizes the outcome of the dichotomous measurements (detailed 
justifications for these are provided later in the comparative historical analysis sections.). 
From groups A to D, in which capital openness is high, a total of seventeen country cases 
are examined. Out of these seventeen, Austria and the UK drop out due to certain issues 
regarding the dependent variable (also discussed later). The country cases with low 
capital openness are examined in groups E to H, but not as extensively as the former 
groups. This is because, except for Finland, their periods are concentrated in the pre-1970 
years, for which only limited data are available. Therefore, these countries are examined 
only briefly by relying on the judgments and findings of previous expert studies. 
From this table, the variable of High Capital Openness is given the score of 1 if 
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Quinn’s index of capital liberalization is equal to or greater than the value of 3. Lack of 
Monetary Commitment is given the score of 1 if the government is not committed to 
monetary integration. Poor Coordination is given the score of 1 if wage costs are 
controlled poorly. The dependent variable, Decrease of Wage-Setting Coordination, is 
given the score of 1 if employers succeed in decreasing the level of wage coordination. 
Notice here that groups G and H are logically meaningless. This is because the 
combination of strong monetary commitment and low capital openness, as shown there, 
cannot last in the long run. Suppose that a government has decided to adopt a fixed 
exchange rate policy when there are still considerable restrictions on cross-border capital 
transactions. Then the government will find a good opportunity to keep the exchange rate 
safe even without constraining its temptation for macroeconomic accommodation. This is 
because although these expansionary policies will produce inflationary pressure, the 
restriction on capital mobility will still help the government defend its currency by 
constraining capital exit (Frieden 1991). In the long run, however, domestic inflations 
under a fixed exchange rate regime will produce an adverse effect on the balance of the 
economy by reducing exports and increasing imports. To address this problem, the 
government will have no other choice but to abandon the fixed exchange rate and devalue 
its currency. Where capital openness is high, however, the situation is quite different. 
There, any accommodating policies trigger capital exit and threaten the fixed exchange 
rate in no time (Frieden 1991). Disciplined by this instantaneous chain of pressure, the 
government will be better able to resist its temptation for accommodation and thus defend 
its currency.  
Now summarizing the empirical associations in Table 2, the combinations of the 
variables in groups A to F are all theoretically exhaustive and empirically supported. They 
also do not produce any contradictory outcomes for the dependent variable. We then find 
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the change to de-coordination takes place only in group A, in which all the three 
independent variables have the score of 1 at the same time. If this is not the case, as 
shown by all the other groups from B to F, the change does not occur. Therefore, the final 
analytic expression for the sufficient effect is: DECREASE OF WAGE SETTING 
COORDINATION = HIGH CAPITAL OPENNESS × POOR COORDINATION × LACK 
OF MONETARY COMMITMENT, in which the variable names in upper-case letters 
denote the presence of the variables. Of course, this expression may not exhaust all other 
possible routes to de-coordination. However, it does provide good support for the 
hypothesis in this study, by showing that the combined effect of high capital openness and 
poor coordination holds only if the government is not committed to monetary integration. 
2.4.4. Alternative hypotheses 
To check the robustness of this finding, I now examine several alternative 
hypotheses in another separate Boolean setting. The focus here is to see if these 
hypotheses can add any alternative routes to the outcome reached by the previous 
Boolean analysis. If so, that previous analysis will be challenged. If not, it will be 
strengthened. The first alternative hypothesis is drawn from the neo-corporatism 
literature: strong left power, as shown by strong unions and/or leftist parties, leads to a 
high level of wage coordination due to their concern for compressed but moderated wages 
(Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979). The second hypothesis is an employer-centred one: the 
presence of well-organized employers leads to a high level of wage coordination as they 
attempt to promote diversified quality production or to take wages out of competition 
(Soskice 1999; Swenson 2002). The third is a hypothesis regarding trade dependency: a 
high level of trade dependency promotes concentration of national productions for the 
sake of specialization, which then encourages strong organization of employers and 
unions and, finally, leads to a high level of wage coordination (Katzenstein 1985). The 
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fourth hypothesis concerns the effect of public sector expansion: the growth of the public 
sectors which are less exposed to market competition makes it difficult to coordinate the 
wages between these and other more market-exposed private sectors, leading to a 
decrease in the level of collective wage coordination (Garrett and Way 2000; Pontusson 
and Swenson 1996). 
Of these four hypotheses, note that only the last one deals with the change of de-
coordination explicitly. The first three are more concerned with the historical origins and 
long-term duration of high-level wage coordination, which may not be directly related to 
the subject of this study. However, they still provide a reasonable implication by 
suggesting that any decrease in those variables would result in a decrease in the level of 
wage coordination.  
With regards to operationalization, the power of the left is measured by the non-
weighted sum of the standardized union density and the standardized left governing 
parties' share of the parliamentary seats. Trade dependency is measured by the trade ratio, 
which is the sum of exports and imports as a share of the GDP. The size of the public 
sector is measured by the share of public civilian employees in the total working 
population, aged between fifteen and sixty-four. All these data are drawn from Huber et 
al.'s dataset. Finally, employers' organizational power is measured by Traxler et al.'s data 
on the authority of business confederations (Traxler, Blaschke, Kittel 2001). In creating 
the data, they broke down various activities of employers' confederations into several 
distinct categories, ranging from formal representation to general consultation, 
coordination of collective bargaining, and signing of collective agreements on wage or 
other work-related issues. For the purpose of operationalization, I give the measure a 
score of 0 if employers' confederations play only the minimal roles as shown by formal 
representation and general consultation, 1 if the confederations actually coordinate 
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collective bargaining, and 2 if they can sign collective agreements on behalf of their 
members. 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for these variables for the same countries 
appearing in groups A to D of Table 2. Those in groups E and F are not covered because 
of missing data. This, however, does not create a problem because the focus of analysis 
here is to check if the alternative variables can produce any new routes to the four 
breakdown cases as shown in group A in Table 2.  
On the right side of the table, all the alternative independent variables are 
dichotomized for a Boolean comparison. The operational key is to compare the average 
scores of each variable between the first-half and second-half of the given period of 
analysis. If these scores changed in the hypothesized direction, then the variable is given a 
score of 1. If not, it is given 0. This way, the dummies of Decrease of Left Power, 
Decrease of Business Power, and Decrease of Trade Ratio are given a 1 if the averages of 
the left power index, Traxler's business confederation data, and the trade ratio decreased 
during the periods. Increase in the Public Sector is given a 1 if the average public 
employment increased. 
Looking at the truth table in Table 3, we find the alternative variables fail in 
adding new sufficient routes for the four breakdown cases. Individually, only the variable 
Increase in the Public Sector has a necessary relationship with the dependent variable. 
Decrease of Left Power and Decrease of Business Power have neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient relationship with it. Decrease of Trade Ratio does not change from the score of 
0, which makes it impossible to test its effect. Their interaction effects are also very weak. 
First, the combinations are far from being exhaustive, producing only six out of the 
sixteen possible paths. Among them, only group 4 produces a sufficient route to the Irish 
breakdown (Even then, the theoretical rationale for this combination is not clear.). Group 
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5 includes the rest of the breakdown cases, but this category is self-contradictory because 
the same combination of independent variables produces the two different results for the 
dependent variable. In these situations, any meaningful Boolean induction cannot be 
made. 
 
2.5. Comparative Historical Analysis: Before Monetary Commitment  
The results of the Boolean analyses so far have confirmed the claim of this study, 
that employers choose to de-coordinate the wage-setting process when the following three 
conditions are met simultaneously. Capital openness should be high, wages should be set 
with poor coordination, and the government should not be committed to European 
monetary integration. The comparative historical analysis in this and the next sections 
provides further support for this. More specifically, the analysis focuses on those cases 
from groups A to D in Table 2, in which the level of capital openness was all high. It then 
highlights the mediating role by European monetary integration in producing the outcome 
of de-coordination. 
Before the main analysis, let us briefly discuss the cases appearing in groups E 
and H. In all these cases capital openness was set to be low. The government also was not 
committed to anti-inflationary monetary integration. The only source of difference among 
them was the performance of wage cost control. Wages were poorly coordinated in group 
E, which was shown by the case of the UK in the 1960s in which strong company-level 
unions took a militant approach in their wage negotiations (Hall 1986, pp.49-99; Scharpf 
1991). But there was not yet a Thatcherite attack on the collective bargaining system in 
this period. Rather, industrial actors and the government searched for a collective solution 
and tried to address the problem of wage inflation by means of nation-wide wage 
guidelines. In group F, wage costs were controlled better. Among the good examples was 
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Austria until the 1960s which boasted one of Europe’s best performances on wage 
moderation (Traxler 1992). Finland until the early 1980s also fell into this category. 
Although its wage costs remained high, they were still acceptable to employers given the 
health of the nation’s macro-economy (Kauppinen 2000). As expected, there was no 
attempt at de-coordination in these cases. 
2.5.1. Configurations of the variables 
Let us now look more closely at the country cases in which the level of capital 
openness was high. We begin with those cases in which the governments were not 
seriously committed to European monetary integration. Good examples include Denmark, 
Ireland, Italy, the UK, and France from groups A and B in Table 2. In all these countries, 
the scores of Quinn's index were ‘3’ or higher throughout the period (Denmark, France, 
and Italy), or had been lower but reached at least that level before their wage coordination 
systems changed (Ireland in 1975 and the UK in 1979).  
With regard to the period of analysis, the countries were examined within the 
years of 1970 to 1985. The start year reflects data availability, and the end year reflects 
the fact that the governments in those countries began their earnest monetary commitment 
from the second half of the 1980s. Within this maximum range of period, the specific end 
years were determined by looking at whether or not a change for de-coordination 
happened during the period. If so, which was true in Denmark, Ireland, Italy, and the UK, 
the end years were when those changes took place. If not, e.g. France, the end year was 
1985. This periodization helps highlight the constellation of independent variables which 
promoted the employers’ decision for de-coordination. 
The upper section of Table 4 provides summary statistics for Kenworthy’s wage 
coordination index and other performance data on wage cost control in the five countries. 
We find that the level of wage coordination decreased from the status quo of the 1970s in 
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all the countries except France. In Denmark and Ireland, Kenworthy’s data exhibit clear 
unidirectional changes which all took place in 1981. In Denmark, centralized government 
mediation broke down in that year, and was replaced by a new system of industry-level 
coordination (Due et al. 1995; Wallerstein and Golden 2000). The Irish wage-setting 
system, which had been centralized at the national level throughout the 1970s, also 
collapsed to the company-level in that year. Although there remained some weak 
characteristics of pattern-setting in the process of wage negotiations, the system remained 
basically company-based until it began to be re-centralized at the end of the 1980s 
(Hardiman 1988; O’Brien 1981). 
The situations in Italy and the UK were more complicated because Kenworthy’s 
data did not exhibit clear patterns of de-coordination. Here Kenworthy’s scores for the 
beginning and the end years of the period were the same (‘2’ for Italy and ‘1’ for the UK), 
although there were some notable spikes in between. For Italy, this reflects the fact that 
the traditional company-level bargaining, which had been coupled with strong 
legal/administrative regulation, was interrupted by two short-lived episodes of centralized 
wage coordination in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. In the UK, there were a series of 
governmental intervention and tripartite pact from 1966 to 1979, which were attempted as 
an alternative to the previous pure company-level bargaining (In this sense, the score of 
‘1’ in the beginning of the 1970s was exceptional for this experiment period.).  
After these experimental periods of centralized coordination, however, expert 
studies suggest that the wage bargaining process in both countries became more 
fragmented than in the pre-experiment periods. In the UK, Thatcher’s victory in 1979 led 
to a company-level system in which the wages for un-unionized workers began to be 
determined via individual negotiations with managers, thus bypassing the system of 
union-based collective bargaining (Edward et al. 1988; Waddington 2000). In Italy, the 
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company-level tier in the national wage-setting system began to assume a more prominent 
role than before. Employers led this process, as illustrated by their repeated challenge to 
the scala mobile --- the national wage indexation formula which provided a nation-wide 
universal floor for wage increase (Regalia and Regini 1998). This trend of de-
coordination in the private sectors then spilt over into the public sectors. Strong 
syndicalist movements, as illustrated by the Coba union group, emerged as the antithesis 
of established union associations. They invigorated the voices of grassroots unions at the 
workplace level and promoted decentralization in the public sector (Visser 1996). 
In all of those four countries, previous expert studies suggested that the chronic 
problem of high wage costs throughout the 1970s was the primary factor that interacted 
with the pressure of capital openness to produce the change of de-coordination. This is 
clearly supported by the trends of the macroeconomic and wage cost data which are 
presented in Table 4. There, the GDP growth and unemployment in the four countries 
were all worse than the average of all sample European countries, as shown in 
parentheses. The Danish figures did not look too bad. But a problem with the country was 
that its economy was declining so sharply in the late 1970s. Growth and unemployment, 
which had been 0.5% and 2% in the first half of the decade, worsened to -4.8% and 7.5% 
in the second half. 
Despite all these macroeconomic difficulties, however, wage costs in none of 
those countries were controlled tightly. Instead, wage increases and workday losses were 
all higher than average. Again, Denmark looked exceptional. Besides the workday losses, 
however, the low figure for wage increase was due to a series of real wage freezes in the 
late 1970s, which were imposed by Parliament after the unions' refusal to accept the state 
mediators' wage proposals. From the viewpoint of Danish employers, unions were still 
not cooperative enough (Iversen and Thygensen 1998). 
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2.5.2. Performances of wage cost control after de-coordination 
An interesting question is what then happened after the attempt of de-coordination. 
The answer is that the movement of wage costs did not meet the employers’ expectation. 
The economy continued to perform poorly (except for Denmark which will be discussed 
separately later), but wage costs were still on the rise.  
Looking at the five-year periods after the change, the GDP growth and 
unemployment in Ireland, Italy, and the UK all continued to be worse than the European 
average. The Irish figures were -3.0% and 15% in 1982-1986, which were worse than the 
-1.7% and 8.4% at the European level. The Italian figures were 0.7% and 9.5% in 1985-
1989, whereas the European figures were 1.9% and 7.8%. In the UK the situation looked 
better because the GDP growth in 1981-1985 did beat the European average (-0.4% vs. -
1.6%), although unemployment still remained worse (10.9% vs. 8.1%). This performance, 
however, was due to the short-term stimulative effect created by the banking-sector 
liberalization in 1980 (Rhodes 2000). Banks began to expand their loans to private actors 
at an unprecedented scale, which then boosted consumer demand even without real 
improvement in the national employment. The growth rate in 1980 and 1981 was 7.6%, 
which was much higher than the European average of 0.7%. But this boom did not last 
long. The growth soon decreased to -2.1% between 1982 and 1985, which became lower 
than the European average of -1.8% during the same period. 
Despite these poor economic climates, wage costs were not controlled tightly in 
the post-transition period. Apparently, there were some signs of improvement. As Table 5 
shows, the non-standardized figures of wage increases and workday losses improved in 
all the three countries (Ireland, Italy, and the UK), when we compare the five-year periods 
before the transition. However, these figures were more misleading than revealing the 
truth because the European average was also improving during the periods. The 
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standardized figures will address this problem by controlling the common European trend 
out of the country statistics. 
As it turns out, relative improvements took place in Ireland and Italy. Wage 
increases and workday losses were all moderated considerably. However, these results 
were mainly driven by a few years of good performance immediately following the 
change. Wage costs then were rising sharply in both countries. In Italy, 1987 marked the 
beginning of the renewed wage militancy. Strong public-sector unions played a leading 
role in the process, who were then under the strong pressure from militant grassroots 
organizations in the decentralized bargaining setting. They demanded rapid wage increase 
to compensate for the previous few years of real wage stagnation. This then became an 
effective guideline for private-sector negotiations for years to come (OECD 1987b, p.14; 
Perez 2002; Visser 1996). Between 1987 and 1990 (the last year before the Italian wage-
setting system began to be re-coordinated under a new austerity-oriented policy regime), 
the standardized wage increases were 0.0, up from -0.3 in 1985-1986. In 1990 only, the 
increase was 0.8, which was higher than the average for the pre-transition period. The 
standardized workday losses also approached the previous level. It rose to 1.8 in 1987-
1990, up from 0.2 in 1985-1985. 
The situation was quite similar in Ireland. In the beginning, wage costs seemed to 
be under good control. Especially important was the government’s intention to hammer 
out tight wage settlements in the public sectors and then use them as an informal 
guideline for private sector negotiations. This strategy worked well at first (Hardiman 
1988; OECD 1982, pp.36-7). However, it soon became ineffective, as the ICTU (the peak 
confederation for Irish unions) continued to emphasize the strategy of real wage increase 
as a means to hold onto its influence on the national wage-setting process. De-centralized 
unions in the private sectors also were increasingly unwilling to comply with the 
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government wage guideline (Hardiman 1988; von Prondzynski 1992). Consequently, the 
private sectors developed a separate pattern of collective bargaining, in which those 
unions who happened to strike wage deals earlier set an informal tone for the entire 
bargaining round. Beginning in 1985, the situation became even worse. Being 
disappointed with the previous few years of real wage stagnation, public-sector unions 
began to push hard for compensatory wage increases. The government initially resisted, 
but ultimately succumbed to their militancy (OECD 1985, pp.16-23). Consistent with this 
historical development, the standardized wage increases in 1985-1986 rose to -0.1 from -
0.4 in 1982-1984 (although workday losses did not change much). In 1986 only, the last 
year before the Irish wage-setting system began to be re-coordinated under a new 
austerity-oriented policy regime, the wage increases was 0.6, which was even higher than 
the average for the pre-transition period. 
In the UK, the situation was clearer than the other two cases above. Although the 
government held tight control over the wages for public-sector workers, the wages in the 
private sectors were on the rise immediately following de-coordination (Hall 1986, 
pp.100-36). This was mainly due to the game of relative wage competition played by 
unregulated company-level actors (Brown and Walsh 1991; Traxler 1995). Especially, the 
unions and un-unionized workers in skill-scarce manufacturing sectors played an 
important role in this syndrome of wage push. Those in other sectors then were put under 
pressure from the call for fair wages, and had to join in the initiative for militancy (Walsh 
1993). As Table 5 shows, both wage increases and workday losses worsened during the 
five years following de-coordination, when compared with the previous five years. 
2.5.3. Governments’ responses 
Interestingly enough, in none of these three countries did the unsatisfactory 
performance lead employers to change their initial decision for de-coordination. 
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Employers had decided to change their wage-setting systems because they had been 
disappointed with their performances. They then held onto their decision even after they 
found wage costs were on the rise following the change. As claimed by this study, this 
attitude could prevail because their governments could provide them with various 
accommodating macroeconomic policies to compensate for the difficulties that they were 
encountering during the transition. Initially, governments adopted non-accommodating 
policies, which they crafted in response to their year-long problem of wage-pushed 
inflation. However, they gave up their tough position as they found that wage costs 
continued to rise and worsened business activity. 
The UK is one of the best examples to illustrate this point, because its new 
conservative government which took office in 1979 seemed to have a really strong 
ideological commitment to monetarism. After her electoral victory, Thatcher adopted a 
package of austerity-oriented policies, consisting of stable sterling and fiscal/monetary 
restriction. Her purpose was clear --- fighting against the years-long problem of wage-
pushed inflations. However, while successful in accomplishing this goal, her policies 
were certainly not helpful for employers. This was especially true for those in the tradable 
manufacturing sectors, in which the rising wage costs after de-coordination added a 
further problem to their already weak price competitiveness (Middlemas1991, pp.241; 
Pollard 1992, pp.380-1, 386). From 1980 to 1982, for instance, the growth of the net 
capital stock in these sectors turned negative. This was quite a notable development, 
given that the stock in the sectors had grown slowly (OECD 1983b, pp.41-7), despite the 
challenge of wage inflations throughout the 1970s. Meanwhile, domestic service sectors 
seemed to be in a better situation, especially after the banking-sector liberalization in 
1980. Consumers’ demand improved, which even led to an increase in investment and 
hiring in these sectors. However, this stimulative effect soon vaporized with rising wage 
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costs in the early 1980s. Then a period recession followed (Rhodes 2000). Under these 
circumstances, the CBI (the peak national confederation for British employers) pressed 
hard the government to change its hard-line position. The confederation even began to 
consider seriously the possibility of returning to the previous wage-setting system, hoping 
that it would help moderate the unions’ militancy by means of national wage guidelines 
(Middlemas 1991, pp.249-50). 
After passing through the short period of tension, the government decided to 
respond to the call for accommodation. More specifically, the government changed its 
position in the areas of monetary and exchange rate policies, although it continued to take 
a restrictive fiscal stance especially on the pays for public-sector workers (Hall 1986, 
pp.100-36). From 1981 to 1985, the sterling was devalued about 20% against the German 
mark, which was greater than 16% of the average of the sample countries. Given that the 
UK was not within the managed exchange rate system of the EMS, there was no official 
action for devaluation. The government simply let the sterling float freely without taking 
any defensive measures. The monetary policies also changed. Among the key issues here 
was the choice of a money target index, which would be used as the reference point for 
managing total monetary supply. Initially, the target was set with the M3, which included 
not only cashes in circulation but also all other credit instruments. Later until the mid-
1980s, the focus shifted toward cash in circulation, allowing the credit side of the 
monetary supply to expand without government supervision (Pollard 1992, p.384). 
In Ireland and Italy the situation was similar, although not as dramatic as in the 
UK. In Ireland, the new center-left coalition government which took office in 1981 
implemented a series of disinflation policies aiming at fiscal scrutiny (via tight control of 
pay for public employees), monetary stability (via direct guidelines for foreign and bank 
borrowing), and exchange rate stability (O’Connor 2002; OECD 1983a, pp.24-31). This 
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policy initiative, however, produced serious tension for business activity at a time when 
wages in the country were still not properly controlled even after de-coordination (Roche 
1994). Investments declined sharply in all major sectors in the first half of the 1980s. 
Tradable manufacturing sectors were hit even harder because the trend of weak sterling 
during the time led to informal appreciation of the Irish pound (OECD1983a, pp.15-9, 40-
1; OECD 1985, pp.38-9). 
In response to these problems, the government switched its policies toward 
accommodation. While continuing its emphasis on monetary stability, the government 
loosened its policies in other areas (Hardiman 1988; OECD 1985, pp.16-23). In1986, the 
Irish pound was devalued unilaterally against both the British sterling and all other EMS 
currencies. Fiscal scrutiny also weakened in order to prop up domestic demand. 
Beginning in 1985, for instance, the government allowed wages in the public sectors to 
rise at least at the same speed with those in the private sectors. 
In Italy, the priority of government macroeconomic policies was again the fight 
against wage inflation. This had already been foreshadowed by the divorce of the Bank of 
Italy from the Treasury in the early 1980s (Ferrera and Gualmini 2000), and continued to 
be true even when wage costs began to rise sharply in 1987. The government reiterated its 
commitment to currency stability. It even announced a plan for budgetary consolidation, 
aiming at a substantial reduction of the debt/GDP ratio by the end of 1992. As for 
monetary policies, the government maintained high interest rates as well as its control 
over bank lending to private actors (OECD 1990b, pp.36-7, 44-52).  
However, the trend of rising wage costs eventually forced the government to 
change its course (Perez 2002). The lira was then devalued unilaterally against all other 
EMS currencies in January of 1990. Fiscal scrutiny also loosened significantly as the 
government delayed the target year of the fiscal consolidation. The monetary authority 
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also began to take a more flexible approach to interest rate fluctuation and bank lending 
(OECD 1990b, pp.36-7, 44-52). 
2.5.4. The Danish and French cases 
In Denmark, another case of breakdown, the situation was quite different from the 
other three countries discussed so far. True, wage costs continued to increase after the de-
coordination, as shown by Table 5. This was due to the wage competition among de-
centralized bargaining units, mainly driven by the overheated construction sector and the 
public sector (Benner and Vad 2000; OECD 1986a, p.25; OECD 1988a, pp.27-8). 
However, the Danish economy at that time was recovering at the fastest speed in all of 
Europe (OECD 1986a, pp.20-2). For example, during the five-year period after de-
coordination (1982 to 1986), Danish unemployment came close to the average of the 
European average (8.7% versus 8.4%) and GDP growth was even better (0.2% versus -
1.7%). Under this circumstance, the trends in the wage costs did not pose a serious 
challenge to employers. The government also did not feel a strong need for active 
macroeconomic accommodation (Benner and Vad 2000; OECD 1984, pp.8-14; OECD 
1986a, pp.9-19). 
Finally, France was the case in which the status quo of wage coordination was 
preserved. The overall business climate of the country was not too bad, as shown by Table 
4. The GDP growth and unemployment did not deviate much from the European average 
in the 1970s and the early 1980s. Wage increases also were near the average, and 
workday losses were even below average. Therefore, there was no strong need for the 
French employers to embark on the project of de-coordination. In fact, the sense of a 
French crisis became widespread only after the mid-1980s, when the inefficiency of the 
state-led economy had been evident but the socialist reflation policies failed to address it 
(Hall 1994; Levy 1999, pp.23-56). 
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2.6. Comparative Historical Analysis: After Monetary Commitment 
Next, we deal with those cases where capital openness was high and there was 
also strong government commitment to monetary integration. We have twelve cases from 
groups C and D in Table 2. In all of them, the scores of Quinn’s index were higher than or 
equal to ‘3.’ As for the monetary commitment, Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands 
started the process in the early 1970s when the Bretton Woods system collapsed. Belgium 
joined them in around 1980. Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Sweden, and the UK 
joined in the second half of the 1980s with their preparations for the EU or EMU. Italy 
finally joined in 1990 when it narrowed the margin of the lira’s fluctuation in the ERM, 
from the previous 6% to the standard 2.25%. Reflecting these different timings of 
monetary commitment, these countries will be analyzed with different start years. They 
all, however, will be covered until the 1990s. 
2.6.1. Configurations of the variables: the cases of poor performers 
Now we look at what happened in the countries where employers suffered 
seriously from poorly controlled wage costs. Here the point of interest is whether or not 
the employers responded in the same way as they did in the previous cases of breakdown. 
It turned out that they did not. The following historical analysis explains why they made 
different choices. 
Beginning with Italy, Belgium, and France, all from the top of the lower section in 
Table 4, the GDP growth and unemployment were all worse than the European average, 
but the wage costs were not tightly controlled. In Italy, both wage increases and strike 
activities were higher than the European average. In Belgium, strike activities were fewer 
but wage increases were higher. France seemed to be in a better situation because both of 
these figures were lower than the average. Entering the 1990s, however, this advantage 
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weakened considerably. While strike activity continued to be lower (2.6 days vs. 6.2 days), 
the difference in wage increases became nil (-1.5% vs. -1.2%). When standardized, the 
wage figure in France was only 0.1 point lower than the average.2 
In the Netherlands, the situation looked quite different because all the indicators 
were in good shape. But this was true only on the surface. The indicators began 
worsening sharply in the second half of the 1970s, which then became worst in around 
1980. From 1979 (when the Dutch government realized its economic problems so 
seriously that it decided to respond with an ultra austerity-oriented policy package (Visser 
1990)) to 1981 (the last year before the pact of Wassenaar), the averages for the GDP 
growth and unemployment were –0.7% and 6.1%, respectively. These were not only 
worse than the European averages of 0.5% and 5.8% during the same years, but were 
even worse than the country’s previous averages in the 1970s, 2.8% and 3.4%. The Dutch 
wage costs, however, were not controlled well. Although it was true that strike activities 
remained low, wages increased sharply (Visser 1998). Here, the wage data for the same 
period of 1979 to 1981 are of little use to show this trend. This is because wages in these 
years were set via parliamentary direct interventions, which imposed wage freezes against 
militant unions. Instead, a comparison of wage trends between the first and second halves 
of the 1970s will provide a better perspective. During that time, the wage figure rose from 
–0.2% to 0.8%. This wasan even worse development, given that the European trend was 
improving from 1.5% to –0.2% during the same period (The Dutch case after the early 
1980s will be discussed separately because its economy has improved significantly since 
then.). 
In Finland (Kauppinen 2000), Ireland (Baccaro 2003), and the UK (Rhodes 2000), 
                                                 
2Even if we consider France to be a successful case of cost control, this still does not 
contradict our hypothesis because after all, the French wage-setting system did not 
change. 
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the macroeconomic indicators were also in poor shape until the early 1990s, although 
they all recovered thereafter. In the UK, both growth and unemployment were worse than 
the European average. The Finnish figures had been good until the late 1980s, but 
worsened rapidly beginning in around 1990 due to the shocks from the Soviet breakdown 
and the banking sector crisis (Kauppinen 2000). GDP growth and unemployment, which 
had been 1.9% and 4.5% in the second half of the 1980s, became –4.7% and 13.3% in the 
first half of the 1990s. These were clearly worse than the European averages of –0.6% 
and 8.9% during the same period. In Ireland, unemployment was the worst in Europe, 
whereas the economic growth looked better. But this growth figure was partly inflated 
due to the superior performances of the expert-oriented foreign companies, which did not 
have a close tie with the Irish domestic economy (OECD 1983a, pp.15-9). 
Despite all these economic difficulties, wages in none of these three countries 
were controlled tightly. As seen again from Table 4, the Finnish figures were just mixed. 
Even focusing on the first half of the 1990s, the situation was not much different; wage 
increases were lower than the European average (–3.8% vs. – 1.6%), but workday losses 
still were far above the average (21.2 days vs. 6.8 days). The Irish figures were also 
mixed. In the UK, both measures were not far from the averages. 
A striking finding here is that the poor performance in those seven countries did 
not result in de-coordination. Instead, the wage-setting process either stayed at the status 
quo or was even more coordinated. In Italy, decentralized bargaining until around 1990 
was re-centralized with a series of non-binding tripartite talks (Ferrera and Gualmini 
2000; Regini and Regalia 1997). In Belgium, industry-level bargaining which had been 
mostly coupled with legal regulations and non-binding central bipartite guidance was 
replaced in 1981 by direct government intervention (Arcq and Pochet 2000). In France, 
company-level bargaining which was coupled with legal/administrative regulations 
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continued to be true, although with a trend of increasing flexibility in the system 
(Goetschy 1998). In the Netherlands, industry-level bargaining with strong 
legal/governmental intervention continued until 1982, when it was replaced by another 
industry-level system with non-binding central agreements (van Ruysseveldt and Visser 
1996; Visser and Hemerijck 1997, pp.81-113). In Finland, the industry bargaining system 
with non-binding central guidance continued with a greater emphasis on peaceful wage 
moderation (Kauppinen 2000; Kauppinen and Waddington 2000). In Ireland, company-
level bargaining with weak pattern-setting was re-centralized with a series of 
binding/non-binding tripartite social pacts (Baccaro 2003). Finally in the UK, the 
combination of union-based and individual negotiations at the company level continued 
without change (Waddington 2000). 
2.6.2. Employers’ reactions to poor performances 
Why did employers choose not to push for de-coordination this time? From the 
perspective of the hypothesis of capital openness, this is a difficult question to answer. 
Employers were suffering from high wage costs. These costs were even more difficult to 
bear because the process of monetary integration eliminates the possibility of government 
accommodation to compensate for their financial burden. In this situation, the hypothesis 
would predict that employers would be seriously interested in the project of de-
coordination to save their wage costs. The following analysis confirms that they did 
attempt such a change (unless their recent experiences had already demonstrated the 
unsatisfactory consequence of such a change). But they soon withdrew from this attempt, 
finding that wage costs were increasing after the change but their government was not in 
a position to help them out. They then either returned to the status quo ante or attempted 
more coordination as a second-best solution for wage cost control. 
The Netherlands, Belgium, and Finland provide the best examples for this 
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reversion. Beginning with the Netherlands, the Dutch government began the monetary 
commitment in the early 1970s. At that time, the Dutch guilder was virtually fixed to the 
German mark. Domestic monetary supply was also put on tight restriction, although fiscal 
policies remained moderately flexible in order to soften the too strong deflationary bias of 
those austerity-oriented policies. Here the government’s intention was clear: combating 
the wage-pushed inflation that the Dutch economy had suffered for a long time. This 
commitment also looked credible given the close economic tie between the country and 
Germany. The outcome of this initiative, however, was disappointing. With the continued 
failure in wage cost control, those policies led to further squeeze of employers’ profits 
especially in the tradable manufacturing sectors (Hemerijck, Unger, and Visser 2000). 
Dutch employers responded with an attempt at unilateral de-coordination. The key 
issue there was the automatic wage indexation formula, in which wages were guaranteed 
to increase at least at the speed of domestic inflation. Blaming this formula for the years-
long problem of wage-inflation spiral, employers decided to abolish it unilaterally. They 
then made their intention clear at the annual national wage conference held in 1976 
(Visser 1990). However, this offensive triggered fierce responses from unions. The 
national conference collapsed. Subsequent industry-level negotiations, which were called 
to determine sectoral wages without any national wage guideline, were fraught with 
tension. Strike activities soared, and wage increases were much higher than employers 
had initially proposed (OECD 1978b, p.17). Worse yet, employers could not solicit any 
policy compensations from their government. The government had already shown its 
commitment to macroeconomic austerity since the early 1970s. Beginning in 1976, it 
even strengthened its position by tightening its fiscal policies, which had been managed 
relatively flexibly to fend off the possibility of deflation (Hemerijck, Unger, and Visser 
2000). With all these unfavorable developments, the employers withdrew from their 
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attempt at unilateral de-coordination (Visser 1990). They then began to take a more 
serious interest in nation-wide wage coordination. Aided by strong government support 
and also by unions’ increasingly cooperative attitude, this led to the historic national pact 
of Wassenaar in 1982 (Visser and Hemerijck 1997). 
The situation was similar in Belgium, except that it instituted its strong monetary 
commitment in the second half of the 1970s. Officially, the Belgian government had 
adopted the same Dutch-style policy package in the early 1970s. In real terms, however, it 
was more skewed toward Keynesianism because of its heavy reliance on fiscal 
stimulation. The cumulative public debt throughout the 1970s was on average 63.6% of 
the GDP, which was much higher than the average of the sampled European countries, 
42.6% (Armingeon et al. 2004). Entering the second half of the decade, however, the 
Belgian government began to tighten its policy position with an explicit aspiration for 
exchange rate stability (OECD 1977, pp.24-32; OECD 1978a, pp.26-34; OECD 1979, 
pp.32-42). It introduced tight ceilings on public spending, along with tax increases. The 
monetary supply also became more restricted, with tight interest-rate management and 
other direct controls on credit and loans.  
Because of the lack of effective wage moderation, however, these policies 
produced a serious tension for business activity. Belgian employers then responded in the 
same way as the Dutch counterparts did. In an effort to save wage costs, they launched a 
unilateral attack on the national wage-indexation system in 1976. Employers in the metal 
and steel sectors played a leading role in this offensive. They, however, failed to receive 
full support from their fellow employers in other sectors, who were threatened by fierce 
responses from unions. Strike activity soared and wages also increased higher than they 
expected. Employers then withdrew from the attempt, and joined in the government-led 
process of obligatory national wage coordination (Pochet 2000; Hermerijck, Unger, and 
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Visser 2000). 
In Finland, the government instituted tight macroeconomic policies in the mid-
1980s, after the 1982 massive devaluation and in the context of emerging EMU (OECD 
1986b, pp.23-30). True, wage bargaining in the country did not adjust successfully to 
these disciplinary policies (OECD 1988b, pp.22-3; OECD 1989, pp.19-20), but this 
failure did not create an urgent problem because the Finnish economy was still 
performing well. A real challenge, however, came around 1990 when the Finnish 
economy was hit hard in the wake of the Soviet meltdown and the burst of the financial-
sector bubble (OECD 1991a, pp.11-3; OECD 1992a, pp.11-8). The critical reference point 
was the 1991 national wage bargaining round, during which the Bank of Finland 
proposed a 3% wage cut for 1992 and 1993 to deal with the national economic crisis. But 
the unions rejected this proposal. This then led to a massive devaluation of the Finnish 
markka in November that year (Kauppinen 2000). 
To employers, this event clearly indicated unions’ unwillingness to adjust to the 
national crisis. Employers then made clear their intention to de-coordinate the wage-
setting system. Although temporarily relieved by the national agreement of wage freeze 
for 1992 and 1993, which soon followed the devaluation, employers nonetheless 
continued with their plan. In 1993 they withdrew unilaterally from the national wage 
negotiations for 1994 and 1995, and forced pure industry-level negotiations on unions 
(Kauppinen and Waddington 2000). This experiment, however, only invited massive 
strikes and wage militancy (OECD 1996, pp.25-8). Employers then came back to the 
national negotiations in 1995. With unions’ increasing interest in peaceful wage 
moderation, employers could continue to make successful wage deals thereafter 
(Kauppinen and Waddington 2000). 
In Italy, the austerity-oriented policy regime began around 1990, when its 
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government narrowed the margin of the lira’s fluctuation in the ERM (OECD 1991c, 
pp.11-8). In Ireland, the regime began in 1987 when the newly elected Fianna Fail 
government launched a strong stabilization plan (OECD 1988c). And in the UK, it began 
in the late 1980s when the reigning conservative government decided to join in the EMS 
(Rhodes 2000). As was true in other cases discussed above, all these choices were a 
response to previous failures of wage cost control, and were made credible with the help 
of a favorable external constraint --- the emerging EU and EMU. Also the same was that 
wages were not put under good control even after the shift of government policy, which 
then produced serious pressure on business activity. However, unlike the countries above, 
there were no explicit attempts by employers to de-coordinate the wage-setting processes. 
In Italy and Ireland, this was mainly because employers had already learned from their 
recent experiences that de-coordination could actually increase wage costs at least in the 
short run (Hardiman 1988; Perez 2002). In the UK, further de-coordination was simply 
not possible because its wage-setting process had already been fully de-coordinated. 
Finally, in France the austerity-oriented policies began after the socialist 
experiment with Keynesian reflation in 1982 and 1983. This experiment was a 
catastrophic failure due to domestic inflation and subsequent job losses (Levy 1999, 
pp.23-56). Since then, the government’s priority has shifted to price and exchange rate 
stability (Hall 1994). This change seemed to work well at first in curbing wage increases 
(OECD 1987a, pp.9-10; OECD 1990a, pp.12-4). But it faced a serious challenge 
beginning around 1990, when the unions in the construction and public sectors launched 
strong campaigns for wage militancy. Wages in the country then rose faster than 
productivity increases in the following several years (OECD 1991b, pp.22-7; OECD 1994, 
p.25). 
French employers responded to this challenge in a quite distinctive way. Instead of 
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attempting de-coordination, they focused predominantly on the issue of flexibility within 
the system. This attitude reflected the fact that the French labor market was among the 
most tightly regulated one in all of Europe. There were strong indexation systems for 
general and minimum wages in which these wages were indexed to not only inflation but 
also general economic growth (Petit 1988). There were also strong government 
regulations on layoffs, part-time employment, fixed-term employment, work-time 
scheduling, and so on. According to the OECD Employment Outlook (2004), for instance, 
France stood highest on the employment protection index among all the eleven sample 
countries, as of the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Under this circumstance, deregulation 
even within the same regulatory framework meant significant savings of wage costs. 
Since the mid-1990s, governments have responded to this call for flexibility in a 
bipartisan manner (Ross 2004). 
2.6.3. Configurations of the variables: the cases of better performers 
Let us now move on to the remaining countries in Table 4, in which wage costs 
were better controlled than in the previous cases. In Denmark and Sweden, the 
macroeconomic and cost indicators were all mixed. The GDP growth and wage increases 
were worse, but unemployment and workday losses were better than the European 
average. Germany performed better than the two Scandinavian countries. During the 
years following the reunification, however, its performance worsened considerably. 
Except for the workday losses of 1.1 days, which still resoundingly beat the European 
average of 5.4 days, all other indicators came closer to the average level in the 1990s. 
GDP growth was 2.8% (a little higher than the average of 1.9%), unemployment was 8% 
(a little lower than the average of 8.7%), and the wage increases were –1.0% (a little 
higher than the average of -1.2%).  
Expert studies of these countries agreed that these performances were far from 
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being satisfactory to employers, especially when compared with their past good 
performances. But the studies did not consider that the countries were in deep crisis 
(Benner and Vad 2000; Manow and Seils 2000). Consistent with this assessment, 
employers in none of the countries strove for a change to de-coordination. They tried 
instead to reap the benefits, proven or potential, of collective wage coordination.  
In Denmark and Sweden, after the transition to industry-level bargaining was 
completed, employers did not attempt further de-coordination. Instead, they were more 
interested in searching for a way to encourage wage moderation in their new systems. 
Echoed by the unions, this concern led to various attempts at multi-industry (although not 
nation-wide) wage coordination, in which several industry bargaining units got together 
and discussed common informal guidelines for moderate wage increases (Dolvik and 
Martin 2000; Due et al. 1995; Scheur 1998). Notice that the Swedish figures from 
Kenworthy’s index seen in Table 4 seem to challenge this evaluation. These figures, 
however, simply reflect the fact that the Swedish transition to industry-level bargaining 
took a relatively long time. After the initial attempt at decentralization in the early 1980s, 
wages in Sweden were set between a pure industry level and a non-binding central level 
until the industry-level bargaining was finally stabilized in the early 1990s (Kjellberg 
1998). 
In Germany, the association of metal employers began the 1990s by adopting a 
militant approach to the metal unions, which could have destabilized the traditional 
system of industry-level bargaining in the country. However, this offensive did not last 
long, because metal employers did not follow the guideline of their association, but rather 
chose "wild-cat cooperation" with their unions. Although not satisfied with their wage 
costs at that time, these employers were more concerned about the possibility of losing 
their trust-based industrial relations, which had been one of the most important sources of 
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the German industrial success (Thelen 2000).  
Finally, in Austria and the post-reform Netherlands, the economic situations were 
even better (Traxler 1998). In Austria, all the indicators were better than the European 
average. The Dutch figures also were close to this pattern, except that wage increases 
stayed at the average level. Entering the 1990s, the Dutch economic situation further 
improved with its unemployment going down to 5.4% (The European average was still 
8.4%). Under these circumstances, employers in neither the countries found a strong 
reason for attempting to change their wage-setting systems. Here again, the decreasing 
figures of the Austrian wage-setting index looks contradictory. This indeed correctly 
reflects the change of 1983 in which the previous centralized bargaining was replaced by 
a new industry-level bargaining system. However, this event is not relevant to our 
hypothesis testing because it was driven by the unions, not the employers. Traditionally, 
the monopolistic union confederation, the OGB, had led the national wage coordination 
through its direct guidance over member unions. Beginning in 1983, however, its role was 
significantly reduced as an outcome of internal debates, which then paved the way for the 
metal union association, the GMBE, to take a strong pattern-setting role in the wage-
setting process (Kenworthy 2001; Traxler 1998). 
 
2.7. The Trends Of The Variables In The 2000s 
Before concluding the empirical analysis so far, recall that the analysis has 
covered only restricted periods up until the 1990s. This was because certain key variables, 
such as Kenworthy's wage-setting index and Quinn's financial liberalization index, did 
not cover more recent years. In this section I trace the trends of these and other variables 
for a more recent period of 2000 to 2005, relying on their original or alternative data 
sources. In doing so, I will show the claim of this study is supported even over this 
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extended time period. 
Beginning with the international economic variables, the level of capital openness 
remained high in every country without a change from the status quo of the late 1990s. 
This could be confirmed from the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions, the original source for Quinn's data (See Quinn (1997) for a more 
detailed discussion of his coding scheme.). As for European monetary commitment, eight 
out of the eleven sample countries continued to be inside the Euro zone. Denmark, 
Sweden, and the UK were outside, but these countries still could keep their exchange 
rates virtually fixed to the Euro. According to the OECD Economic Outlook, the Danish 
Krone and Swedish Krona stayed at around 0.1 Euro throughout the period. The British 
Pound was at the 1.5 to 1.6 level. 
Next, the trends in cost control performance are summarized in Table 6. We first 
find Belgium and Italy continued to be the worst performers. But the situation in the other 
countries was better. In Finland, Austria, the Netherlands, and Denmark, the 
macroeconomic and cost indicators were all mixed. In France and Germany, the worse 
macroeconomic indicators were counterbalanced by better cost indicators. The Swedish 
indicators were overall around the European level. Finally, in the UK and Ireland, the 
situation was even better. Both the GDP growth and unemployment were better than the 
European average. The cost indicators were also either mixed (the UK) or all in better 
shape (Ireland). 
Despite these varying performances, the outcome for the dependent variable was 
the same across all those countries. Seen from various country reports from the European 
Industrial Relations Review (EIRR), there was no major change toward a decrease in the 
level of wage coordination. Instead, notable changes were all about specific modes of 
high-level wage coordination. In Belgium, for instance, government unilateral 
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involvement until the late 1990s was replaced by a series of bipartite national negotiations. 
The Italian tripartite negotiation continued under Berlusconi's center-right government, 




Throughout this study, I have explored the relationship between capital openness 
and wage-setting coordination in the developed European countries. I reviewed the 
previous literature, and summarized it into the conditional hypothesis that high capital 
openness motivates employers to de-coordinate the wage-setting process if wages have 
been set under poor control. I then demonstrated that this hypothesis holds only if a 
country is not committed to European monetary integration. 
In a broader theoretical context, this study contributes to the studies on European 
social pacts in an important way. Responding to the pessimism about European 
corporatism (Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Streeck 1998), the studies have shown that this 
form of economic governance is still viable even in the context of European integration 
(Baccaro 2003; Rhodes 2001; Visser and Hemerijck 1997). The need for tight cost control 
in dealing with fierce competition and monetary austerity has been among the most 
important forces to support such an institutional arrangement. However, the studies have 
not provided an explicit explanation for why this pressure for cost control has to be 
handled in collective concertation (Molina and Rhodes 2002), rather than by means of the 
market discipline. Focusing on the area of wage-setting, I provide an answer: at a time 
when the government does not have freedom in macroeconomic and exchange rate 




A POLITICAL CONDITION FOR COORDINATED WAGE-SETTING: THE CASES 
OF ITALY AND SOUTH KOREA 
 
When the national economy performs poorly but the government cannot provide 
active accommodation policies, economic recovery becomes difficult without a tight 
control of wage costs. Focusing on the experiences of developed European countries, 
where governments have been under serious policy constraints from monetary integration, 
previous studies argued that the economic pressure makes the wage-setting process more 
coordinated, if unions and employers are capable of collective action. By increasing 
coordination, it was expected that the economic actors will be able to have tighter control 
of wage costs in a more predictable way (Baccaro 2003; Hassel 2003). The driving 
mechanism for this change was the tripartite political exchange among unions, employers, 
and the government. Here unions accept the idea of peaceful wage moderation, and the 
other participants reward them by committing to employment and avoiding any neo-
liberal reforms on social welfare and the labor market (Molina and Rhodes 2002). 
This study builds on these findings, but contributes to the literature by arguing that 
a change to increasing coordination also depends on another mediating variable, which is 
drawn from the national political party system. More specifically, I look at the patterns of 
party-voter linkage, which show how political parties appeal to voters in democratic 
elections. I then argue that the change occurs only if parties seek votes by providing 
voters with general programmatic benefits (ranging from the leftist to rightist ones). If 
parties compete mostly by making non-programmatic appeals, such as clientelistic vote-
buying or charismatic mobilization (Kitschelt 2000), the change does not happen. 
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The rationale is concerned with the following question: under what circumstance 
the government and industrial actors will be seriously interested in finding a cooperative 
solution for their economic problem. Previous studies suggested that they will be 
generally so motivated if, first, they have suffered seriously from their economy and, 
second, the coordinative solution is likely successful given the industrial actors’ capability 
of collective action. This suggestion, however, can still be challenged if any of those 
actors find a good way to promote their interests, even without tackling the economic 
problem. Here I argue that the patterns of party-voter linkage play an important role in 
exploring such a possibility. More specifically, the linkage pattern determines whether or 
not the government will be interested in resolving the national economic problem. This 
then determines the way that unions and employers will respond. 
Suppose that all the major parties, or at least a significant portion of the governing 
parties --- which are here defined broadly as those parties whose support is crucial to the 
functioning of the government, regardless of whether they are inside or outside the 
cabinet --- compete mostly by making non-programmatic appeals to voters. Then the 
government will not be seriously motivated to deal with the economic problem, or simply 
not able to draw enough consensuses for the effort from the governing parties. This is 
because even without making real improvement in the economy, the parties can still 
survive elections at least in the short run, by relying on their charisma-influenced 
followers or clientelistic supporters. However, the situation changes if all major parties or, 
if not, the governing parties compete by making general policy proposals. Here poor 
economic performance hurts their electoral prospect seriously, because the economic 
situation puts broad voter groups into painful positions, but the parties cannot appease 
these people in a way that clientelistic or charismatic parties can do. The government thus 
finds no other way but to tackle the economic problem and search for a general policy-
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based solution to it. 
Once the government has made its choice, then unions and employers will make 
theirs. If the government is interested in dealing with the national economic problem, they 
will be also. If not, they will not be either. This hierarchy of preferences exists because, as 
will be discussed later in more details, the government decides what it wants by relying 
on the exogenous need from the electoral politics, whereas the industrial actors cannot 
promote their interests by going against the government’s policy initiative. 
Building on this theoretical elaboration, this study also provides an important 
empirical contribution to the literature of comparative industrial relations. Despite the fact 
that a national economic crisis, which is coupled with the government’s inability of 
flexible accommodation, is a recurrent phenomenon in both developed and developing 
democracies, few studies have explored how the crisis impacts on the wage-setting 
process in a general perspective (cf. Baccaro and Lim (2007)). The European literature 
has dealt with the question primarily in the regional context of European integration. For 
the developing countries, there have not been even similar attempts at a regional-level 
generalization. Although a few studies have provided some preliminary analytic 
frameworks by exploring the prospect of corporatist economic governance in those 
regions (Evans 1995; Wiarda 2004), they have not yet provided concrete, testable 
hypotheses regarding the question of wage coordination, discussed here. This study fills 
in this lacuna. By focusing on the patterns of party-voter linkage, I suggest a hypothesis 
which could be applicable to both developed and developing democracies. 
In developed Europe, political parties have competed mostly by making general 
policy proposals. This is because most voters tend to be affluent and well educated given 
the high level of economic development and modernization. Voters thus are not easily 
swayed by clientelistic benefits or any invocation of personal attachments to certain 
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supposedly charismatic leaders. (Austria, Belgium, and Italy were among the few 
examples with a strong tradition of mass-clientelism, but even they have moved to 
programmatic linkage-patterns since the 1980s or 1990s (Kitschelt 2007)). In many 
developing democracies, however, most voters are less affluent and less educated because 
of the intermediate level of development and moderanization. Accordingly, political 
parties, often supported by certain historical legacies from their authoritarian or transition 
periods, find more room for attracting voters with non-programmatic appeals (Choi 1996; 
Kitschelt 1995; Stokes 2005). In this study, I argue that this difference in the political 
environment is likely to produce a systematic effect on the outcomes of wage 
coordination, even if those countries share similar economic and organizational 
conditions. 
In the next section, I discuss the theoretical background for my hypothesis. Then I 
provide empirical support for it in a comparative analysis of Italy and South Korea. 
Focusing on the period of the 1990s to the 2000s, I show these two countries shared 
similar economic and organizational conditions, but reached different outcomes due to 
their different political conditions. 
The choice of these sample countries is justified by the following consideration. 
First, both had a consolidated democracy, which meant that there was no serious 
possibility of authoritarian or extra-legal intervention in the economic adjustment process. 
So, if governments liked to deal with the economic challenge, they could do it only in a 
certain legally or politically acceptable way. This should be noteworthy particularly for 
South Korea, in which the democratic transition was completed only recently in the late 
1980s to the early 1990s. Despite this short history of democracy, elections were held 
competitively. Citizens also enjoyed basic civil/political rights, although the voices of 
powerful interest groups, such as big businesses and oligopolistic media, were over-
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represented in pubic political discourses (Choi 2005). 
Second, the two countries are also well suited to highlight the importance of the 
political condition in the course of tripartite political exchange. First of all, unions and 
employers in these countries had never (as in South Korea) or only rarely (as in Italy) 
been engaged in tripartite policy concertation. This was not surprising for South Korea, 
given its relatively brief period of democratic rule. But it was not so usual for a country in 
developed Europe, where unions and employers generally had more frequently 
participated in such cooperative practices (Ferner and Hyman eds. 1998). Despite this 
lack of previous experience, however, unions and employers in Korea and Italy joined in 
an unfamiliar experiment of tripartite policy coordination when their governments 
persuaded or pressed them to do so. Second, the countries shared similar experiences in 
which the tripartite coordination began in a context of extreme economic or political 
shocks, which produced an exceptional momentum for change. However, the outcomes 
were quite different. Italy could consolidate its initial success because it had reformed the 
old mass-clientelism by establishing a competitive multi-party system. But the South 
Korean experiment ended in failure because a significant portion of the governing parties 
still relied on charismatic vote-mobilization. 
 
3.1. Wage-Setting Coordination In Hard Times 
When a government faces a serious constraint on its macro-economic policy 
making, wage costs need to be tightly controlled to keep the economy in good shape. In 
Europe, for instance, monetary integration has kept governments from engaging in 
flexible macroeconomic accommodation. Currency devaluation is out of option. 
Economic stimulation is also virtually impossible, given that it makes domestic inflation 
higher than in other countries, which first triggers outflow of financial assets and then 
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increases the pressure for currency devaluation (Huber and Stephens 2005). Under this 
circumstance, shocks in wage costs can no longer be compensated for by government 
policy intervention (Iversen and Wren 1998; Martin 1999). Wages thus need to be 
controlled tightly without occurrence of major industrial disputes. If the national economy 
has already been performing poorly, then the call for tight cost control will be even 
greater, pressing the government and industrial actors to search for an immediate solution 
(Pochet and Fajertag 2000). 
A similar story is found among developing countries, especially those countries 
which have been under tight policy supervision from international financial institutions. 
Typically, they have suffered from serious balance-of-payment problems, usually due to 
poor economic performance and declining international reputations. Finding that they can 
no longer finance or pay for their foreign transactions and liabilities, they have decided to 
ask for emergency loans from international financial institutions (e.g. the International 
Monetary Fund (the IMF)). These loans, however, are provided conditional upon the 
borrowers accepting shock therapies for stabilization. So, now all macro-economic 
policies are set to cool down domestic demand and reduce foreign imports. Spending cuts, 
reduction of monetary supply, high interest rates, and very high exchange rates are among 
the good examples of the policy initiative (Bird 1996; Killick 1995). These measures will 
surely be helpful to resolve the balance-of-payment problem as quickly as possible. But, 
they are costly in the sense that they entail high unemployment and economic stagnation. 
To minimize these costs and promote non-inflationary growth, wage costs must be tightly 
controlled. Any failure in this will not only lead to a longer period of economic hardship, 
but also invite even harsher austerity measures from the outside supervisors. 
3.1.1. Previous studies 
The literature of comparative industrial relations, focusing on the recent 
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experiences of developed European countries, argued that this economic pressure impacts 
strongly on the wage-setting process by promoting collective wage coordination. A broad 
sense of crisis shared by all economic actors is the underlying force for this pressure. 
Now the government, union, and employers all agree that their economy is in a deep 
trouble and wage costs must be tightly controlled to get out of the trouble. This consensus 
then increases a pressure for collective wage coordination, in anticipation that it will lead 
to more predictable control of wage costs (Rhodes 2001). 
To turn this pressure into a reality, previous studies added that industrial actors 
need to have a certain capability of collective action. For instance, unions need to be 
organized enough to be able to act credibly at the collective bargaining table (Baccaro 
2003). The employers’ organization is also important because any collective coordination 
beyond the individual company level is not possible (Culpepper 2005) or unsustainable 
(Baccaro and Lim 2007) unless backed up by organized support from employers. An 
interesting point here, however, is that these organizational preconditions are specified 
only moderately, if compared with those by the neo-corporatist literature. Previously, 
industrial actors had to be highly centralized under a strong guidance from their peak 
organizations (Molina and Rhodes 2002). Today, however, unions and employers only 
need to be at least moderately organized. Then the shared sense of crisis will compensate 
for the lack of centralized hierarchy by encouraging them to cooperate with one another 
to address their common urgent economic situation (Baccaro 2002; Regini and Regalia 
1997; Visser and Hemerjick 1997). 
A centrist political exchange among unions, employers, and the government has 
been what drives the process of increasing coordination. Here unions accept the idea of 
peaceful wage moderation. The government then promises not to attempt radical neo-
liberal reforms on social welfare and the labor market. Instead, they seek only moderate 
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reforms or, sometimes, even a small cost-efficient increase in social welfare if the benefit 
systems have been so underdeveloped. The government also promises to increase jobs by 
continuing or, if budget allows, expanding public spending on active labor market 
measures and other policies for human capital. Employers also join in the deal by 
committing to firing less and hiring more workers than they would do otherwise (Huber 
and Stephens 2001; Rhodes 2001; Scharpf 2000; Teulings and Hartog 1998). 
Of course, this centrist compromise may not be the only conceivable path to a deal. 
In fact, there are two more logical alternatives. The first is the traditional neo-corporatist 
exchange, in which the unions’ commitment to wage moderation is compensated for by 
greater social welfare, strong job protection, and expansionary macroeconomic policies 
(Regini 1984; Scharpf 1991). But this generous compensation is no longer possible for 
the following reasons. First, monetary constraint in an integrated Europe has eliminated 
the option of government macroeconomic accommodation (Rhodes 2001). The welfare 
state also has been under serious fiscal stress due to various socio-economic changes such 
as globalization, demographic change, and post-industrialization (Huber and Stephens 
2001; Scharpf 2000). Labor market protection also has been increasingly in conflict with 
the goal of job creation at a time of post-industrialization and flexible production 
(Pontusson and Swenson 1996). To be worse, economic crisis has further increased the 
pressure for the welfare and labor reforms as a means to reduce the financial burden for 
employers. All these suggest that the economic grounds for generous compensation do 
not exist anymore. 
In the meantime, the second alternative comes with neo-liberal reforms in which 
the government or employers take radical steps toward de-coordination of wage-setting, 
de-regulation of the labor market, and retrenchment of social welfare. These policies 
could enhance efficiency by strengthening the principle of market discipline, if 
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implemented consistently over the long run. However, a transition to this new policy 
regime is deemed difficult because of the resistance from relatively strong unions (Hassel 
2003; Traxler 1995). 
All these difficulties with the traditional leftist and the radical rightist solutions 
seem to suggest that any meaningful path to recovery must be found around the zone of 
moderate center, in which all economic actors share the burden of economic adjustment 
for the sake of their common good. This also explains why many observers have 
understood the process of current tripartite concertation as being relatively free of the 
substantive partisan constellations in the national politics (Monila and Rhodes 2002; 
Traxler, Blaschke, and Kittel 2001). 
3.1.2. Party-voter linkage and the motivational condition for increasing coordination 
In light of our discussion on the previous European studies, we now reach a 
conditional hypothesis: an economic crisis at a time of monetary austerity would motivate 
the government and industrial actors to search for a centrist political exchange, if the 
industrial actors are organized at least moderately. However, this hypothesis is not 
sufficiently specified yet because it is still possible that any of those actors find a good 
way to promote their interests, even without tackling the economic challenge. In this 
study, I address this possibility by introducing the role of the party-voter linkage in the 
adjustment process. I argue that the linkage pattern determines whether or not the 
government will be seriously motivated for the cooperative solution. Industrial actors will 
then have to make their choices consistently with this guideline, if they are interested in 
promoting their material interests. 
Suppose that the major parties or the governing parties (or at least a significant 
portion of the governing parties) compete by making non-programmatic appeals to voters. 
Here parties could be linked to voters in a web of mass-clientelism, in which the parties 
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compete to provide particular benefits which are directly tailored to the voters’ specific 
needs (Piattoni 2001; Stokes 2005). In the context of this study, this could mean that at 
least some segments of unions or employers would be given such special treatments. For 
unions and workers, these benefits could include targeted public work programs, selective 
public sector jobs, preferential social transfers, etc. For employers, the benefits may 
include preferential lending, targeted public contracts, tax benefits, and other measures of 
rent-seeking. In exchange for receiving these special rents, the beneficiaries will then 
deliver their votes and other necessary resources to their patron parties. 
Meanwhile, political parties can also draw mass votes, based on the personal 
charisma of their leaders. If this is the case, parties do not even need to provide any 
meaningful policy benefits for their voters, whether general or particularistic. Instead, 
they garner votes based on the voters’ reverence or empathy toward their leaders, who are 
believed to have some extraordinary capabilities and personal characters (Madsen and 
Snow 1991; Shils 1965; Spencer 1973; Weber 1968). Of course, these parties will still 
need to pay some concrete benefits to certain resource-rich supporters from whom they 
extract essential resources for their political activities --- financial, organizational, or other. 
Those supporters are in general better positioned to develop more independent 
preferences than other ordinary citizens, meaning that their loyalty cannot be secured 
simply by their emotional or psychological attachments to charismatic leaders. Also, 
given that these people are relatively small-sized and easily identifiable, the benefits 
should be highly tailored to their particular needs. 
In all these political situations, the tripartite political exchange for economic 
recovery does not take place or, even if it is attempted, cannot end in success. This is 
because the government either does not have serious motivation for the solution or cannot 
draw enough consensuses for the effort from the governing parties. In mass-clientelism, 
 67 
for instance, parties only need to continue their preferential treatment for selected clients, 
and monitor them to see if they keep their promises of delivering their support. True, this 
clientelistic practice will contribute to perpetuating the economy in trouble, which in the 
long run will possibly lead to exhaustion of the material resources necessary for the 
practice. However, to the extent that the patron parties can continue to provide 
clientelistic benefits at least in the short run, and can garner mass votes in exchange of 
these benefits, they will not be seriously interested in the project of recovery. This is 
simply too risky because it entails a substantial reform on their clientelistic networks, 
which will lead to alienation of their core supporters. 
The situation is similar, although with a different reason, where parties rely mostly 
on their charismatic leaders to garner mass votes. Here the major voter groups may suffer 
from the poor economic situation, and thus are likely to be critical of the parties for the 
failure of macroeconomic management. When the election time comes in, however, many 
of them are easily swayed by the emotional or psychological rhetoric employed by their 
charismatic leaders. The voters either become blind to the real economic issues, or are 
bought into some perverted analyses which are provided by their leaders about the causes 
of and the solution to the problem. Under this circumstance, parties are not seriously 
motivated to tackle their national economic problem. The charismatic politics is still 
working, and the reform will only create unnecessary tensions by encouraging parties to 
engage in rational and realistic discussions on their troubled economy. This will not only 
contribute to disenchantment and de-mobilization of their charisma-affected mass 
followers, but also alienate their resource-rich supporters, who will be asked to forgo their 
special rents in the course of economic reform. 
Now a natural question to be asked is how unions and employers would respond 
to these government preferences. My answer is that they will not act in a way to promote 
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economic recovery. Beginning with the case of mass-clientelism, unions and employers 
inside the clientelistic networks will obviously continue to solicit particularisitic 
treatments from their government. None of these benefits will be conditional on the 
beneficiaries paying due costs for addressing the national economic problem, meaning 
that the benefits are pure rents levied against the society. This in turn makes unions and 
employers outside the clientelistic networks less interested in the project of recovery. 
Although they do suffer from a poor economy, they are justly suspicious that their 
sacrifices would not make any meaningful difference, given the continued prevalence of 
mass-clientelism. 
The situation is also similar for the case of charismatic politics. First, suppose that 
unions and employers (usually only certain small influential subsets of them) are inside 
the power circle. They usually provide the government with some essential resources for 
its charismatic politics, in exchange for receiving certain special rents. Here they are not 
interested in the project of economic recovery, because they do not want to forgo the rents 
in the process of collective burden sharing for recovery. Second, industrial actors, 
especially mass unions, could be ordinary supporters for the charismatic parties. Then, 
they will be ready for doing whatever they are called to do by the parties. Mass unions, 
for instance, can even make serious sacrifices by moderating their wage demands . These 
sacrifices, however, are not likely to promote recovery. They are simply wasted by 
various direct/indirect taxes to the government and also by various preferential rents 
given to the core supporters of the governing parties. Finally, unions and employers can 
be outside the reach of the charismatic politics. In this case, their choice will be similar to 
those who are outside the clientelistic networks above. Suspecting that their sacrifices 
will be just wasted away, they curtail their interest in any serious projects for economic 
recovery. 
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In the meantime, we have quite a different situation if all the major parties or the 
governing parties compete by making programmatic appeals to voters. Here parties 
cannot rely on either clientelistic vote-buying or charismatic mobilization. Instead, they 
must provide a general public-goods type of policy benefits for their voters (Kitschelt 
2000). At a time of economic crisis, this means that the parties --- regardless of their 
partisanship --- really need to find a good way for economic recovery. None of profits, 
wages, jobs, and social protection will remain safe under a poorly performing economy, 
which will likely produce electoral setbacks for the governing parties.  
The effort for recovery will also provide the governing parties with additional 
benefits: it will help them attract extra electoral support from non-partisan independent 
voters. These voters tend to cast their votes based on their rational reviews of competing 
policy proposals. Finding that economic recovery will improve their material conditions, 
directly or indirectly, they will appreciate the government’s effort by delivering their 
votes. 
Now it is time for unions and employers to decide whether or not they will 
cooperate with the government’s initiative for a centrist tripartite deal. The answer is that, 
given that the government’s commitment is steadfast and well grounded in the electoral 
politics, unions and employers will find no other way but to accept the initiative and join 
in the process of collective burden sharing. Refusal of cooperation will simply prolong 
the economic crisis and, especially from the viewpoint of unions, will further destabilize 
the already problematic system of social welfare and labor market protection. 
 
3.2. Italy: The Reform Of Mass-Clientelism And The Success Of Coordination 
To provide empirical support for the hypothesis developed so far, I conduct a 
comparative analysis of Italy and South Korea, focusing on the period of the 1990s and 
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the early 2000s. The analysis will show that, controlling the economic and industrial 
organizational variables, the pattern of the party-voter linkage was a decisive factor in 
determining the success or failure of the tripartite political exchange. More specifically, I 
will establish the following factual arguments. First, the governments in both countries 
could be fully motivated for the cooperative solution only if the major parties or the 
governing parties relied on general programmatic appeals to voters. Second, this 
government choice was exogenous to the preferences of unions and employers, and these 
actors had to follow the guideline to promote their interests. Finally, certain economic or 
political shocks could create a momentum for a change to more coordination, but this 
effect was only temporary and thus needed to be backed up by a favorable political 
condition from the party-voter linkage. 
3.2.1. Initial conditions 
The Italian economy was performing poorly during the whole period covered in 
this study (Ferrera and Gualmini 2000). The unemployment rate, for instance, was as high 
as 10.2% from 1986 to 2002, which was clearly above the average of 7.2% for the 18 
OECD countries of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the UK, and the USA (Huber et al. 2004). Despite the economic difficulty, 
however, the government was not able to provide flexible accommodating policies due to 
its firm commitment to monetary austerity. Italy joined in the project of European 
monetary integration in the second half of the 1980s, with its preparation for the EMU. Its 
commitment became steadfast from 1990, when its government decided to tighten the 
margin for the lira’s fluctuation in the ERM from the previous 6% to the standard 2.25% 
(OECD 1991c, 11-8; Perez 2002). 
Turning to the industrial actors, Italian workers were moderately organized. The 
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level of union density (the share of union members among the total wage and salary 
earners) was around 38% from 1986 to 2002, which was roughly close to the average of 
41% for the 18 OECD countries (Huber et al. 2004). Peak-level unions also were actively 
representing member unions on the national stage, although they could not enjoy a strong 
hierarchical authority over their members (Visser 1996). The situation was similar with 
employers. The biggest employers’ national confederation, Confindustria, did represent a 
vast majority of Italian employers, especially those from the manufacturing and 
construction sectors. Its membership coverage even expanded in the 1990s when it 
recruited new employers from the former public sectors, which were just privatized. But 
the power of Confindustria was still limited vis-à-vis member employers. This was 
especially true when it comes to the issue of wage setting (Regalia and Regini 1998; 
Visser 1996). 
Under these circumstances, Italy became one of the ideal examples in which 
economic crisis made the wage-setting process more coordinated --- despite the lack of 
strong organizational hierarchy among unions and employers. A sense of vulnerability, 
shared by all economic actors, was considered as the primary force behind the change 
(Baccaro 2002; Negrelli 2000; Regini and Regalia 1997). However, I argue, these 
previous studies need to be further elaborated because they do not pay due attention to the 
motivational condition for the tripartite cooperation. Even with those favorable economic 
and organizational conditions, the government and industrial actors can still fail to agree 
on a cooperative solution. This is because, depending on situations, at least some of those 
actors can find a good way to promote their interests, even without improving the national 
economy. In this study, I deal with this possibility by introducing the pattern of the party-
voter linkage produces in the adjustment process. The variable first affects the preference 
of the government for dealing with the national economic problem, which then affects the 
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preferences of unions and employers. 
As will be discussed in greater details below, this hypothesis is well grounded in 
the Italian experience. The Italian politics until the early 1990s had been dominated by 
Christian democrats (the DC), who had stayed in power for decades only by switching 
their minor coalition partners. To continue in its power, the DC had developed an 
extensive web of patron-clientelism. Although it could not co-opt the leadership of unions 
and employers, who were more interested in general public policies and ideologies 
(Regalia and Regini 1998), the DC did co-opt some significant portions of workers and 
businesses especially from the South. It drew mass votes from them in exchange for 
various preferential treatments, such as public employment, social benefits, exclusive 
accesses to government projects and loans, and selective public spending (Hopkin and 
Mastropaolo 2001; Warner 2001). Under this circumstance, the DC’s interest in tackling 
the national economic problems really depended on the crisis of mass-clientelism. 
Without this, the party still could attempt a solution, but only with a diminishing 
commitment. Industrial actors then had to make their choices in a way which was 
consistent with this government preference. It was thus only after the mass-clientelism 
was put into crisis in the early 1990s, that the Italian governments and the industrial 
actors became seriously committed to the cooperative project of recovery. 
3.2.2. Mass-clientelism and the failure of an early attempt at coordination 
Looking at the Italian experience more closely, national talks for wage-
coordination began in around 1990. There was a growing pressure that wage costs, which 
had been relatively high due to the unions’ wage militancy and frequent industrial 
disputes, should be put under tight control to deal with the poorly performing economy 
and monetary austerity (Perez 2002). Even the clientelist government bought this idea. It 
could even persuade the leaderships of the labor movement --- who were still deeply 
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divided by the ideological rivalry between the leftist CGIL and the Christian-democratic 
CISL --- to agree on the idea of tripartite political exchange to promote peaceful wage 
moderation (Negrelli 2000). 
The 1990 negotiations marked the earnest beginning of all this government-led 
collective effort. There, the government agreed with unions and employers that their 
company-level wage-setting system --- which had been coupled with an automatic wage 
indexation formula, scala mobile (Visser 1996) --- should be replaced by an alternative 
one with more spirit of voluntary wage moderation. This change then should be backed 
up by various government policies which would promote workers’ long-term interests, 
such as jobs and sustainable social protection. 
More specifically, unions agreed to abolish the scala mobile, which had been 
blamed for the chronic problem of wage-inflations, by the end of 1991. In return, 
employers agreed to rationalize collective bargaining by institutionalizing a two-tiered 
wage negotiation system, in which the industry-level negotiators would produce basic 
wage guidelines by considering the nationwide trend of inflation, and then the company-
level negotiators would finalize the wage settlements by adding some company-specific 
considerations in the guidelines (Regalia and Regini 1998). The government supported 
this compromise by promising jobs and other reform measures for social welfare, in 
which employers’ contributions would be reduced but without radical cuts in benefits 
(EIRR 1990). 
However, this initiative for tripartite policy concertation did not last long. In the 
follow-up negotiations in 1991, the participants re-confirmed abolishment of the scala 
mobile, but they also agreed to continue national talks to search for a nationwide 
compensatory measure to protect real wages. Implementation of the new collective 
bargaining system was also postponed without a specific time table (EIRR 1992a). 
 74 
The prevalence of mass-clientelism in the electoral politics, I argue, was the 
primary reason for this delay and lack of progress. While recognizing the national 
economic problem, the government still continued its old clientelistic practices in order to 
maintain the electoral support from core clients. This is well-illustrated by the trend of 
government spending in the early 1990s (OECD 1991c, 11-8, 21-9; OECD 1992b, 56-60). 
After the lira devaluation in 1990, the government began to retighten the exchange rates 
as well as domestic monetary supply, as a means to restoring price stability. But it still 
continued a flexible approach to fiscal policies. Spending increased significantly in the 
areas of social securities (especially, public pensions) and the pays for public employees, 
which were among the primary loci of the Italian mass-clientelism (Ferrera and Gualmini 
2000). 
Not coincidentally, the government was increasingly losing its interest in the 
tripartite negotiations. It eventually decided to leave with the future government the task 
of implementing the 1990 agreement. This in turn made industrial actors, especially union 
confederations, increasingly pessimistic about the prospect of the tripartite negotiations in 
their country (Negrelli 2000). The socialist CGIL even decided to negate the 1990-1991 
agreements by demanding that the wages in 1992 still should be determined by the 
previous scala mobile. It also proposed a new national wage-indexation system, as a 
functional equivalent to the old formula (EIRR 1992b). 
3.2.3. Momentums for change: political and economic shocks 
The state of insufficient motivation, however, changed dramatically with the series 
of political and economic shocks took place in 1992. The lira crisis in 1992 worsened the 
Italian economy to a stage of national emergency (Perez 2002). The DC-led government 
also was hit hard by the anti-corruption investigations led by the “clean hands” judges 
(Newell and Bull 1997). Finding itself in a perilous situation for the next election, then 
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the government was eager to strike a deal with social partners. It hoped to improve its 
reputation on macroeconomic management and also solicit votes from outside the 
clientelistic networks. This initiative eventually led to the 1992 emergency pact, which 
was finalized in 1993 under a new politically-neutral technocratic government (Baccaro 
and Lim 2007). 
Throughout the negotiations, the DC-led government pressed still ambivalent 
social partners, especially the CGIL, by taking a “take it or leave it” approach (EIRR 
1993b). Leaving the option of unilateralism wide open, it proposed a comprehensive deal 
which would not only reconfirm the issues which had been agreed on in the 1990 
negotiations, but also include other important issues (such as pension reform and wage 
differentials) which were still in the beginning of serious discussion (EIRR 1992c, 1993a, 
1993b). 
Faced with this firm resolve, social partners had no other choices but to participate 
in the deal. Non-cooperation would only mean prolongation of the economic crisis and, 
especially for the unions, further challenges over the already problematic systems of 
social welfare and labor market protection. By participating in the deal, however, they 
could negotiate specific terms to their interests. For instance, the unions initially did not 
want to include the issue of pension reform in the deal, as illustrated by the general strike 
which was organized by all the major confederations in October 1992, but they decided to 
negotiate the issue and eventually could the previous pension benefits safe at least for 
public pensioners (EIRR 1992d, 1993a). 
3.2.4. New party politics and the success of coordination 
An interesting point here is that the renewed process of tripartite coordination 
continued even after the lira crisis and the political crisis were all over. The wage 
guideline set by the 1992/1993 deal continued to be effective, in which industry-level 
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negotiators set some industry-wide wage guidelines for a two-year period, and then 
company-level negotiators reached their final wage deals by further considering 
company-specific productivity issues at the bargaining table (EIRO 2001). Several other 
national agreements also followed to deal with such issues as job creation and 
welfare/labor reforms followed. For instance, the 1995 pension reform finalized the 
1992/1993 reform in a phased manner, by allowing the benefits for current and near-
future pensioners to reduce gradually (EIRR 1996a). The 1998 pact for development and 
employment also made significant progress in labor market flexibility and tax reductions 
for employers (EIRR 1999a). Entering the 2000s, the process of coordination became 
noisier, due to the CGIL’s decision to establish itself as the main political opposition to 
Berlusconi’s center-right government. The government also responded by a threat and 
limited use of unilateralism (EIRO 2003d). Nevertheless, nationwide talks continued. The 
‘Pact for Italy’ in 2002 provided small-business employers with more freedom for hiring 
and firing, although in a still regulated fashion (EIRO 2002c). The 2004 pension reform 
widened the room for the supplementary, privately-managed tier of the national pension 
system (EIRO 2003b, 2004b). 
Given that the previous attempt at the tripartite political exchange in 1990 and 
1991 ended in failure and also that the subsequent success in 1992 and 1993 was mainly 
due to certain temporary political/economic shocks, the overall success of the tripartite 
deals since the mid-1900s warrants a careful examination. Here I emphasize the fact that 
the Italian political system changed from one in which the governing parties garnered 
mass votes by relying on mass-clientelism, to an alternative system in which all major 
parties competed by making general programmatic appeals. The anti-corruption drive led 
by the “clean hands” resulted in complete breakdown of the DC and its subordinate 
socialist PSI, who had been the core players in the clientelistic networks (Newell and Bull 
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1997). This political vacuum then was filled in by the social democratic PDS (the former 
communist PCI) and other new anti-clientelist center/right parties, which entered the 
national political scene in the 1994 election. Since then, the Italian party system has been 
characterized by a centripetal policy competition between broad center-right and center-
left coalitions (D’Alimonte and Bartolini 1997). 
In this new political situation, all governments had to pay serious attention to the 
challenge of their economy. Given that the clientelistic vote-buying was no longer a 
viable option, the only way to reward their supporters and also attract independent voters 
was to provide general policy benefits for them. Especially at a time of economic 
hardship, such attempt had to include any serious plan for economic recovery. 
Governments thus attempted a series of centrist political exchanges, although in a trial-
and-error manner in which they initially adopted partisan approaches to recovery, but 
ended up tilting toward centrist ones. 
For instance, Berlusconi’s center-right government (elected in March, 1994) began 
its first year by pushing for a radical pension reform, which aimed at a swift fix for the 
troubled pension financing system (Natali and Rhodes 2004). Faced with massive protests 
by unions, however, the Northern League, the largest coalition partner for Berlusconi, 
began to worry about the electoral repercussions of the reform. This then provoked an 
internal dispute within the governing coalition, and eventually contributed to the collapse 
of the government in December of 1994 (EIRR 1994). The subsequent center-left 
government (elected in 1996) also took a similar approach, but this time by clinging to 
leftist policies. Among the best examples was the work-time reduction bill in 1997, which 
aimed at rapid reduction of weekly work-hours from 40 to 35 by 2001. This was pushed 
by the PDS, a left wing of the governing coalition. But, being faced with strong 
resentments from employers and also worried about potential electoral setbacks, the PDS 
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moderated its initial position and let the bill be a symbolic recommendation (EIRO 
1997e; EIRR 1999c). Finally, Berlusconi’s second center-right government (elected in 
2001) also began with a strong partisan approach by pushing hard for easier lay-offs for 
small businesses and also mandatory facilitation of the private-tier of the national pension 
system. After a period of confrontation with the unions, however, it withdrew from the 
initial hard-line approach, and became more open for compromise with unions (EIRO 
2002a, 2002b). 
All these episodes provided unions and employers with credible signals that not 
only were their governments serious about fixing the national economy, but any possible 
solutions for recovery would have to be found around the zone of moderate center, in 
which all participants would share their due burdens for the sake of the common interest 
of recovery. Not coincidentally, major successes in the tripartite exchange took place after 
governments abandoned their partisan approaches and thus ended their strong 
confrontations with social partners. The 1995 pension reform came after the breakdown 
of Berlusconi’s first government. The 1998 pact for development and employment 
accompanied the failure of the work-time reduction plan. And the 2002 ‘Pact for Italy’ 
and the 2004 pension reform came after Berlusconi’s second government softened its 
hard-line approach on labor market flexibility and pensions. 
 
3.3. South Korea: Charismatic Politics And The Failure Of Coordination 
South Korea provides another example for exploring the effect of party-voter 
linkage on wage-setting coordination. There, the initial conditions were as similar as in 
Italy. The economy was in crisis, but the government was not able to provide flexible 
accommodating policies. Industrial actors also were moderately organized. Lastly, an 
exogenous political shock facilitated national talks among the government, unions, and 
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employers. But the final outcome was different. While Italy could solidify its initial 
success by reforming its mass-clientelism, South Korea did not, because a significant 
portion of the governing parties still relied on charismatic vote-mobilization during the 
period of crisis. 
3.3.1. Initial conditions 
The economic crisis in South Korea started suddenly in the winter of 1997, when 
various short-term international funds led a series of speculative attacks on the Korean 
financial market, which triggered a crisis in the foreign currency reserves of the country. 
The government had to borrow emergency loans from the IMF to cover dollar shortage. 
Subsequent stabilization programs, which were conditional on the borrowing, produced a 
very tight macroeconomic environment. Among the most important measures was drastic 
currency depreciation. According to the Korean Statistics Office (http://www.kosis.kr/), 
one US dollar, as of 1996, was traded for 805 Korean won in the Korean foreign 
exchange market. But by the end of 1997, the dollar was traded for as much as 1,695 won. 
It then stayed high at the average of 1,251 won level until the end of the IMF guidance in 
2001. Unlike usual currency manipulations which aimed at boosting economy, this drastic 
devaluation obviously was meant for a shock therapy, aiming at cooling down an 
economy which was highly dependent on foreign trades. 
The government expected that these austerity measures would help addressing the 
problem in the financial market by reducing foreign imports and improving the balance of 
current accounts quickly. But the measures were costly in the sense that they sapped the 
potential for recovery. For instance, the overall investments, as measured by the total 
fixed capital investments, dropped significantly from the average of 10% increase in 
1990-1997, to -0.5% decrease in 1998-2001. Unemployment, which had been around the 
2.4% level in 1990-1997, was more than doubled to reach 5.4% in 1998-2001. If we focus 
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on the years of 1998 and 1999, when the national talks for the tripartite political exchange 
were experimented and then failed, the unemployment rate was around 7% (Korean 
Statistics Office, http://www.kosis.kr/). 
Turning to the industrial actors, Korean employers were relatively moderately 
organized. True, there were no hierarchical organizations for employers at either the 
national or industry level, but the web of big business conglomerations (called the 
Chaebols), a variant of the Japanese Keiretsu system, provided an informal but effective 
medium for coordinating business activities in the major manufacturing and service 
industries. The network not only set the basic parameters for investment and employment 
in all major private sectors, but also played an important role in shaping the government’s 
industrial and labor market policies (Wade 1990; Woo 1991). 
Korean workers were also moderately organized. Notice that the absolute level of 
union organization was low, as shown by the 10% level of union density throughout the 
1990s (Ministry of Labor, several years). This was mainly due to the legacy of the 
previous ‘state corporatism,’ in which authoritarian governments oppressed workers’ self-
organization at a time of industrial expansion, and also due to the relatively small size of 
the Korean public sector, along with still the illegal status for public-sector unions (Choi 
1997; Deyo 1989). In the wake of the democratic transition in 1987, however, the Korean 
labor movement was mobilized to a level, which was far beyond what the numerical 
figures would suggest. For instance, unions could successfully organize mass protests and 
other political strikes in selective private and public sectors, when the government and big 
businesses attempted a neo-liberal labor-market reform in 1996 and 1997. The reform 
package included various measures for labor market flexibility, such as part-time 
employment, easy lay-offs, and flexible working hours, but eventually failed to pass 
legislation due to unions’ resistance (Choi 1997; Im 2003; Kang 1998; Song 1999). 
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The newly organized unions in big business conglomerations led the process of 
union galvanization (Im 1999; Sun 2002). First, they played an effective role of pattern-
setting, albeit informal, in the annual collective bargaining which was concentrated in the 
spring season. They also provided a key organizational support for the new peak 
confederation, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), which emerged as an 
alternative to the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), the former state-controlled 
confederation during the authoritarian period (Mah 1998). 
Despite these favorable conditions, however, the path to coordinative wage-setting 
was deemed difficult in South Korea. This was because of the characteristics of the 
Korean political party system, in which the dominant party in the system relied heavily on 
charismatic mobilization of mass votes. The close relationship between the party and 
strong special interest groups, such as the Chaebols, added further difficulty to this path 
to change. 
Throughout the 1990s, there were two major parties which competed with each 
other in the national assembly and presidential elections (South Korea adopted a 
presidential system in which the executive and legislative branches were selected in 
separate popular elections). Both parties had their own regional strongholds in the 
Kyungsang and the Cholla regions, respectively, but none of these supports were 
associated with any policy benefits, either particularistic or general-programmatic (Choi 
1996; Park 1998; Kwon 2005). Instead, the regional voters threw their support because 
they had some strong emotional or psychological attachments to their leaders (Choi 1996; 
Im 2004). Overall, the Kyungsang party prevailed. It won in all of the two presidential 
elections (1987 and 1992), which were held between the 1987 democratic transition and 
the 1997 economic crisis. The party also continued to hold a near majority position in the 
national assembly throughout the 1990s. 
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An interesting point here is that to win or survive in national elections, the parties 
also needed to earn sizeable support from the metropolitan Seoul area, where voters were 
relatively free from charismatic mobilization. There, the Kyungsang party appealed to 
strongly-conservative voter blocs, whereas the Cholla party appealed to relatively liberal-
reformist voters (Kang 2003). This, however, did not change the defining characteristics 
of the party-voter linkage because the dominant Kyungsang party still maintained its 
position by mainly relying on its regional support (Lee 1998). But the Cholla party had to 
invest more seriously on its general policy appeals to the metropolitan voters, given that 
the size of its regional voters was too small to compete with the Kyungsang party. 
According to the online database of the National Election Commission 
(http://www.nec.go.kr/sinfo/index.html), the size of votes cast by the Cholla residents 
were 43 to 45% of those by the Kyungsang residents throughout the 1990s. 
The Kyungsang party also had a special relation with the Chaehols, the most 
powerful special interest group in Korea. In exchange for receiving massive financial 
donations, legal or illegal, as well as a strong support in the area of public opinions (Choi 
2005), the party provided the Chaebols with a wide range of rents, including recognition 
of illegal or quasi-illegal practices in corporate governance, preferential access to bank 
loans and governmental assistance, etc. (Kang 2002). 
All these discussions suggest that the powerful Kyungsang party would not be 
interested in addressing the national economic problem. Without this general policy 
initiative, the party still could maintain its preeminent position in the national politics by 
relying on its regional voters, on top of the strongly-partisan conservative voters in the 
metropolitan area. Furthermore, any serious plan for recovery would entail 
discontinuation of the rents for the Chaebols, the party’s core supporters. Not surprisingly, 
the party continued the electoral strategy of regional vote-mobilization along with its 
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conservative discourses, even in the 2000 national assembly election which took place in 
the middle of the crisis (Ahn 2001). 
3.3.2. A momentum for change: the 1997 presidential election 
In this political setting, a meaningful attempt to address the economic crisis took 
place only with a help of an exogenous shock. This shock came with the 1997 presidential 
election, in which the former opposition leader Kim Dae Jung from the Cholla-based 
National Congress for New Politics (the NCNP) defeated his rival Lee Hoe Chang from 
the Kyungsang-based Grand National Party (the GNP). Kim’s victory was generally not 
expected, given the strength of the GNP. Nonetheless, his victory brought the country an 
extraordinary momentum for change. He was the first liberal, centrist president since the 
breakdown of democracy in 1960, which provided him with a great source of political 
legitimacy when he attempted various reform agenda. Furthermore, to stay in power 
despite his narrow regional base, his party really needed to expand and consolidate the 
support from liberal and independent voters in the metropolitan Seoul area. He had to 
show them some clear evidence of success in his centrist reforms. When it came to the 
economy, Kim’s task was to persuade powerful big businesses and the recently-organized 
militant unions to agree on cooperative burden-sharing for economic recovery (Kang 
1999). 
In Korea, note that the deal had to include broader issues than in other European 
countries. First, there was a broad consensus that the economic crisis was aided by a 
failure of overall governance in the major business sectors. In other words, the financial 
market was so vulnerable to the speculative attacks because of corruptions in the 
business-finance networks, in which big banks pipelined cheap loans to the Chaebols, 
who used the money to finance uncompetitive companies in their domestic business 
empires (Kim 1998). Second, even after the democratic transition, the unions in South 
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Korea had not been given a full range of organizational and political rights. Unionization 
was still prohibited for public-sector workers and teachers; unemployed workers also 
could not join in unions; and no unions could engage in ordinary political activities 
(including financial donations) (Song 1999). 
Under this circumstance, any serious plan for recovery had to include not only 
such general issues as cost control, jobs, the labor market, and social welfare, but also 
other specific measures for corporate governance and business restructuring, which would 
be necessary to correct the failure of the major businesses. Unions also needed to have 
full citizenship in the industrial relations before they could possibly join in a public-
minded collective effort for national economic recovery (Kang 1999; Kim 1998). 
At the beginning of the negotiations, unions and employers insisted on their 
partisan solutions to the economic crisis. Unions emphasized the need for corporate 
governance reform and business restructuring, while refusing to provide any specific 
plans for how to moderate national wage costs. Employers, on the other hand, emphasized 
on labor market flexibility (especially freedom to fire regular workers) as a means to cost 
control, while trying to avoid any serious discussions on the issues of corporate 
governance reform and business restructuring (Ryu 2003). However, this attitude changed 
as the new president showed his strong commitment to a centrist deal-making. He 
convened direct talks with unions and employers to discuss the reform issues. He also 
appointed key political figures from his party to engage in the negotiations with social 
partners (ESDC 2002). These efforts eventually led to a historic tripartite pact in February 
1998, which was unprecedented in the history of the Korean industrial relations. 
In this compromise, unions agreed on the idea of peaceful wage moderation. They 
also agreed on serious measures for labor market flexibility, giving employers freedom to 
fire regular workers although with some regulations. In response, employers promised to 
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take serious steps for corporate governance reform and business restructuring, which 
would target big banks and the Chaebols. The government also promised to improve 
labor rights by permitting unions’ political activities and also legalizing unionization of 
public employees, teachers, and the unemployed. The government also increased 
unemployment spending, and promised moderate expansion of social welfare, which had 
been provided primarily by big businesses for their workers and families (ESDC 2008). 
Among these agreements, those regarding the labor market flexibility and labor 
rights were the most significant ones. This was because those issues had been among the 
top priorities for employers and unions for years since the democratic transition (ESDC 
2002). Unions worried that their activities had been threatened by serious restrictions on 
their legal rights. Employers thought that their profits had been challenged by regular 
workers whose jobs were so strongly protected. For instance, the EPL score (an OECD 
aggregate measure for the strictness of protection against dismissals) was 3.22 for Korean 
regular workers in the 1990s until the break of the 1997 financial crisis. The socre was not 
only higher than the average 2.12 of the 22 OECD countries (excluding the countries 
from Eastern Europe). But it also was among the highest of all the member countries. In 
this situation, the issue of the flexibility in the regular labor market became a functional 
equivalent to the issue of wage moderation in most other European countries. 
3.3.3. Persistence of the charismatic politics and the failure of coordination 
Unlike the Italian case, however, the initial success in Korea did not last long. 
First, the key agreements were implemented only selectively. The flexibility measures 
passed legislation immediately, but those for labor rights did not. In addition, there was 
no real progress on other issues which were broadly agreed in the February pact in 
anticipation that they would be further specified in the next stage of negotiations (ESDC 
2002, 2008). 
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The GNP was the driving force behind the failure. True, its dominant position 
weakened after the defeat in the 1997 presidential election. However, the party still held a 
near majority position in the national assembly, meaning that the new government could 
not function without its support. Exploiting this veto power, the GNP began a strong anti-
pact campaign as soon as the February pact was signed. In the legislative session, which 
was convened soon after the pact to provide a legal backup for the key agreements, the 
GNP passed all the measures for labor market flexibility, but expressed strong reservation 
on virtually every measure regarding labor rights (Kim 2000; Sun 2002). 
With this strong anti-pact campaign from the legislature, the tripartite negotiations 
were put on hold. The government, however, was still eager to engage in the pact-
building process. It continued to pledge to pass the measures for labor rights in the 
upcoming legislative session at the National Assembly, scheduled for September to 
December (The Hankyoreh 05 May 1998). Social partners then responded positively to 
the government’s call by continuing their participation in the tripartite talks. Of course, 
unions took a more ambivalent approach, if compared with employers who had just 
obtained significant gains from the flexibility measures. For instance, the members of the 
KCTU rejected the February pact at their national convention called for right after the 
pact. All leaderships then had to resign, and new leaderships pledged immediate 
withdrawal from the negotiations. They even called two general strikes in the spring of 
1998 to prove their firm opposition to the flexibility measures. However, the KCTU 
revoked both calls at the last minutes. They then came back to the national talks, 
eventually accepting the flexibility measures although reluctantly (The Hankyoreh 10 Feb. 
1998, 13 Feb. 1998, 06 June 1998). 
As approaching the end of 1998, however, unions became increasingly doubtful 
about the government’s commitment. Although the National Assembly had been in 
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session since September, no measures for labor rights had been passed as promised. To 
appease these complaints, the government attempted to pass the measures in the final 
days of the legislative session. But this effort turned out to be a catastrophic failure. For 
instance, the legalization of the teachers’ unions, which was among the most salient issues 
at that time, could not pass legislation because, in addition to the well-known objection by 
the GNP, there was an internal dispute within the governing party which was led by those 
who were leaning to the GNP’s position (The Hankyoreh 22 Dec. 1998). The bill for 
legalizing unemployed workers’ unions, which was at the final stage of legislative 
proposal, was revoked at the last minute due to an objection from within the government 
bureaucracy (The Hankyoreh 18 Dec. 1998). 
For unions, all these events clearly suggested that the idea of tripartite policy 
coordination would not be relevant in their country. After having been constantly checked 
by the GNP’s objection, the government now appeared to be no longer able or willing to 
engage in the cooperative effort for economic recovery. The KCTU then announced its 
permanent withdrawal from the negotiations, and began focus on its previous hard-line 
approach. It publicly negated its concession on the issue of labor market flexibility, while 
demanding expansion of social welfare and work-time reduction (without pay cuts) (The 
Hankyoreh 25 Feb. 1999).  
In response, the centrist FKTU, which was in competition with the KCTU, also 
began taking a tough approach at the negotiation table. The FKTU also became 
increasingly ambivalent towards the talks, alternating between participation and 
withdrawal. In response, employers also took a tougher approach to the unions and the 
government, especially on the issue of corporate governance reform. They also soon 
began to alternate between participation and withdrawal from the talks. The historic 




In this study, I provided a political explanation for the success and failure of 
coordinated wage-setting, in a general context which is applicable to both developed 
Europe and developing democracies. I built on the finding of the previous European 
studies, that the wage-setting process is more coordinated when relatively organized 
industrial actors meet a national economic crisis. But I argued that these actors are not 
sufficiently motivated for the solution unless the government is motivated in the same 
way. Relying on the literature of party-voter linkage, I then showed that the government 
chooses to deal with the problem only if parties compete by making general programmatic 
appeals to voters. If parties compete via non-programmatic appeals, the government does 
not deal with the problem seriously. 
In a broad context of the corporatism literature, this study provides two substantial 
contributions. First, it enriches our understanding on the corporatism in the developing 
world. Most previous studies dealt with this topic in the context of authoritarian “state 
corporatism,” as opposed to democratic “societal corporatism” (Schmitter 1979). Recent 
studies, however, have begun to take a different look by exploring the conditions as well 
as challenges for societal corporatism in developing democracies (See Evans (1995) and 
Wiarda ed. (2004), among others, for the general framework of this approach). This study 
joins in this attempt by highlighting a political precondition for the societal corporatist 
wage-setting in these countries. 
Second, the study also provides a critical assessment on the literature of European 
corporatism, especially on their understanding of the recent corporatist experiences in 
developed Europe. Unlike the traditional neo-corporatism literature, which emphasized 
government partisanship (Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange 1991; Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979) 
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or the consociational politics (Lehmbruch 1979; Lijphart and Crepaz 1991) as a 
precondition for the success of corporatist interest-intermediation or concertation, the new 
literature of ‘competitive corporatism’ tends to consider corporatism as being free of the 
substantive configurations of the national politics (Molina and Rhodes 2002; Traxler, 
Blaschke, and Kittel 2001). This approach is justified in part because, as discussed in this 
study, the terms of the political exchange these days are structured so narrowly around the 
zone of moderate center that neither strongly leftist nor neo-liberal solutions can provide 
a viable alternative. While recognizing this constraint, I argue that the national politics 
still play an important role in a way that the researchers have not paid attention to, namely, 
by determining the government’s willingness to deal with a national economic problem. 
From this perspective, the reason why the governments in most developed European 
countries have been so serious about their economic challenges is because the major 




INTER-UNION RIVALRY AND THE MODALITY OF POLITICAL EXCHANGE: 
THE EXPERIENCE OF FIVE COUNTRIES IN DEVELOPED EUROPE 
 
The wage-setting process in Europe was characterized by a relatively high level of 
collective coordination among unions, employers, or the government. There, the 
participating actors were interested in how to reach a wage deal in which they could strike 
a good balance between sustainable profits and egalitarian wages. This generous system 
of corporatist coordination, however, has been under stress these days. One of the notable 
challenges came from the process of economic integration (Streeck and Schmitter 1991). 
Intense competition in the European product market increased a pressure for tight cost 
control. Monetary integration added further to this pressure by keeping government 
macroeconomic accommodation out of option and, thus, making wage moderation an 
indispensible means to macroeconomic management (Crouch 2000; Huber and Stephens 
2005). If businesses had already been in a downturn but wage costs had not been 
controlled well, the economy would fall into a real crisis situation. The call for tight cost 
control would grow even greater (Baccaro 2003; Pochet and Fajertag 2000). 
How would this economic pressure impact on the wage-setting process in Europe? 
Here conventional wisdom suggested that the wage-setting process would undergo a 
significant change to de-coordination. By making wage negotiations more individualized 
and fragmented, employers would be better able to increase the market discipline in the 
wage-setting process and thus save more wage costs (Streck and Schmitter 1991; Streeck 
1998). But the actual developments in developed Europe were not supportive of this 
prediction. First, there was no case of de-coordination in developed EU countries, 
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although the degree of flexibility within the system has increased overall, as shown by the 
trends of wage differentials, occasional opt-outs, etc. (Rhodes2001; Teuling and Hartog 
1998). In several countries, the wage-setting process was even more coordinated (Fajertag 
and Pochet eds. 2000; Ferner and Hyman eds. 1998). 
This study is interested in these countries of increased coordination. There, 
nationwide wage settlements among the government, unions, or employers assumed a 
more prominent role than before in management of aggregate wage costs. Previous 
studies proposed a list of causes for this change, including monetary integration, poor 
macro-economy, and the organizational capabilities of industrial actors (Baccaro 2003; 
Hassel 2003; Pochet and Fajertag 2000; Rhodes 2001). They also found that the political 
exchange between unions and the government provided the driving mechanism for the 
change, in which unions agreed on the idea of tight wage control and then the government 
promised to promote employment and also avoid any neo-liberal reforms on social 
welfare and the labor market (Huber and Stephens 2001; Rhodes 2001; Scharpf 2000). 
This study builds on these findings, and explores a relatively under-studied issue: 
the modality of the political exchange. The question has not been dealt with extensively, 
although there were notable differences in the ways that the exchange took place. These 
differences then produced significant impacts on economic performance, especially on the 
pattern of wage moderation (Traxler and Kittel 2000). In this study I fill in this lacuna in 
the literature by first identifying three patterns of the political exchange --- voluntary 
negotiation, government-pushed negotiation, and government unilateralism. I then present 
a causal explanation for this diversity by looking at the effect of inter-union rivalry. 
More specifically, I begin by reviewing previous few studies that tackled the same 
question, but from a different perspective (Baccaro and Lim 2007; Hamann and Kelly 
2007). Focusing on the electoral politics, they argue that the government negotiates with 
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unions when the governing party or coalition is electorally weak. This is because the 
government worries that a unilateral approach could trigger an electoral backlash by 
alienating many resentful workers. When provided with stable electoral support, however, 
the government becomes less sensitive to this possibility, leaning towards unilateralism as 
an easier, less-demanding way to secure tight control of wage costs. 
While not denying this political consideration by the government, I argue that the 
final choice between negotiation and unilateral intervention is ultimately determined by 
another factor, that is, the degree of inter-union rivalry. If a labor movement is mired with 
deep rivalry, it becomes difficult for competing union actors to coordinate their wage 
demands to produce a moderate wage settlement. This makes even a weak government 
consider that unilateral intervention as the only possible way to secure wage moderation. 
If a labor movement does not suffer from deep rivalry, however, union actors will be in a 
better position to reach such an agreement. Then, even a stable government will consider 
negotiation as a more attractive and feasible path to cost control. 
The focus on inter-union rivalry also permits us to improve the empirical coverage 
of theory. In the election-based studies, researchers were interested in only the dichotomy 
of negotiation versus government unilateralism. I improve on this typology by adding two 
sub-paths on the path to negotiation. I will show that while the hypothesis of electoral 
politics cannot even be applied to this new context, the alternative hypothesis is. 
Negotiation takes place with voluntary agreement when the labor movement is united or 
characterized by only weak rivalry. When the labor movement is characterized by a 
moderate degree of rivalry, negotiation still occurs, but only under notable threats or 
limited exercises of government unilateralism. 
In the following sections, I discuss the theoretical background of these claims. I 
then provide supporting evidence for them in a comparative analysis of five European 
 93 
countries (Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Italy, and the Netherlands), covering from the 1980s 
to the early 2000s. I will also challenge the alternative hypothesis of electoral politics by 
using the same empirical cases. 
 
4.1. Electoral Politics vs. Inter-Union Rivalry 
Until recently, there was widespread pessimism about the viability of the 
coordinative wage-setting systems in Europe, which had aimed at balancing between 
sustainable profits and relatively egalitarian wages. Increasing competition in the 
European product market created a strong pressure for tighter control of wage costs 
(Martin 1999). Monetary integration made this pressure even stronger by preventing the 
government from pursuing macroeconomic accommodation. Previously, the government 
had been able to provide a variety of flexible policies, ranging from exchange rate 
manipulation to fiscal/monetary stimulation, to compensate economic actors for any 
shocks in prices and costs. With the government being committed to monetary integration, 
however, none of these policy benefits remained available. Instead, the government’s 
priority changed from macroeconomic accommodation to price stability (Crouch 2000; 
Huber and Stephens 2005). 
Under this circumstance, wage costs needed to be controlled very tightly. A failure 
in this would instantaneously lead to loss of competitiveness and squeeze of profits. If 
wages had already been poorly controlled, the pressure for cost control would be even 
greater. Any continued trend of high wage costs would not only deteriorate the already 
fragile profit bases for employers, but also worsen the already insecure job situations of 
workers. In this situation, a broad consensus would emerge among all economic actors, 
that their economy would be in a serious crisis and their wages must be tightly controlled 
to get out of this crisis (Baccaro 2003). 
 94 
Previously, it was widely expected that this economic pressure would motivate 
employers to decrease the level of coordination --- that is, the level (company, sector, 
nationwide, or somewhere in between) at which a target of aggregate wage increases 
would be set and negotiated (Crouch 1995; Streeck and Schmitter 1991). So, if wages had 
been set via negotiations with broad nationwide or inter-sectoral coverage, now they 
would be set for certain specific industries or specific companies without any implications 
beyond their respective domains. The rationale goes as follows. By making wage 
negotiations more fragmented and individualized, employers would be better able to 
increase the market discipline on the wage-setting process. This then would help them 
save more wage costs, because in the new system the wage-setting process would be less 
politicized and thus unions would pay more attention to the financial situations of their 
employers. 
The experiences of developed European countries, however, have not been 
supportive of this prediction. There has been no clear case of de-coordination in the EU 
area, although the overall degree of flexibility within the system has increased, as shown 
by wage differentials and flexible opt-outs (Rhodes 2001; Teulings and Hartog 1998). In 
several countries, the wage-setting process has even been more coordinated (Fajertag and 
Pochet eds. 2000). 
Researchers have tried to explain what might have led to this unexpected 
development. Among the widely-cited causes was a sense of economic crisis, shared by 
all economic actors. As discussed briefly above, poor economic performance in an 
integrated economy threatened not only the profits for employers but also the jobs for 
workers, producing a strong pressure for tight cost control. Unlike the previous prediction, 
however, this pressure did not work out in a way to strengthen the market rule in the 
wage-setting process. In an urgent situation of economic crisis, economic actors were 
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more interested in finding a more predictable solution to their wage problem. Rather than 
relying on a method of decentralized discipline (which could be unpredictable, at least in 
the short run, without a central authority), they preferred a more coordinative solution. By 
increasing the level of wage coordination and thus letting encompassing bargaining units 
--- which might have better understanding of the macroeconomic consequence of the 
failure of wage moderation --- take a more prominent role in the wage-setting process, 
they hoped that they could have more predictable control on national wage costs (Pochet 
and Fajertag 2000; Rhodes 2001). Where unions and employers already retained the 
organizational capability (proven or potential) for such collective action, this shared 
interest really galvanized the corporatist wage-coordination (Baccaro 2003; Hassel 2003). 
The underlying mechanism of this enhanced coordination was the tripartite deal-
making among the government, unions, and employers, in which the wage issues were 
linked to other broad issues such as jobs, welfare, and labor market protection. First, 
unions and the government made a political exchange in which unions recognized, 
voluntarily or by governmental direction, the necessity of tight wage restraint as a means 
to recovery. Then the government promised that it would avoid any neo-liberal reforms of 
welfare and the labor market and also implement various activation policies for job 
creation (e.g. active labor market policies and other human-development policies (Huber 
and Stephens 2001; Rhodes 2001; Scharpf 2000)). Employers then joined the deal by 
committing to more employment and training than they would have done otherwise. 
Note that the actual processes of the tripartite interaction were more complicated 
than this. The interaction could take place simultaneously; unions and employers could 
lead the process and the government would join later; or the government could lead 
without explicit consultation with unions and employers. Despite all this diversity, 
however, the common prerequisite for success was that there should be at least an implicit 
 96 
exchange between unions and the government before the whole process came to a 
conclusion. The rational was as follows. Economic recovery, the common goal of the 
tripartite interaction, hinged on the unions' acceptance of tight cost control, but the unions 
would like to trade their commitment not only for jobs but more fundamentally for 
continued (although moderately reformed) provision of welfare and labor market 
protection (see Regini (1984) and Scharpf (1991) for the original formulation of this idea). 
Unions existed primarily to improve the quality and security of workers’ lives. They 
would fight for job stability, no ‘race-to-the-bottom’ competition in wages, and humane 
treatment for the workers out of jobs. Without these ‘passive’ concerns being taken care 
of by any means, they were not able to agree on other ‘positive’ issues like wage 
moderation and job creation. Even the studies that recognized the active role of employers 
in this tripartite interaction did not forget to add that the employers’ commitment to 
cooperation would not be possible (Culpepper 2005) or sustainable (Baccaro and Lim 
2007) unless unions were already ready for the cooperative deal. 
4.1.1. The modality of political exchange 
Building on these studies, I explore a relatively under-studied issue: the ways that 
the political exchange was struck between the government and unions. More specifically, 
I am interested in the ways that wages have been set at the national level, given the 
governmental promise for welfare, protection, and activation. The experiences of 
developed Europe suggest two broad paths here. In one, the government took a unilateral 
initiative against unions, and imposed certain measures for cost control without seeking 
explicit agreement from the unions. Typically, the government initially sought a 
negotiated solution. Passing a substantial period of stalemate, however, the government 
switched its position to unilateralism, introducing such measures as obligatory wage 
freezes/ceilings and restrictions on strike activities. As discussed in the country analysis 
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section later, Belgium in the 1980s and 1990s and the Netherlands around 1980 were 
among the best examples for this. In the second path, the government negotiated with 
unions, which resulted in a nationwide settlement for tight wage moderation. A typical 
sequence there was that the government urged unions to engage in a direct talk with 
employers and, sometimes, the government itself; unions responded positively to this call 
by joining a national wage settlement. As discussed later, Belgium since 1998, Finland 
and Italy since the early 1990s, Ireland since 1987, and the Netherlands since 1982 are 
among the best examples. 
Within the path to negotiation, there also were two different sub-paths. In one, 
negotiation took place with a voluntary agreement from unions. Here the role of 
government was limited to providing a public-minded bargaining space for wage 
negotiators. In the other, wages were negotiated under a visible pressure from the 
government. A typical sequence was that union actors revealed some problem in 
coordinating their wage demands; the government responded with a threat or limited 
exercise of unilateral intervention. After a short period of tension, however, unions 
succeeded in coordinating their wage demands, paving a way toward a national wage 
settlement. 
4.1.2. The hypothesis of electoral politics 
How can we explain these diverse patterns of the political exchange? Previous 
studies have been mostly silent on this issue, except for the works by Baccaro and Lim 
(2007) and Hamann and Kelly (2007). Focusing on the role of the electoral politics, they 
provided a coherent hypothesis for the government choice between negotiation and 
unilateral action. They argued that governments choose negotiation with unions "when 
they lack the necessary electoral strength to face a potential popular backlash" which 
would likely be triggered by a unilateral approach (Baccaro and Lim 2007, p. 38). In 
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other words, they negotiate "when potentially unpopular policies are deemed necessary, 
when the governing party or parties are facing electoral pressures, when they believe 
incur heavy electoral costs from implementing some of their policies unilaterally and 
when they believe pacts would increase the legitimacy and popularity of these policies" 
(Hamann and Kelly 2007, p. 976). If the governments enjoy stable electoral support, 
however, they will not be so sensitive to this possibility of electoral backlash. They will 
consider unilateral intervention as an easier, less-demanding way to secure wage control. 
While providing a plausible explanation for the government’s choices, this 
hypothesis suffers from the following problems. First, it is not clear why a stable 
government should be so open to compromise its support base. Instead, hoping to stay in 
power stably, any government in established democracies will be attracted to the idea of 
negotiation as a better way to deal with its economic problem. It will be only when this 
preferred solution does not look feasible, that the government will begin to consider 
unilateral intervention seriously. 
Second, the hypothesis is also criticized for its another implication, that the fear 
for electoral backlash will make a weak government choose non-action rather than doing 
anything else, once the path to negotiation is blocked. This, however, is too a strong 
argument. Despite the potential backlash from angry workers, unilateral intervention can 
still be an attractive option even to a weak government. This is because the intervention 
helps prevent further worsening of the economy, the occurrence of which would invite 
broader blames from the general public, enough to nullify the benefits of avoiding the 
concentrated blames from workers. Furthermore, if successful, the intervention will 
provide incumbents with a real performance record with which they can dilute blames of 
the workers and also demonstrate their capability of macroeconomic management to the 
general public. 
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All these criticisms, which will be confirmed empirically later in the country 
analyses section, suggest that the government’s choice over the two paths may not depend 
on the electoral politics. Rather, it may depend on the exogenous feasibility of negotiation. 
The government will choose negotiation only if this looks feasible. If not, however, it will 
choose unilateralism. In this study, I argue that this feasibility is ultimately determined by 
the degree of inter-union rivalry. 
4.1.3. Inter-union rivalry: an alternative hypothesis 
More specifically, the new hypothesis goes as follows. When a labor movement is 
mired in deep inter-union rivalry, it becomes difficult for competing union actors to reach 
an agreement on how tightly their wages should be moderated. This difficulty then invites 
the government to bring some obligatory measures to the wage-setting process. If the 
rivalry is not that serious, however, unions will be better able to coordinate their wage 
demands toward a moderate wage settlement. Then negotiation becomes the main path for 
cost control. 
Within this path to negotiation, there is a notable source of diversity (although this 
has been never considered seriously in the previous election-based studies). I argue that 
negotiation takes place with unions’ voluntary participation if a labor movement is all 
united or only has weak rivalries. If a labor movement is under still moderate tension 
from rivalry, then negotiation takes place but only under the considerable threat of 
government unilateral intervention.  
Before presenting a detailed justification for this claim, let me begin by 
elaborating more on the definition of the independent variable, the degree of inter-union 
rivalry. In this study, the rivalry varies depending on the following two criteria: 
distinctiveness of self-identities among competing union actors and the intensity of their 
competition. For instance, a labor movement is in deep rivalry if the major union actors 
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adopt distinctive ideologies and also compete with one another in all major economic 
sectors, without a clear demarcation of their respective organizational dominance. Among 
the European countries examined here, this was clearly the case with Finland up until the 
1980s, in which communist and socialist unions fought each other for the support of 
ordinary middle/low income workers from all economic sectors. 
Since the collapse of communism, however, this cleavage has moderated 
significantly because the communist-leaning SAK has re-established itself as a social-
democratic confederation (Lilja 1998). Religion can also be a good source for such rivalry. 
In Belgium until the late 1990s (Vilrokx and Van Leemput 1998), Italy until the late 
1980s (Regalia and Regini 1998), and the Netherlands until the early 1980s (Visser 1998), 
Christian democratic unions were in ideological competition with socialist ones to obtain 
mass support from various occupational groups of ordinary workers. Although the 
Christian unions toned down their strong religious colors in the wake of cultural 
secularization, they still remain loyal to the Christian idea of inter-class collaboration and 
co-determination, whereas socialist unions clung to the idea of class differences (Van 
Kersbergen 1995). 
In the mean time, a labor movement would be in complete unity if unions share 
the same ideology and there is only one peak confederation which dominates all other 
unions. If this is too a strict requirement, we could allow a weak rivalry by relaxing one 
of these two criteria. In Ireland, several general unions (although under the ‘non-binding’ 
guidance from a peak confederation) competed to recruit ordinary workers from all 
economic sectors, but this did not lead to a centrifugal pattern or rivalry because unions 
were basically homogeneous in the sense that they shared the same ideology of moderate 
social democracy (Von Prondzynski 1998). In Finland after the collapse of Communism, 
union organizations were still clearly divided along the ideological cleavage of social 
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democracy vs. centrist reformism. But their rivalry remained quite mild because they did 
not have to engage in intense membership competition, given a clear pattern of respective 
organizational dominance across the major economic sectors (Lilja 1998). 
Finally, the rivalry can be at a moderate level, somewhere in the middle of these 
two ends of the scale. There, the major union actors have typically adhered to distinctive 
ideologies. They also have competed intensively to solicit support from various groups of 
ordinary workers. But their rivalry moderates because, although their organizational 
competition continues, the ideological side of the rivalry weakens as hard-line unions 
have moved toward reformism. We thus no longer see the major unions fighting over 
fundamental ideological claims. However, this does not mean the marginalization of 
identity competition. Rather, the previous hardliners will still be eager to make their 
reformism as different as possible from others. Given the ongoing membership 
competition in the major economic sectors, this effort for differentiation will then keep 
the major union actors under considerable tension in their relations. As discussed in more 
details later, this was the case with Belgium since the late 1990s (Van Gyes, De Witte, and 
van der Hallen 2000) and the Netherlands since the early 1980s (Visser and Hemerijck 
1997). 
What will be the implication of these diverse patterns of rivalry for the political 
exchange? My answer is that the diverse patterns determine the degree to which unions 
can cooperate voluntarily. This then invites diverse responses from the government, 
ultimately producing diverse patterns of the political exchange. Beginning with the case 
of deep rivalry, typically there are hard-line union organizations who are in intense 
confrontation with other reformist competitors. Here the pivotal actors are the radical 
members in the hard-line organizations. They are given strong leverage in the internal 
decision-making process, because their claim for ideological clarity is considered 
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legitimate given the deep rivalry. If this demand is not accepted, they can also punish their 
organizations by threatening internal objections and defections. Fearing that this internal 
rupture could hurt the relative power position of the organizations in the labor movement, 
the leaderships find no other way but to listen to these radical voices (see Przeworski and 
Sprague (1986) and Kitschelt (1994) for the original discussion of this idea in the context 
of party politics). 
Even in the context of this study, in which a national economic crisis at a time of 
deep economic integration motivates the hard-line union organizations to join in the 
bargaining process for reasonable policy trade-offs, those radical members still play. They 
continue to press their organizations to maintain a strong, ideologically-charged position 
at the bargaining table. Fearing the possibility of internal rupture, the leaderships of the 
organizations will have to listen to these voices. Typically, they will end up insisting that 
wages should still be allowed to increase to maintain real purchasing power. They will 
then justify this position by arguing that any employment-unfriendly effects from this 
demand should be counterbalanced by reducing the labor supply without pay-cuts 
(Vilrokx and Van Leemput 1998; Visser 1990). 
It is not difficult to understand that this tough position put forth by hard-line union 
organizations will sap the possibility of voluntary agreement for tight wage moderation. 
Although not its first preferred solution, now the government begins to seriously consider 
unilateral intervention as the only feasible alternative to address its national economic 
problem. This move is further supported by the public opinion that the union rivalry has 
interfered with timely response to the national economic problem. Of course, the hard-
line organizations will not welcome this development because government unilateralism 
will put in peril the very principle of workers’ autonomy in industrial relations (Visser and 
Hemerijck 1997). However, faced with a tough choice between defending the autonomy 
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and saving their core support base, they choose the latter for the sake of organizational 
survival. 
As economic difficulties continue, however, the considerations of the hard-line 
union organizations change significantly. Now all their members, even radicals, are more 
concerned about the fact that their workers have been losing jobs but the emphasis on real 
income maintenance has not been helpful for addressing the problem. This consensus then 
widens the room for reformism in the organizations and, ultimately, narrows the policy 
differences between them and their competitors. Now the labor movement is in a better 
position to produce a broad consensus for tight wage moderation. The government also 
welcomes this move, expecting that it will enhance the prospect of negotiated political 
exchange in which the possibility of electoral backlash is minimized. 
From the viewpoint of the leaderships in the previous hard-line organizations, this 
new development provides a golden opportunity in which they can keep the industrial 
relations safe from government intervention without jeopardizing their organizational 
base. However, the process should be managed with great care, because the heirs of 
radicalism in their organizations will still be eager to make the new reformism as different 
as possible from others. To avoid the possibility of internal rupture, now the leaderships 
have to be very cautious about the formality of the negotiation process. Although they 
will eventually agree on a tight wage settlement, they need to show their members a 
seemingly-strong commitment to a generous wage deal. They will often have to delay the 
deal, even though this will invite public criticism and also increases the possibility of 
government unilateralism. Then they sign on a wage deal at a point when they can claim 
that they have done enough but when further stalemate would likely trigger wide 
repercussions in public opinion and eventually invite wholesale unilateralism from the 
government. Even after a deal has been made, they will have to be keen to show their 
 104 
sympathy to those who were hit hard by the deal. They will have to allow these members 
to express their complaints freely in their organizations. Sometimes, they will even have 
to withdraw from the signed deal, although temporarily, to appease the mounting angers 
from those members. 
In the meantime, if the labor movement has been unified or only vexed by weak 
rivalries, the negotiation process will be even smoother. Here the labor movement is 
placed in a best situation to produce a voluntary agreement for tight wage moderation. 
Union actors will have relatively homogenous ideologies, meaning that there will be no 
inflammable materials or their legacies which potential hard-liners can utilize to establish 
and politicize their claims. Even if the major union actors are divided ideologically, their 
competition will be mild. There will be a clear demarcation of their respective 
strongholds across the major economic sectors. This will then allow even the 
ideologically-divided unions to move on to a coordinative wage deal, without worrying 
much about the reactions from their dis-satisfied members. Under this circumstance, there 
is no strong need for the government to attempt unilateral intervention or even a threat of 
it. Rather, the role of the government will be limited to provide a public-minded 
bargaining space for social partners. The government may promote a non-partisan 
assessment of the national economy and possibly provide a certain recommended range of 




To provide empirical support for these claims developed so far, I examine the 
experiences of five countries from developed Europe: Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Italy, 
and the Netherlands. They are all among the widely cited examples in which the level of 
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wage coordination increased recent decades. Some Southern European countries, such as 
Portugal (Royo 2002) and Spain (Hamann 2001), should also have been included in the 
empirical analysis. But they were not, due to a data problem: these countries were not 
covered by all of the quantitative measures of wage coordination which were adopted in 
this study. 
Table 7 provides a summary trend of wage coordination for the five sample 
countries. The periods of analysis were determined by the following considerations. First, 
the countries should have strong commitment to supra-national monetary coordination. 
Second, they also should have suffered seriously from the problems with their national 
economies. Finally, industrial actors should have been at least moderately organized. All 
these reflect the key conditions which have been specified for the path to increasing wage 
coordination, as briefly sketched previously (Baccaro 2003; Hassel 2003; Pochet and 
Fajertag 2000). 
Beginning with the monetary commitment, the Netherlands was an early starter, 
who pegged its currency to the German mark from the early 1970s as soon as the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods system (Kurzer 1993). Belgium joined the process around 1980 
when the EMS was started (Kurzer 1993; Hemerijck, Unger, and Visser 2000). Finland, 
Ireland, and Italy joined in the late 1980s with their preparation for joining the EMU. 
When it comes to economic performance, all of these countries suffered from sluggish 
growth, high unemployment, and poor control of wage costs from or even before the 
beginning of their monetary commitment. In Belgium and the Netherlands, the poor 
performance dated to the 1970s; this improved in the Netherlands from the early 1980s 
after the 1982 pact of Wassenaar, but poor performance continued in Belgium until the 
2000s (Arcq and Pochet 2000; Visser 1998). The Irish and Italian economies were also in 
poor shape in the 1980s, but the Irish economy improved significantly in the late 1990s, 
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while the Italian recovery lagged until the 2000s (Ferrera and Gualmini 2000; O’Donnell 
and O’Reardon 2000). In Finland, its economy had been good until the late 1980s, but 
worsened sharply from the early 1990s in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the crisis in the banking sector (Kaupinnen, 2000). Finally, in all five countries 
unions and employers were organized at least moderately, as reported in such volumes as 
Ferner and Hyman (1998) and Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000). 
Consistent with these background conditions, the level of wage coordination 
increased in all five countries. In Table 7, this was measured by looking at the 
institutionalized characteristics of coordination as well as the participating actors’ real 
commitments for it. Given that these two reflect different aspects of wage coordination 
and thus may not necessarily go together all the time, an increase in either side was 
considered to indicate an increase in wage coordination, unless the other side decreases. 
Among the three pooled time-series data which are publicly available from Kenworthy 
(2001), Nickell, Nuniziata, and Ochel (2005), and Traxler, Blaschke, and Kittel (2001), I 
use Kenworthy’s data to deal with the institutional aspect of wage coordination. Focusing 
on such characteristics as pattern setting, government arbitration, and peace obligation, he 
provides five discrete levels of wage coordination which runs from no coordination (one) 
to poor (two), intermediate (three), and high coordination (four and five). Traxler et al. 
also deal with the institutional aspect of wage coordination, but they only provide a non-
ordinal, categorical typology. Meanwhile, Nickell et al. provide a measure for the 
behavioural aspect of wage coordination, based on their subjective judgments of the 
participating actors' voluntary commitment to concerted wage moderation. Their data 




4.3. Test Of The Hypothesis Of Electoral Politics 
The empirical analysis begins by testing the hypothesis of electoral politics 
against these five country cases. The hypothesis suggests that in the course of the political 
exchange, a government will seek negotiation with unions if it has a weak electoral base, 
but it will choose unilateral intervention if it enjoys a stable electoral base. As it turns out 
below, this hypothesis is well supported by the cases of Finland, Ireland, and Italy, but 
contradicted by the cases of Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Table 8 summarizes the trend of the governmental electoral base for each of the 
five countries, covering the sample periods defined by Table 7. All data are drawn from 
Muller and Strom’s edited volume (2000) and various annual political reports in the 
European Journal of Political Research. To make qualitative judgments on the 
government’s electoral power from these data, I adopt the following operational criteria. 
The government has a stable electoral base if the governing parties (or their core) survive 
most of several consecutive elections without frequently changing their coalition partners. 
Otherwise, the government has a weak base. Within the category of stable electoral base, 
the government is considered dominant if the seats of the core governing parties or their 
coalitions are close to or higher than 50% of the total parliamentary seats. 
Beginning with Belgium, Christian Democrats were in a dominant position until 
the early 1960s. From the 1950 to the 1961 elections, the CVP/PSC (Christian 
Democrats) held about 48% of the total parliamentary seats and remained in power most 
of the time (73%) as either the virtual, single governing party or a leading party in the 
coalitions with the BSP/PSB (Social Democrats) or PVV/PLP (Liberals). After the 1965 
election, however, their power began to weaken significantly. From then until the 1981 
elections, they held approximately 35% of the total parliamentary seats. Although the 
CVP and PSC could continue to stay in power, they had to switch their coalition partners 
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very frequently among the Social Democrats, Liberals, and Regionalists. Passing the early 
1980s until the end of the 1990s, however, their electoral base stabilized again. With the 
average share of 30% of the parliamentary seats, they certainly were not a dominant party 
coalition, but they managed to stay in power by forming relatively stable electoral 
coalitions throughout the period (with Liberals for the 1981 and 1985 elections and then 
with the Social Democrats for the 1988, 1991 and 1995 elections). Beginning in the late 
1990s, however, their electoral base weakened again. There has been no stable governing 
coalition since that time. Instead, power has been alternating among various coalition 
alternatives, including the two non-CVP/PSC coalitions of 1999 and 2003 (De Winter, 
Timmermans, and Dumont 2000). 
In Finland, the SDP (Social Democrats) led stable center-left coalitions with the 
CE (a centrist party with agrarian origins) and the SW (Swedish People’s Party) from the 
1966 election to the late 1980s. The party was never dominant with the average share of 
27% of the parliamentary seats, but it nevertheless stayed in power throughout the period 
as the largest party in Finland. Entering the 1990s, however, its electoral base weakened 
dramatically. The decade started with a center-right coalition in 1991 --- for the first time 
since 1966, which was then followed by various governing coalitions among social 
democrats, centrists, and rightists (Nousiainen 2000). 
In Ireland, the nationalist catch-all party, Fianna Fáil, dominated the government 
until the late 1970s. From the 1950s to the 1970s, the party retained about 50% of the 
parliamentary seats and remained in power in about 77% of the period. Its hegemony, 
however, began to fall in the early 1980s when a coalition of Labour and the relatively 
liberal Fine Gael won the 1981 election and stayed in power for roughly six years. 
Thereafter, coalition building became the norm of government formation. Except for the 
brief period of Fianna Fáil’s sole rule from 1987 to 1988, various coalition alternatives 
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were experimented with among Fianna Fáil, Labour and other liberals (Mitchell 2000). 
Italy represents a case of Christian Democrat dominance until the late 1980s. 
From the 1953 to the 1987 elections, the DC (Christian Democrats) occupied about 41% 
of the parliamentary seats and stayed in power by forming coalitions with Social 
Democrats, Liberals or Republicans as minor partners. However, the party system 
changed dramatically in the early 1990s in the wake of the political big bang, which led to 
re-foundation of the former communist PCI into the social democratic PDS, and also total 
collapse of the DC and the PSI (the former socialists). Since then, no dominant party or 
stable governing coalition has been formed in the electoral politics. General elections 
have been very competitive, resulting in an alternation of power between broad center-left 
and center-right coalitions. In the years of 1993 and 1995, the major political parties even 
agreed to devolve power to politically-neutral technocrats for the sake of crisis 
management (Verzichelli and Cotta 2000). 
In the last country, the Netherlands, the KVP (Catholics) led a dominant right-
wing coalition with the CHU (orthodox Protestants) and ARP (Anti-revolutionary Party) 
until the early 1960s. From the 1952 to the 1963 elections, they held more than 50% of 
the parliamentary seats and only occasionally invited the PvdA (Social Democrats) and 
VVD (Liberals) as their minor coalition partners. From the 1967 to the 1982 elections, 
however, the situation changed significantly. Not only did their combined seat share fall 
to the mid-30%, but they also had to switch their coalition partners frequently among the 
PvdA, VVD, and D66 (newly-established Liberals) to stay in power (Timmermans and 
Andeweg 2000). 
Do these patterns of government electoral base fit in the patterns of political 
exchange in these countries? As can be seen in Table 9, the answer is not entirely positive. 
For Finland, Ireland, and Italy, there was a good fit. The political exchanges in these 
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countries occurred all via negotiation. Their governments were also all weak, alternating 
either among various coalition alternatives as in Finland and Ireland, or between broad 
center-left and center-right coalitions as in Italy (more detailed discussions on these and 
other country cases are provided shortly in the country analyses section). 
However, the Belgian and Dutch cases tell us different stories. In Belgium, the 
dominant pattern of political exchange between 1981 and 1997 was unilateral government 
direction, but the government entered the period with a weak coalition base (although 
stabilized thereafter). It is not clear how the weak government of the early 1980s could 
adopt such a strong approach, despite the fear of electoral backlash from angry workers. 
Also, since the 1998 pact, the Belgian political exchange has proceeded mostly with 
negotiation. But the Christian Democrats was in a stable government with the Social 
Democrats at least until 1999, when they lost power to a secular coalition government for 
the first time since 1958. The electoral defeat also was never widely expected, being 
mainly triggered by some unanticipated political scandals around the election year 
(Rihoux 2000). It is not clear why the government who still thought to enjoy a stable 
electoral support decided to discontinue its previous unilateral approach in 1998. 
The Dutch case provides another challenge to the hypothesis. The Dutch 
government implemented a series of unilateral measures from 1980 to 1982, but then 
changed its approach to join in the accord of Wassenaar in late 1982, which later turned 
out to be the beginning of negotiated pact-building in the country. Both choices, however, 
were made under the same political condition that the government suffered from a weak 
coalitional base. It is not clear how the same electoral weakness could lead to these two 
different outcomes. Both these empirical contradictions suggest that the hypothesis of 
electoral politics may not specify either a necessary nor sufficient condition for the path 
to negotiated political exchange. Government stability could lead to successful 
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negotiation, as shown by Belgium in 1998, whereas government weakness could lead to 
government unilateralism, as shown by Belgium and the Netherlands in the early 1980s. 
The next section addresses these problems by loyoking at the alternative hypothesis of 
inter-union. 
 
4.4. Test Of The Hypothesis Of Inter-Union Rivalry 
To establish the hypothesis of inter-union rivalry, recall that we began with a 
context in which a serious economic crisis in the context of European integration called 
the government and social partners to engage in nationwide wage coordination to achieve 
better control of wage costs. As previous studies suggested, the political exchange 
between unions and the government provided a key mechanism for this by making unions 
more attentive to the idea of tight wage moderation, in exchange for the government’s 
promises of activation and avoiding neo-liberal reforms of welfare and the labor market. 
Then I suggested that the pattern of the political exchange was determined by the unions’ 
ability to coordinate their wage demands toward tight moderation, which was ultimately 
an outcome of the degree of inter-union rivalry.  
If a labor movement was characterized by deep rivalries, it became difficult for 
competing union actors to agree on the zone of wage restraint, which invited the 
government to impose obligatory measures to break the stalemate. If a labor movement 
was relatively united or there were only weak rivalries, union actors were best able to 
produce such an agreement. The government felt no need for unilateral direction. The 
process of political exchange also was smooth, following voluntary negotiation. Finally, if 
a labor movement was characterized by moderate rivalry, negotiation still took place 
because unions were eventually able to produce an agreement. The process of negotiation, 
however, was full of tensions among rival union actors, which invited government’s threat 
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or limited exercise of unilateral intervention. 
As summarized in Table 9 and also discussed in detail below, this hypothesis is 
well supported by the experiences of all five countries. In Belgium and the Netherlands, 
the change from governmental unilateralism to government-pushed negotiation was 
associated with the change from a high to a moderate degree of inter-union rivalry. 
Voluntary negotiations in Finland and Ireland took place in the context of weak rivalries. 
In Italy, the change from voluntary to government-pushed negotiation was associated with 
the change from a low to a moderate rivalry. 
The following comparative analyses provide real empirical grounds for these 
associations by focusing on the Belgian, Dutch and Italian cases. The first two provide 
critical cases which contradict the hypothesis of electoral politics, but confirm the 
alternative hypothesis. The Italian case extends the coverage of theory by providing a new 
empirical context which the latter hypothesis can be applied to (although the former has 
never been attempted so). Finland and Ireland, however, do not add much strength to the 
analysis because they are consistent with both the hypotheses, so their experiences are 
examined only briefly. 
In Finland, the labor movement was characterized by relatively weak rivalries in 
the 1990s. True, the major unions had been differentiated along deep ideological 
cleavages until the late 1980s; the largest SAK had been clearly leftist, whereas the 
smaller unions, such as STTK and AKAVA, had been more centrist or liberal. After the 
collapse of communism, however, the distance among them narrowed. This was because 
the internal struggle in the SAK between communism and moderate social democracy, 
which had been the primary source of union militancy in Finland, was resolved in favor 
of the latter. The fact that there was already a clear pattern of confedral dominance across 
different economic sectors, further weakened the rivalry. The SAK was undisputedly 
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dominant among all workers in the private sectors and male workers in the public sectors; 
the STTK was dominant among female workers and technicians in the public sectors, and 
the AKAVA was dominant among well-educated workers in the public sectors (Kauppinen 
and Waddington 2000; Lilja 1998). Consistent with these configurations, the political 
exchange in Finland took place via voluntary negotiation. Under the leadership of the 
SAK, unions were able to reach broad agreements on tight wage restraint, which were 
then fully incorporated in the tripartite negotiations for social pacts (EIRO 1997d, 1998a; 
Kaupinnen 2000). 
In Ireland, the inter-union rivalry was also weak. Organizationally, union actors 
were under competitive pressure. Although all Irish unions were formally united under 
the ICTU (the peak confederation of Irish workers), real decision-making powers spread 
to several “general unions,” who were in competition for recruiting their members from 
virtually all economic sectors (Hardiman 1988; Von Prondzynski 1998). However, this 
did not develop into a centrifugal pattern of union rivalry because the Irish unions were 
ideologically homogeneous and endorsed moderate social democracy. Historically, the 
only major source of substantive divides was nationalism, over which the Irish-based and 
the British-based unions fought each other. This, however, was resolved successfully in 
1959, when the Irish-based CIU merged with the British-based ICTU (Hardiman 1988). 
Consistent with all this configuration, the political exchange in this country also took 
place in voluntary negotiations. From the late 1980s on, the leaders of the ICTU and other 
general unions took a deliberative initiative towards tight wage moderation, which was 
then complied with by company-level unions (Baccaro 2003; O’Donnell and O’Reardon 
2000). 
4.4.1. Belgium 
In Belgium, the nationwide negotiations between unions and employers had 
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produced encompassing wage guidelines, albeit non-binding, for most of the 1960s and 
1970s (Vilrokx and Van Leemput 1998). Their performance regarding wage moderation 
had never been good. But, faced with an economic downturn at a time of macroeconomic 
austerity in the late 1970s (due to a strong monetary commitment to the German mark), 
the government was eager to strengthen this tier of wage negotiations. It hoped that 
nationwide wage-coordination, if backed up by committed participants, still could provide 
a predictable way for tight cost control and economic recovery (Hemerijck, Unger, and 
Visser 2000). This initiative produced a wave of interactions with social partners, 
resulting in a series of obligatory wage guidelines in the early 1980s to late 1990s, and 
then government-pushed social pacts thereafter. 
More specifically in the late 1970s, the Belgian government, which was then 
backed by fragile Christian-led coalitions, initiated a project of centrist political exchange 
with unions. It urged them to engage in a nation-wide talk with employers for tight wage 
moderation, while showing no intention of radical restructuring of social welfare and the 
labor market (Balpain 1985; Dancet 1988). Unions responded positively by participating 
in a series of national talks to discuss these issues. But, after a stalemate in the 
negotiations (in fact, unions and employers had not been successful in the national wage 
negotiations since 1975), the government switched to unilateralism. In 1981, it legalized a 
right to issue a mandatory wage guideline in case of a failure of bipartite national 
agreement. This was then applied to the wage-setting process in the country for the next 
several years to come (Balpain 1984; Dancet 1988). Entering the 1990s, the same pattern 
of government intervention reappeared. In 1993, for instance, the failure of voluntary 
tripartite negotiations for the so-called Global Plan led to a legislative response by the 
government, in which the previous wage indexing system was revised to constrain the 
minimum rate of wage increase (Vilrokx and Van Leemput 1998). In 1996, another failure 
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of negotiation led to the Law on Safeguarding the Competitiveness of Enterprise, through 
which a legal ceiling of wage increase was introduced; it could be no higher than those of 
Germany, France, and the Netherlands (EIRR 1996b). 
The ABVV/FGTB, the socialist confederation, was the main trigger of all these 
dynamics toward government unilateralism. Preoccupied with the issue of real income 
maintenance, the confederation made no voluntary wage agreement possible during most 
of the years, ultimately inviting a series of unilateral interventions from their governments 
(Arcq and Pochet 2000; ETUI 1983; Hemerijck, Unger, and Visser 2000). The intense 
rivalry between the ABVV/FGTB and ACV/CSC was the background for this militancy. 
The ACV/CSC had been oriented to Christian Democracy with an emphasis on class 
compromise and co-determination, whereas the ABVV/FGTB had been skewed strongly 
toward working-class egalitarianism (Vilrokx and Van Leemput 1998). Also 
organizationally, these two confederations were engaging in a tough membership 
competition. True, the ABVV/FGTB did better in the traditional manufacturing and 
public sectors, whereas the ACV/CSC was stronger in light manufacturing, new 
knowledge-intensive manufacturing, and the service sectors. But neither party had clear 
organizational dominance in any of these sectors. They just had to recruit their members 
from all these sectors (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000). 
It is not difficult to understand that this strong pattern of inter-union rivalry put the 
radical members of the ABVV/FGTB in a good position to press for wage militancy. By 
threatening internal opposition or defection, which could hurt the power of the 
confederation vis-à-vis its competitor, those members could make their leadership pay 
more attention to their strong demand. In Belgium, this pressure for radicalism was even 
stronger because of its traditional regional cleavages. Although the ABVV/FGTB drew 
members from both prosperous Flanders and declining Wallonia, its radical members 
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were more concentrated in the latter, the home of out-dated heavy industries such as 
mining and steel. This then bolstered the voices of these radical members in the following 
ways. First, the idea of trading wages for jobs was not realistic in Wallonia because 
businesses in the region were in structural decline and thus did not have meaningful 
capacity for job creation. Second, the Walloon members were also given their own 
communicative space, isolated from Flanders, in which they could easily solidify their 
common pessimism on the coordinative wage deal (Arcq and Pochet 2000; Van 
Ruysseveldt and Visser 1996). 
Under these circumstances, the Walloon members of the ABVV/FGTB could exert 
an effective veto on their confederation’s participation in the negotiated deals. The 1996 
negotiations were clearly illustrative of this. Following a lengthy process of negotiations 
with other unions, employers, and the government in the year, the leadership of the 
ABVV/FGTB finally signed on a comprehensive deal, covering such broad issues as 
wage restraint, working time reduction, and moderate reforms of welfare and the labor 
market. The Walloon members did not express their explicit opposition during the 
negotiations, but began to galvanize their dissatisfaction at a rank-and-file referendum 
that was called to approve the deal. Although the leadership wanted to keep the deal alive, 
it chose to keep silent in an effort to appease the anti-pact sentiment of the members. The 
result was a disapproval, and the government intervened to break the stalemate (EIRR 
1996b; Vilrokx and Van Leemput 1998). 
Since the end of the 1990s, however, a new pattern of political exchange has 
emerged in which successful negotiations have replaced the previous unilateralism. The 
1998 national bargaining, which produced a negotiated wage settlement for 1999 and 
2000, was the beginning of this new process. The position of the government was the 
same as before, despite the fact that it was then backed up by a more stable coalition than 
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in the early 1980s. It continued to promise not to engage in radical restructuring of 
welfare and the labor market, and urged unions to strike a voluntary agreement on wage 
moderation with employers. But this approach could be successful this time, because the 
ABVV/FGTB changed its position toward reformism and supported a bipartite deal of 
wage restraint and cost-neutral work-time reduction (EIRR 1999b, 1999d). This success 
was then repeated in most of the early 2000s (EIRO 2003f; EIRR 2003).  
As widely cited, the continued squeeze of the job market was the primary reason 
why the ABVV/FGTB began to embrace the new idea of reformism (Van Gyes, De Witte, 
and van der Hallen 2000). The abortive 1996 negotiations already harbingered this change, 
during which its leadership began to display a readiness for wage moderation. In the 
following national talks, which were convened to negotiate the wages for 1997 and 1998 
but also failed, the leadership repeated the same idea. They suggested an exchange of 
wage moderation for work time reduction, job creation by employers, and a moderate 
increase in the minimum wage. This time, even the Walloon wing supported the idea 
(EIRR 1996c). 
The new process of negotiation since 1998, however, has never been a smooth one. 
Every bipartite wage agreement was struck only after a tedious process of negotiation. In 
the 2004 national bargaining, the ABVV/FGTB even refused to renew the previous 
national wage agreement of 2002 (although it returned to an agreement in the next 
bargaining round in 2006). The government responded by imposing obligatory wage 
guidelines, which then triggered a general strike organized by the ABVV/FGTB for the 
first time since the mid-1990s (EIRO 2005c). 
Arguably, this continued tension and toughness by the ABVV/FGTB was because 
of the still considerable rivalry between the two confederations. Despite the narrowing of 
policy differences, their organizational competition continued. This can be easily 
 118 
confirmed if we look at the issue of union merger in the country. Despite the serious 
financial difficulties in recent decades which both confederations suffered from general 
membership decline, there was not even a single discussion of merger between them 
(Vilrokx and Van Leemput 1998). The same pressure, however, has led to rapprochement 
among competing unions in other countries where the rivalries were relatively low, such 
as Finland in the recent past (EIRO 2003g, 2006b). In addition, the Belgian ‘social 
elections,’ in which unions competed for various posts in company-level workers’ 
organizations, continued to be among the noisiest in all of Europe (EIRO 2004a; Van 
Ruysseveldt and Visser 1996). Even in 1998, the beginning year of the negotiated 
political exchange in the country, the government had to delay the social elections in a 
fear that the confrontation between the confederations would trigger a wave of militancy 
in the sectoral wage negotiations which coincided with the elections (EIRO 1998b; EIRR 
1998). With this continued rivalry, the Walloon unions could easily continue their critical 
voices inside the ABVV/FGTB. The failure of the nationwide wage negotiation in 2004, 
for instance, was mainly due to their internal objection (EIRO 2005a). 
4.4.2. The Netherlands 
By the late 1960s, the Dutch wage-setting system had undergone a gradual change 
from a system of strong government mediation to one of industry-level coordination by 
unions and employers. The process of de-pillarization, which had made industrial actors 
freer from government influence, was the underlying force for this change (Hemerjick, 
Unger, and Visser 2000). From the 1970s, however, the Dutch government was eager to 
reverse this trend. Facing a poorly performing economy in a context where its 
commitment to the German mark made macroeconomic accommodation out of option, 
the government thought that nationwide wage coordination would be a good way for 
getting out of the crisis (Van Ruysseveldt and Visser 1996). This initiative then resulted in 
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a series of government-imposed wage guidelines in the early 1980s, which was soon 
followed by tripartite social pacts thereafter. 
In the late 1970s, the Dutch government, which relied on a fragile Christian-
Liberal coalition, attempted an austerity-oriented wage deal with unions. In a series of 
policy initiatives, which were best illustrated by the publication of “Blueprint 1981” in 
1979, the government urged unions to join with employers in a bipartite national 
agreement for wage moderation. As rewards, the government promised unions that it 
would not attempt major cuts in public employment and other social security benefits 
(Visser 1990). Unions were attracted to this idea, but their problem was that they were not 
able to coordinate their wage demands toward the deal --- which had been a decade-long 
problem in the Dutch labor movement. The FNV, the largest confederation, took a tough 
policy stance, whereby it insisted on the maintenance of real wages along with work-time 
reduction without pay cuts. However, the CNV, the second-largest confederation, was 
more flexible on these issues. They emphasized wage moderation. They also recognized 
the necessity of cost-neutral work-time reduction, by which work hours would be reduced 
in exchange for concomitant pay reductions (ETUI 1980). These continuing 
disagreements on the part of the unions then pave a way for government unilateralism. In 
1980 and 1982, the Dutch government directly intervened to break the stalemate, and 
imposed unilateral wage ceilings against which no strike activity was considered legal 
(ETUI 1981, 1982). 
Why did the FNV take such a strong policy stance and end up inviting 
government intervention? As was true in Belgium, this was because of its deep rivalry 
with the CNV. First, the FNV endorsed different ideologies from the CNV. The FNV was 
rooted in the socialist NNV, which had a strong class-based ideology. Even after joined by 
the Catholic NKV in a 1976 merger, it still could maintain its distinctive socialist 
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orientation because by the time of the merger, the NKV was inclined toward egalitarian 
fundamentalism. The CNV then reacted to this radicalization of the labor movement by 
adhering more staunchly to its moderate Christian doctrine (Visser 2000). Second, the two 
confederations were also in intense competition for membership. Although overall the 
FNV was more successful than its competitor, both confederations had to recruit their 
members from all economic sectors without a clear pattern of respective organizational 
dominance (Van Ruysseveldt and Visser 1996). 
Under these circumstances, the radical members of the FNV could veto their 
confederation’s participation in the negotiations, by threatening an internal rupture. In 
1977 and 1980, for instance, there was an attempt at a moderate wage settlement in the 
FNV, mainly backed by the IB-FNV (the metal workers’ association within the FNV). In 
1980, there was another initiative for a cost-neutral plan for working hours reduction, 
which was also backed by the IB-FNV. However, all these efforts turned out to be failure 
because of the strong objections from food and other low-paid service sectors (Visser 
1990; Visser and Hemerijck 1997). 
After this experience of failure, however, the situation changed in favor of 
negotiation. Again, the government continued to hold the same position; it promised not 
to engage in neoliberal reforms of welfare and the labor market (a promise it kept, as 
shown by the moderate welfare and labor market reforms implemented in the mid to late 
1980s after the Accord of Wassenaar (Visser 1992)). In return, the government urged 
unions to join in a voluntary agreement with employers for tight wage moderation. This 
time, this approach was successful because the FNV changed its policies. The 
confederation dropped its demand for real income maintenance and also accepted the idea 
of cost-neutral reductions in work-time. Thanks to this change, the Dutch unions could 
effectively coordinate their wage demands, which then contributed to a success in the 
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bilateral wage deal with employers (Visser 1998). 
As was true in Belgium, the continued squeeze on jobs was what led to the spread 
of reformism in the FNV. The FNV unions became increasingly concerned that their 
members had been losing jobs. Although failed due to dedicated objections from radical 
minorities, the previously mentioned reformist initiatives led by the IB-FNV in 1977 and 
1980 earned broad support from other member unions, resulting in the official backing by 
the FNV leadership. The initiatives also received warm responses even from outside the 
FNV. The IB-CNV (the IB of the CNV), for instance, fully supported the project from the 
beginning, in a hope that this could facilitate a unified approach to various labor issues 
among the major unions (Visser 1990; Visser and Hemerijck 1997). 
The success of Wassenaar in 1982 will not be understood without considering this 
widening reformism in the Dutch labor movement. Note, however, that the negotiations 
even in that successful year were far from being smooth. The final agreement could b 
reached only with considerable tensions created by the FNV’s tough bargaining strategy 
and the government’s threats of unilateralism (Visser and Hemerijck 1997). Obviously, 
this procedural toughness of the FNV leaderships was due to the still considerable rivalry 
between the two confederations. Despite the narrowing of policy differences, 
organizational competition with the CNV persisted (Visser 1992). As was in the Belgian 
case, there was no discussion for inter-union merger despite the general trend of 
membership decline and subsequent financial difficulties. Furthermore, their competition 
continued to be infused with political motives even in the post-1982 period (Visser 1998). 
As well illustrated in the 1993 negotiation of the “solidarity pact,” which was called to 
renew the previous 1982 pact, the FNV and CNV aligned themselves strongly with the 
partisan approaches presented by the PvdA (Socialists) and CDA (Christian Democrats). 
The CNV even showed its conditional willingness to embrace the CDA’s proposal to 
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abolish the minimum wage law. This was not only antithetical to its core value of the 
Christian social-market economy, but also pushed the FNV to an even more dedicated 
opposition during the negotiation. Although the two could finally get together on a joint 
position, this political confrontation pushed the negotiation process almost to a failure 
(EIRR 1993c, 1993d). 
Under this still considerable rivalry, the radical groups in the FNV could better 
hold their critical stance. Worrying about the possibility of internal rupture, the 
leaderships had no other choice but to be attentive to their voices. A few years after the 
1982 pact, for instance, there were some growing voices for compensatory wage increases 
inside the FNV, which were led by radical public-sector unions. The leaderships did not 
support this idea, but acquiesced in these voices. This then triggered similar militant 
reactions from other member unions. Even the IBFNV, who had led the reformist 
movement in the FNV, joined in this stream of wage push, putting the national wage 
settlement in real stress (Visser and Hemerijck 1997). 
4.4.3. Italy 
In Italy, wages had been set mostly by company-level bargaining until the 1980s, 
albeit under relatively strict administrative and legal guidelines (Regalia and Regini1998). 
There had been a few attempts at direct national talks on wages in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, none of which was successful in terms of the duration of cooperation and the 
performance of wage control (Regini 1984). Facing a long period of economic recession 
at a time of the EMU-driven monetary austerity, the Italian government in the 1990s 
began its attempt to re-vitalize national wage coordination as a key measure for 
retightening national wage costs (Perez 2002; Regini and Regalia 1997). This initiative 
then led to a series of voluntary social pacts until the late 1990s. Since then, the pact 
building process has continued but with considerable tensions and government pressure. 
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The years 1992 and 1993 marked the beginning of all these processes. The 
Christian- Socialist government of 1992, which was in a very fragile position due to the 
anti-corruption drive, initiated a series of national talks that eventually led to the so-called 
‘emergency pact’ of 1992. This was then finalized in the July Pact of 1993 under a new 
technocratic government which was led by a former governor of the Italian central bank. 
Both pacts were narrowly focused, only covering the issues that were directly related to 
wage-setting, such as abolition of the scala mobile and rationalization of the wage 
bargaining structure (EIRR 1992c, 1993b). After this success, however, a series of social 
pacts followed to deal with other important issues, e.g. welfare reform, labor market 
reform, and activation (Ferrera and Gualmini 2000). 
Note here that the negotiation process initially was full of tension. In the 
1992/1993 pacts, union actors were not yet in harmony regarding their opinions. 
Governments thus had to push hard for the success of the negotiations by adopting a “take 
it or leave it” approach. Once the tripartite agreements were signed, the CGIL, the major 
leftist confederation, also faced serious internal disputes waged by hard-liners, which then 
led to resignation of its general secretary (EIRR 1992c, 1993b). Passing this transition 
period, however, the process became more smooth and voluntary (except for a brief 
period of the full-scale confrontation in 1994 that was triggered by Berlusconi’s abortive 
neo-liberal pension plan (Natali and Rhodes 2004)). All major unions took a common 
reformist approach to the wages and other policy issues. Governments responded 
positively to this development by more recognizing the autonomy of their social partners 
in the negotiation process (EIRO 1997a, 1999a; EIRR 1996a). 
All these developments were quite surprising, given the deep ideological 
cleavages that had characterized the traditional Italian labor movement until the late 
1980s. Since the late 1940s, when the united anti-Fascist Labor Front collapsed, the 
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communist CGIL and the Christian- Democratic CISL had maintained their ideological 
distinctiveness in close affiliations with their supportive political parties (other 
confederations, such as the reformist UIL, are not examined here because of their limited 
influence). They also had been engaged in a fierce membership competition. Although the 
CGIL had been relatively more successful among industrial workers and CISL among 
service workers, they each had recruited their members from virtually all economic 
sectors (Regalia and Regini 1998; Visser 1996). 
This rivalry began to thaw around 1990 in the wake of economic crisis. The 
change was not dramatic in the beginning. As illustrated in the 1990/1991 national wage 
negotiations, which took place right before the historic 1992/1993 pacts, the inter-union 
rivalry was still deep enough to keep the CGIL maintaining its opposition to abolishment 
of the scala mobile (an automatic wage indexation system which had provided a floor of 
minimum wage increase), although the CISL was flexible on this (EIRR 1990, 1992b). 
The rivalry, however, dissolved significantly after passing through a series of political 
shocks --- such as the re-foundation of the PCI (the former Communist Party) into the 
PDS (the new Socialist Party) and the total collapse of the DC (the dominant Christian 
Democratic Party) and PSI (its subordinate Socialists). These events freed the 
confederations from their previous linkages to the ideological politics, and thus fostered a 
reformist spirit in the labor movement (Negrelli 2000). Following the CGIL’s adoption of 
“a new realism” at the 1991 Congress (EIRR 1991), both confederations began to 
coordinate all activities closely under the new principle of “unity of action.” In 1997, they 
even officially endorse a plan of inter-confederal merger that was planned to be 
completed by 2000 (EIRO 1997b,1997c). 
Since the early 2000s, however, Italy has diverged from this smooth path to 
voluntary negotiation. True, the government still encouraged unions to stay in the course, 
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except for a brief period of abortive unilateralism that came right after the return of 
Berlusconi to power in 2001(EIRO 2002a, 2002b). The CGIL and CISL, however, began 
to express different opinions on various issues regarding the labor market. On the matter 
of wage-setting, for instance, the point of disagreement was on the framework of wage 
negotiations. The CISL insisted on staying with the status quo, in which the industry-level 
bargaining set a broad wage standard by considering the overall trend of inflation and 
then company-level bargaining finalized the wage deal by considering some company-
specific factors, such as productivity increases. However, the CGIL suggested that the 
industry-level bargaining should also take the average trend of productivity increase into 
consideration, hoping that this would further strengthen the industry-level tier of the 
national wage-setting system. 
This disagreement was never considered to be fundamental, but it nonetheless 
caused ruptures in the wage-setting process. In 2001 and 2003, for instance, the CGIL-
FIOM (the metal union association of CGIL) decided not to join in the wage agreements 
for the metal sector (EIRO 2003e, 2006a; EIRR 2001), which was quite a notable 
development given the importance of this sector in the Italian economy. The CGIL-FIOM 
then carried out a series of offensives by organizing nation-wide strikes and also 
encouraging its members not to abide by the sectoral agreements reached by other unions 
and employers. Employers reacted by urging the government to intervene, e.g. by 
imposing an anti-strike measure which would allow individual employees to continue 
working despite the calls for strikes from their unions (EIRO 2003e, 2005b). This pattern 
of offensive and counter-offensive continued until the CGIL-FIOM finally returned to its 
sectoral bargaining in 2005. 
How can we explain this increased toughness on the side of the CGIL in the 
2000s? As proposed by this study, it was due to the re-emerging rivalry between the CGIL 
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and CISL. Despite the success of the “unity of action” approach throughout the 1990s, 
their commitment to collaboration weakened in the late 1990s. This was partly because 
the sense of economic crisis in the early 1990s was softening as the Italian economy 
satisfied the EMU criteria (Hancke and Rhodes 2005), and also partly because the 
memory of the political shocks faded away. In 1998, the CSIL began to visibly distance 
itself from the unification project (EIRO 1998c). The CGIL followed by declaring the 
failure of the project all but officially. The CGIL then resumed its rhetorical emphasis on 
union activity as “workers’ movement,” as opposed to CISL’s vision of “workers’ 
association” (EIRO 1999b). 
It is not difficult to understand that all these developments provided radical 
members of the CGIL with a golden opportunity for re-vitalization. Given the persistence 
of sluggish economy (Ferrera and Gualmini 2000), they did not attempt total reverse of 
the established trend of wage concertation. Determined to establish the CGIL as a main 
political opponent of Berlusconi’s new government (EIRO 2003d), however, the radical 
members pressed their organization to take a tougher stance at the negotiation table. 
Fearing the possibility of internal rupture, moderate members in the CGIL had no choice 
but to be attentive to these voices. In 2002, for instance, the radical members, backed by 
strong support from the CGIL-FIOM, pushed hard for a national referendum to oppose a 
national pact in that year which introduced a series of new measures for labor market 
flexibility. The leaderships of the CGIL were initially opposed to the move, but they 
ended up providing organizational support for it (EIRO 2003a, 2003c). 
 
4.5. Summary 
This study began from a context in which nationwide wage coordination was 
called for to deal with a serious economic crisis. Building on the previous finding that the 
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political exchange between unions and the government was the key mechanism for such 
change, I explored why the deal making has taken different forms across countries. 
Focusing on the experiences of developed European countries, I provided and tested a 
causal hypothesis that was centered on inter-union rivalry, in an explicit comparison with 
the previous hypothesis of electoral politics. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy provided 





Throughout this study, I discussed various issues regarding the recent changes in 
the European industrial relations. I focused on the wage-setting process of the developed 
European countries, especially in the context where the national economy was performing 
poorly mainly due to the failure of wage cost control, but the government was not able to 
provide compensatory macroeconomic policies due to the policy constraints from an 
integrated Europe. This was where the pressure for tight cost control was the strongest 
and, not coincidentally, many recent works in the European industrial relations motivated 
their research. I also attempted to extend some of my hypotheses to the context of a 
developing democracy which shared a similar economic challenge with the European 
countries. 
I began by noting the unexpected resilience of coordinated wage-setting in 
developed European countries. I then asked the following important but neglected 
questions. I first asked why employers in such an urgent economic situation did not 
choose the option of de-coordination in order to take a tight control of wage costs. I found 
that employers indeed attempted de-coordination, but they soon withdrew from their 
efforts. This was because the cost of the institutional change was too high at least in the 
short run, given that unions became increasingly militant during the transition period but 
the government was not able to provide generous macroeconomic measures to 
compensate for the rising militancy. 
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Second, I asked why then the wage-setting process was more coordinated in some 
countries but not in others. To provide an answer, I began with recent studies which 
argued that the wage-setting process would be more coordinated at a time of economic 
emergency, if unions and employers are organized at least moderately. However, I showed 
that these economic and organizational conditions alone were not yet enough to produce 
the expected outcome, unless the government was also interested in the coordinative 
solution. My argument was that the change to further coordination depended on the 
success of tripartite political exchange, in which the unions’ commitment to tight cost 
control would be rewarded for by various measures for job creation and moderate reforms 
on welfare and the labor market. Such a deal, however, could not be made unless the 
government was seriously committed to playing an active supporting role. That said, I 
showed that the government’s commitment was a function of the patterns of the party-
voter linkage. 
My final question focused on the country cases in which the wage-setting process 
was more coordinated. Noting that there were various paths to this change, which ranged 
from voluntary negotiation to unilateral government intervention, I asked what led to this 
diversity in the adjustment processes. Previous few studies tackled the question by 
highlighting the government’s electoral concerns, but I provided an alternative answer by 
focusing on the rivalry within the labor movement. I showed that the degree of inter-
union rivalry had a systematic effect on the different paths to coordination, by making the 
negotiation process exogenously easier or more difficult. This effect was true even after 
considering the effect of the government’s electoral power. 
Overall, my study provides a broad implication for the literature of European 
political economy. More specifically, it adds a critical look at an influential approach, 
called the “Varieties of Capitalism” approach, to the study of European political 
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economies (Hall and Soskice, eds. 2001). In this approach, the institutions of economic 
governance are considered as a product of strategic interactions among economic actors, 
especially led by employers who try to react to the challenges of structural economic 
changes, such as globalization, production regime shifts, and post-industrialization. But 
they do so under tight constraints from the previous institutional forms of economic 
governance, which then provide them with a strong set of institutionalized payoffs. 
One of the main criticisms to this approach has been that it neglects the role of 
other relevant actors, such as unions and the government, who also play important roles in 
the formations and changes of economic institutions. Relatedly, the approach also does 
not fully explore the process of the institutional dynamics, in which various non-
economic variables and considerations come into play in addition to economic pressures 
(Amable 2003; Hanke, Rhodes, and Thatcher eds. 2007; Howell 2003; Streeck and 
Yamamura eds. 2001). 
The approach also has a static view on the institutional dynamics, as implied by its 
understanding that once a certain institution is established, there will be only a bounded 
process of innovations, constrained by the previous institutionalized payoffs. This, 
however, is too a strong view of path-dependence (Crouch 2001). Instead, there will be 
various sources of profound institutional changes, which may be originated from the 
structural economic changes (Yamamura and Streeck eds. 2003) and other changes in 
politics and society (such as the changes in sociopolitical coalitions and political 
institutions (Jackson and Deeg 2006; Streeck and Thelen eds. 2005)). 
My study follows the lead of these criticisms. Focusing on the industrial relations 
of developed European countries, I highlight the role of political and social organizational 
variables in the adjustment process. More specifically, I show that the process has gone 
beyond previous institutional arrangements, and explain how it has been influenced by 
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the organizational/political interests of the major unions and also by the dominant 
electoral strategies of political parties. 
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Table 1: The Trends Of Capital Openness In Sample European Countries 
  Quinn's Index of Capital Opennessa) 
Countries 
  1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
      
Austria  2.2 2.6 3.1 3.5 
Belgium  3.0 3.0 3.0 3.9 
Denmark  3.0 3.0 3.2 4.0 
Finland  0.7 1.9 2.2 3.8 
France  2.8 3.0 2.9 3.6 
Germany  4.0 3.9 4.0 4.0 
Ireland  2.0 2.5 3.0 3.7 
Italy   2.9 3.0 3.2 3.9 
The Netherlands  3.0 3.0 3.7 4.0 
Sweden  2.5 2.4 3.0 3.5 
The UK  1.8 2.4 4.0 4.0 
            




































Table 2: The Boolean Truth Table For The Main Conditional Hypothesis 
Independent Variables  Dependent Variable Country 
Group Countries Periods High Capital 
Openness 









Denmark 1970 - 1981 1 1  1  1 
Ireland 1970 - 1981 1 1  1  1 
Italy 1970 - 1984 1 1  1  1 
A 
The UK 1970 - 1980 1 1  1  1 
B France 1970 - 1985 1 1  0  0 
 Belgium 1980 - 1999 1 0  1  0 
 Finland 1986 - 1995 1 0  1  0 
 France 1986 - 1999 1 0  1  0 
C Ireland 1986 - 1995 1 0  1  0 
 Italy 1990 - 1999 1 0  1  0 
 The Netherlands 1970 - 1981 1 0  1  0 
 The UK 1986 - 1995 1 0  1  N/A 
 Austria 1970 - 1999 1 0  0  N/A 
 Denmark 1986 - 1999 1 0  0  0 
D Germany 1970 - 1999 1 0  0  0 
 The Netherlands 1982 - 1999 1 0  0  0 
 Sweden 1986 - 1999 1 0  0  0 
E The UK The 1960s 0 1  1  0 
Austria Until the 1960s 0 1  0  0 
F 
Finland Until the early 1980s 0 1  0  0 
G N/A N/A 0 0  1  N/A 








































The Boolean Truth Table 
Country 
Group Countries Periods 




















                     
1 Sweden 1986 - 1999  2.6 2.5  1.7 1  59.7 73.7  24.6 21.5  1 1 0 0 0 
Austria 1970 - 1999  1.9 1.0  2 2  66.3 77.5  10.0 12.3  1 0 0 1 N/A 
France 1986 - 1999  -1.5 -2.2  2 2  42.4 45.3  12.9 13.8  1 0 0 1 0 
The 
Netherlands 1970 - 1981  -0.9 -1.3  1 1  92.1 98.2  5.6 6.2  1 0 0 1 0 
2 
Germany 1970 - 1999  0.1 -1.7  1 1  47.3 52.8  7.9 8.3  1 0 0 1 0 
The UK 1986 - 1995  -1.4 -1.8  0 0  51.2 51.7  13.4 10.9  1 0 0 0 N/A 
3 
Finland 1986 - 1995  1.5 0.9  1 1  49.6 57.4  13.9 13.6  1 0 0 0 0 
4 Ireland 1970 - 1981  -0.5 -0.4  2 1.8  80.4 104  6.3 7.3  0 1 0 1 1 
Denmark 1970 - 1981  0.7 2.2  2 2  57.8 62.3  13.9 18.6  0 0 0 1 1 
Italy 1970 - 1984  -0.9 -0.8  1 1  37.8 45.8  6.4 7.6  0 0 0 1 1 
The UK 1970 - 1980  -0.5 1.0  0 0  47.6 55.7  12.5 14.0  0 0 0 1 1 
France 1970 - 1985  -2.6 -1.0  2 2  35.4 43.8  10.8 11.8  0 0 0 1 0 
5 
Belgium 1980 - 1999  -0.3 0.7  2 2  133 137  9.3 9.6  0 0 0 1 0 
Italy 1990 - 1999  -1.0 -0.5  1 1  40.0 48.8  8.4 8.2  0 0 0 0 0 
Ireland 1986 - 1995  -0.8 -0.4  1.8 2  108 124  7.1 6.8  0 0 0 0 0 
Denmark 1986 - 1999  0.3 2.2  2 2  65.3 67.3  21.4 21.4  0 0 0 0 0 
6 
The 
Netherlands 1982 - 1999  -2.0 -0.9  1 1  107 107  6.2 6.0  0 0 0 0 0 
                     





























  Countries Periods 












              
Without the Monetary Commitment            
 Denmark 1970-1981  5 3  -2.3 (-1.0)  4.8 (4.3)  -1.8 (0.5)  25.2 (38.1) 
 Ireland 1970-1981  4 1  -4.0 (-1.0)  7.4 (4.3)  0.7 (0.5)  71.3 (38.1) 
 Italy  1970-1984  2,4,5 2  -6.0 (-1.5)  6.5 (5.1)  1.1 (-0.2)  132.3 (36) 
 The UK 1970-1980  1,4,5 1  -5.4 (-1.1)  4.5 (4.1)  1.1 (0.7)  56.4 (39.4) 
 France 1970-1985  2 2  -2.1 (-1.3)  5.5 (5.3)  0.0 (-0.2)  15.5 (35.3) 
              
                        
With the Monetary Commitment            
 Italy  1990-1999  2 4  -0.9 (1.9)  10.5 (8.4)  -0.6 (-1.2)  15.7 (6.2) 
 Belgium1) 1980-1999  3 4,5  0.7 (1.0)  9.4 (8.0)  -0.5 (-1.0)  3.9 (13.8) 
 France 1986-1999  2 2  1.7 (1.9)  10.6 (8.2)  -1.5 (-0.7)  3.0 (8.0) 
 The Netherlands 1970-1981  3,4,5 3,4,5  1.9 (-1.0)  4.1 (4.3)  -0.6 (0.5)  3.6 (38.1) 
 Finland 1986-1995  3,4 3,4  -1.4 (0.6)  8.9 (8.2)  -1.5 (-0.7)  31.3 (9.7) 
 Ireland 1986-1995  1 4,5  1.9 (0.6)  15.2 (8.2)  -1.5 (-0.7)  17.2 (9.7) 
 The UK 1986-1995  1 1  -2.4 (0.6)  9.2 (8.2)  -0.8 (-0.7)  8.1 (9.7) 
 Denmark 1986-1999  3,5 3,5  1.0 (1.9)  7.3 (8.2)  -0.5 (-0.7)  4.8 (8.0) 
 Sweden 1986-1999  3,4 3  -1.0 (1.9)  5.8 (8.2)  -0.4 (-0.7)  7.0 (8.0) 
 Germany 1970-1999  4 4  3.0 (0.3)  5.3 (6.7)  -0.1 (-0.5)  3.1 (22.6) 
 Austria1) 1970-1999  5 4  2.9 (0.3)  2.9 (6.7)  -0.7 (-0.5)  0.6 (22.6) 
 The Netherlands 1982-1999  4 4  2.2 (1.1)  6.7 (8.3)  -1.0 (-1.0)  1.9 (11.8) 
                        
Sources: a) Kenworthy 2001; b) Huber et al. 2004; c) OECD Economic Outlook (several years), The OECD Online Data Base, 
http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Default.aspx. 
1) The wage increase data for Austria and Belgium does not cover the years before 1977, due to missing data. 
























Table 5: The Wage Cost Indicators For The Four Breakdown Countries 
 Wage Increases (%) a)  Workday Lossesb) 
Countries The Year of Change 
 
Periods 
Un-standardized Standardized  Un-standardized Standardized 
           
 1976-1980 -2.5 -0.9  9.3 -0.6 
Denmark 1981 
 1982-1986 -1.9 -0.4  24.8 0.1 
           
 1976-1980 -0.1 0.1  92.0 1.0 
Ireland 1981 
 1982-1986 -1.7 -0.3  44.8 0.5 
           
 1979-1983 0.1 0.6  120.8 2.1 
Italy 1984 
 1985-1989 -0.5 -0.3  30.0 1.2 
           
 1975-1979 0.0 0.0  50.9 0.3 
The UK 1980 
 1981-1985 -1.4 0.3  44.6 0.4 
Sources: a) OECD Economic Outlook (several years), The OECD Online Data Base, http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Default.aspx; 




































Table 6: The Performances Of Wage Cost Control, 2000-2005 
Countries   Economic Growth (%) a)  
Unemployment  
(%) a)  
Wage Increases  
(%) a), b)  Workday Losses 
c)
 
         
Belgium  2.0  7.7  -0.9  7.5 
Italy   1.2  8.7  0.2  7.9 
Finland   3.0  9.0  -1.0  8.1 
Austria  1.7  4.3  -1.5  5.8 
The Netherlands  1.7  3.5  -0.7  0.9 
Denmark  2.1  4.9  -0.3  3.4 
France  2.0  8.9  -1.0  3.2 
Germany  1.1  8.9  -2.8  0.3 
Sweden    2.5  5.8  -0.8  5.0 
The UK  3.4  5.0  0.9  2.3 
Ireland   6.0  4.4  -2.3  3.1 








Sources: a) OECD Economic Outlook (several years); b) the OECD Online Data Base, 


































Table 7: The Summary Trends Of Wage-Setting Coordination In Five European 
Countries 






Kenworthya) Nickell et al.b) 
         
Belgium   The early 1980s The early 2000s  Increase No Change 
Finland   The early 1990s The late 1990s  No Change Increase 
Ireland   The late 1980s The late 1990s  Increase Increase 
Italy    The late 1980s The early 2000s  Increase Increase 
The Netherlands   The early 1970s The early 1980s  No Change Increase 
              





































Table 8: The Trends f Government Electoral Bases In Five European Countries 
Characteristics of Electoral Base 
Stable Weak Election Years 













Name Seats (%)  
 
Name Seats (%)  
 Characteristics 
                
1950 1961 Christian Dem. (CVP/PSC) 47.5 73       
1965 1981          
The CVP/PSC (separated in 
1968) staying in power, but only 
with frequent changes of 
coalition partners among 
Liberals, Social Democrats, and 
Regionalists. 
1981 1995      CVP, PSC 29 100   
Belgium 
1999 2003          
Changes of government among 
various coalitional alternatives, 
excluding the CVP and PSC 
                
                
1966 1987      Social Dem. 27.2 100   Finland 
1991 1995          Changes of government among 
various coalitional alternatives 
                
                
1951 1977  Nationalists (FF) 49.9 76.7       Ireland 
1981 1997          Changes of government among 
various coalitional alternatives 
                
                
1953 1987  Christian Dem. (DC) 41.3 100       
Italy 
1992 2006          
Changes of government between 
center-right and center-left 
coalitions, along with short-lived 
technocratic governments in the 
early 1990s 
                
                





53.3 100       
The 
Netherlands 
1967 1982          
The three previously-dominant 
parties (merged into CDA in 
1977) staying in power, but only 
with frequent changes of 
coalition partners among Liberals 
and Social Democrats. 
                          














Table 9: The Modality Of Political Exchange And Its Determinants In Five 
European Countries 








The Degree of 
Inter-union 
Rivalry 
            
   
Unilateral governmental 
direction 1981-1997  
From weak to 
stable  High Belgium 
  
The early 1980s 
– the early 2000s 
 
Government-pushed 
negotiation 1998-2005  
From stable to 
weak  Moderate 
            
Finland   The 1990s  Voluntary negotiation 1991-1999  Weak  Low 
            
Ireland   The late 1980s – the late 1990s  Voluntary negotiation 1987-1999  Weak  Low 
            
   Voluntary negotiation 1992-1998  Weak  Low 
Italy  
  
The late 1980s – 
the early 2000s 
 
Government-pushed 
negotiation 1999-2005  Weak  Moderate 
            
   
Unilateral governmental 
direction 1980-1982  Weak  High The 
Netherlands 
  
The early 1970s 
– the early 1980s 
 
Government-pushed 
negotiation 1982  Weak  Moderate 
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